CVE-2021-26505
CVE-2021-26505
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
Prototype pollution vulnerability in MrSwitch hello.js version 1.18.6, allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code via hello.utils.extend function.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2021-26505 (Prototype Pollution in hello.js)
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
CVE ID: CVE-2021-26505
CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Vulnerability Type: Prototype Pollution (CWE-1321)
Affected Component: hello.utils.extend() function in hello.js (v1.18.6)
Severity Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Exploitable remotely over a network.
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity; no special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR:N): No privileges needed.
- User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required.
- Scope (S:U): Unchanged (impact confined to vulnerable component).
- Confidentiality (C:H), Integrity (I:H), Availability (A:H): High impact across all three security objectives.
Rationale for Critical Severity: Prototype pollution is a high-impact vulnerability that can lead to arbitrary code execution (ACE), remote code execution (RCE), or denial-of-service (DoS) conditions. The fact that this vulnerability is remotely exploitable without authentication or user interaction significantly increases its risk profile.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Prototype Pollution Primer
JavaScript’s prototype inheritance model allows objects to inherit properties from their prototype (Object.prototype). Prototype pollution occurs when an attacker manipulates an object’s prototype, injecting malicious properties that propagate to all objects inheriting from it.
Exploitation Mechanism in hello.js
The vulnerability resides in the hello.utils.extend() function, which performs a deep merge of objects without proper input sanitization. An attacker can craft a malicious payload to pollute Object.prototype, leading to:
-
Arbitrary Property Injection
- By supplying a crafted object (e.g.,
{ "__proto__": { "maliciousProp": "value" } }), an attacker can modifyObject.prototype. - Example payload:
hello.utils.extend({}, JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}')); - After pollution, any new object will inherit
isAdmin: true, potentially bypassing authentication.
- By supplying a crafted object (e.g.,
-
Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- If the application uses user-controlled properties in sensitive operations (e.g.,
eval(),Function(), or dynamic property access), an attacker can inject executable code. - Example:
hello.utils.extend({}, JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"exec": "require(\'child_process\').exec(\'rm -rf /\')"}}')); - If the application later calls
someObject.exec, it may execute arbitrary system commands.
- If the application uses user-controlled properties in sensitive operations (e.g.,
-
Denial-of-Service (DoS)
- Polluting
Object.prototypewith non-configurable properties (e.g.,toString,valueOf) can break JavaScript runtime behavior, leading to crashes.
- Polluting
Attack Scenarios
- Web Application Exploitation:
- If
hello.jsis used in a web app (e.g., OAuth/Social Login), an attacker could submit a malicious JSON payload via an API request, leading to prototype pollution.
- If
- Supply Chain Attacks:
- If
hello.jsis a dependency in a larger project, exploitation could propagate through the dependency chain.
- If
- Server-Side JavaScript (Node.js):
- If
hello.jsruns in a Node.js environment, RCE is possible viachild_processorvmmodule manipulation.
- If
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
- Affected Software: hello.js (JavaScript library for OAuth/Social Login)
- Vulnerable Version: 1.18.6
- Patched Version: Not explicitly documented (check GitHub Issue #634 for updates)
- Dependencies at Risk:
- Any application using
hello.js@1.18.6as a direct or transitive dependency. - Node.js applications are at higher risk due to RCE potential.
- Any application using
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
-
Upgrade or Patch:
- Check for updates in the hello.js GitHub repository.
- If no patch is available, consider forking and fixing the
extend()function.
-
Input Validation & Sanitization:
- Modify
hello.utils.extend()to block__proto__andconstructorproperties during object merging. - Example fix:
function safeExtend(target, source) { if (source && typeof source === 'object') { for (const key in source) { if (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor') continue; if (source[key] && typeof source[key] === 'object') { target[key] = safeExtend(target[key] || {}, source[key]); } else { target[key] = source[key]; } } } return target; }
- Modify
-
Use Secure Alternatives:
- Replace
hello.utils.extend()with lodash’s_.merge()(if properly configured) or structuredClone() (Node.js 17+).
- Replace
-
Defensive Programming:
- Freeze
Object.prototypeto prevent pollution:Object.freeze(Object.prototype); - Use
Object.create(null)for objects that should not inherit fromObject.prototype.
- Freeze
-
Network-Level Protections:
- Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules: Block requests containing
__proto__orconstructorin JSON payloads. - Content Security Policy (CSP): Restrict inline scripts and
eval()usage.
- Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules: Block requests containing
Long-Term Strategies
- Dependency Scanning:
- Use tools like npm audit, Snyk, or Dependabot to detect vulnerable dependencies.
- Static & Dynamic Analysis:
- SAST Tools (e.g., Semgrep, SonarQube): Detect prototype pollution patterns.
- DAST Tools (e.g., OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite): Test for prototype pollution in runtime.
- Secure Coding Training:
- Educate developers on JavaScript security risks, including prototype pollution and deserialization attacks.
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications
- Supply Chain Risks:
hello.jsis a third-party library used in web applications for OAuth/Social Login. A single vulnerability can affect thousands of downstream projects.
- Increased Attack Surface:
- Prototype pollution is underreported but highly exploitable. This CVE highlights the need for better JavaScript security practices.
- Exploitation in the Wild:
- While no active exploits for CVE-2021-26505 have been publicly documented (as of analysis), similar prototype pollution vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2019-10744 in lodash) have been weaponized in real-world attacks.
- Regulatory & Compliance Impact:
- Organizations using
hello.jsmay face compliance violations (e.g., GDPR, HIPAA) if exploitation leads to data breaches.
- Organizations using
Comparison with Similar CVEs
| CVE | Vulnerability | CVSS | Exploitation Impact |
|---|---|---|---|
| CVE-2021-26505 | Prototype Pollution | 9.8 | RCE, ACE, DoS |
| CVE-2019-10744 | Prototype Pollution | 9.8 | RCE, ACE |
| CVE-2020-28500 | Prototype Pollution | 7.5 | DoS, ACE |
| CVE-2021-23337 | Prototype Pollution | 9.8 | RCE |
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
The vulnerability stems from unsafe object merging in hello.utils.extend(). The function recursively copies properties from a source object to a target object without checking for __proto__ or constructor properties, allowing prototype pollution.
Vulnerable Code Snippet (Simplified):
hello.utils.extend = function(target, source) {
for (var key in source) {
if (source[key] && typeof source[key] === 'object') {
target[key] = hello.utils.extend(target[key] || {}, source[key]);
} else {
target[key] = source[key];
}
}
return target;
};
Issue:
- No validation for
key === "__proto__"orkey === "constructor". - Allows modification of
Object.prototype.
Exploitation Proof of Concept (PoC)
Scenario: Pollute Object.prototype to add a malicious property.
// Malicious payload
const maliciousPayload = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
// Trigger prototype pollution
hello.utils.extend({}, maliciousPayload);
// Verify pollution
console.log({}.isAdmin); // Output: true (all new objects inherit this property)
RCE Exploitation (Node.js):
const maliciousPayload = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"exec": "require(\'child_process\').exec(\'calc\')"}}');
hello.utils.extend({}, maliciousPayload);
// If the app later calls `someObject.exec`, it executes arbitrary code
const obj = {};
obj.exec(); // Launches calculator (or any command)
Detection & Forensics
- Static Analysis:
- Search for
extend()ormerge()functions in JavaScript code. - Check for lack of
__proto__filtering.
- Search for
- Dynamic Analysis:
- Use Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to fuzz JSON inputs with
__proto__payloads. - Monitor for unexpected property inheritance in browser/Node.js consoles.
- Use Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to fuzz JSON inputs with
- Log Analysis:
- Look for unusual JSON payloads containing
__proto__orconstructor. - Check for unexpected object property access in application logs.
- Look for unusual JSON payloads containing
Hardening Recommendations
- JavaScript Runtime Protections:
- Use SES (Secure ECMAScript) or Realms to isolate untrusted code.
- Enable Node.js
--disable-protoflag (if available).
- Code-Level Fixes:
- Replace
for...inloops withObject.keys()to avoid prototype properties. - Use structuredClone() (Node.js 17+) for safe object copying.
- Replace
- Monitoring & Response:
- Deploy runtime application self-protection (RASP) to detect prototype pollution.
- Set up SIEM alerts for suspicious JavaScript execution patterns.
Conclusion
CVE-2021-26505 is a critical prototype pollution vulnerability in hello.js that enables remote code execution, arbitrary property injection, and denial-of-service attacks. Given its CVSS 9.8 score, organizations using hello.js@1.18.6 should immediately apply patches, implement input sanitization, and monitor for exploitation attempts.
Security teams should audit all JavaScript dependencies for similar vulnerabilities and adopt secure coding practices to mitigate prototype pollution risks. The broader impact of this CVE underscores the need for enhanced supply chain security in the JavaScript ecosystem.
References: