Analysis of the 'Going Dark' Debate and End-to-End Encryption Restrictions

A new paper titled 'Encryption and Globalization 15 Years Later: End-to-End Encryption and the Third Round of the ‘Going Dark’ Debate' analyzes the current phase of the 'Going Dark' debate, focusing on government proposals to restrict end-to-end encryption (E2EE) for law enforcement and national security. The paper outlines three historical rounds: Round 1 (1990s Crypto Wars, ending in 1999 with relaxed U.S. export controls), Round 2 (2010–2015, when encryption-in-transit became common but cloud providers retained access), and Round 3 (present, involving E2EE where no intermediary can access plaintext). It identifies five technically distinct E2EE scenarios with varying implications for lawful access, challenging the assumption that E2EE universally blocks surveillance. The paper also highlights E2EE’s integration across technologies like TLS, SSH, VPNs, and Zero Trust Architecture, noting that U.S. and EU laws now mandate the latter. It concludes that past lessons—such as the 'least trusted country problem' and the 'golden age of surveillance'—remain relevant, urging skepticism toward new encryption restrictions.