CVE-2023-0854
CVE-2023-0854
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
Buffer overflow in NetBIOS QNAME registering and communication process of Office / Small Office Multifunction Printers and Laser Printers(*) which may allow an attacker on the network segment to trigger the affected product being unresponsive or to execute arbitrary code. *:Satera LBP660C Series/LBP620C Series/MF740C Series/MF640C Series firmware Ver.11.04 and earlier sold in Japan. Color imageCLASS LBP660C Series/LBP 620C Series/X LBP1127C/MF740C Series/MF640C Series/X MF1127C firmware Ver.11.04 and earlier sold in US. i-SENSYS LBP660C Series/LBP620C Series/MF740C Series/MF640C Series, C1127P, C1127iF, C1127i firmware Ver.11.04 and earlier sold in Europe.
CVE-2023-0854: Professional Cybersecurity Analysis
Executive Summary
CVE-2023-0854 represents a critical buffer overflow vulnerability in Canon multifunction printers and laser printers affecting NetBIOS QNAME processing. With a CVSS score of 9.8, this vulnerability poses severe risks including remote code execution (RCE) and denial of service (DoS) capabilities for network-adjacent attackers.
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Severity Classification
- CVSS v3.x Score: 9.8 (CRITICAL)
- Attack Vector: Network-adjacent (AV:A)
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
- User Interaction: None (UI:N)
- Impact: Complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability
Technical Assessment
The vulnerability exists in the NetBIOS Name Service (NBNS) implementation, specifically during:
- QNAME registration processes - When devices register their NetBIOS names on the network
- NetBIOS communication handling - During ongoing network communications using the NetBIOS protocol
The buffer overflow condition allows memory corruption, potentially enabling:
- Arbitrary code execution with device-level privileges
- Denial of service rendering the device unresponsive
- Potential lateral movement within the network segment
Risk Factors
- No authentication required - Attackers need only network segment access
- Legacy protocol exploitation - NetBIOS is a well-understood attack surface
- Embedded system target - Limited security controls on printer firmware
- Persistent access potential - Compromised firmware may survive reboots
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Prerequisites
- Network Position: Attacker must be on the same network segment (Layer 2 adjacency)
- Protocol Access: Ability to send crafted NetBIOS packets (UDP port 137/138, TCP port 139)
- No Credentials: No authentication required
Exploitation Methodology
Phase 1: Reconnaissance
- Network scanning for vulnerable Canon printers
- Firmware version identification via SNMP or web interface
- NetBIOS name enumeration (nbtscan, nmap NSE scripts)
Phase 2: Exploitation
Attack Flow:
1. Craft malicious NetBIOS QNAME packet with oversized data
2. Target QNAME registration or query response handlers
3. Trigger buffer overflow in firmware's NetBIOS stack
4. Overwrite return addresses or function pointers
5. Execute shellcode or trigger DoS condition
Technical Exploitation Details
- Buffer Type: Likely stack-based or heap-based overflow in QNAME parsing
- Trigger Mechanism: Malformed NetBIOS Name Service packets with excessive length fields
- Payload Delivery: Embedded in QNAME labels (typically limited to 255 bytes, but improper validation allows overflow)
Attack Scenarios
Scenario 1: Denial of Service
- Send malformed QNAME packets causing device crash
- Repeated exploitation for sustained DoS
- Impact: Business disruption, printing services unavailable
Scenario 2: Remote Code Execution
- Craft exploit with shellcode payload
- Gain control of printer's embedded Linux/RTOS
- Establish persistence through firmware modification
- Potential actions:
- Document interception and exfiltration
- Network reconnaissance and pivoting
- Deployment of additional malware
- Man-in-the-middle attacks on print jobs
Scenario 3: Supply Chain/Persistence Attack
- Compromise printer firmware
- Use as persistent foothold in network
- Evade traditional endpoint security solutions
- Maintain access even after network security improvements
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Affected Product Lines
Japan Market (Satera Series)
- LBP660C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- LBP620C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- MF740C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- MF640C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
United States Market
- Color imageCLASS LBP660C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- Color imageCLASS LBP620C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- Color imageCLASS X LBP1127C - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- Color imageCLASS MF740C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- Color imageCLASS MF640C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- Color imageCLASS X MF1127C - Firmware ≤ v11.04
European Market (i-SENSYS Series)
- i-SENSYS LBP660C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- i-SENSYS LBP620C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- i-SENSYS MF740C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- i-SENSYS MF640C Series - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- i-SENSYS C1127P - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- i-SENSYS C1127iF - Firmware ≤ v11.04
- i-SENSYS C1127i - Firmware ≤ v11.04
Vulnerability Scope
- Device Category: Office and small office multifunction printers (MFPs) and laser printers
- Global Impact: Worldwide deployment across enterprise and SMB environments
- Installed Base: Potentially thousands to tens of thousands of devices
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Priority 1)
1. Firmware Updates
Action: Apply Canon's security patches immediately
- Target Version: Firmware > v11.04
- Distribution: Available through Canon support portals
- Deployment: Use centralized management tools where available
Implementation Steps:
1. Inventory all Canon printers in environment
2. Identify firmware versions via SNMP or web interface
3. Download appropriate firmware from Canon support
4. Schedule maintenance windows for updates
5. Verify successful update and functionality
6. Document patching status
2. Network Segmentation
Action: Isolate printers on dedicated VLAN
Network Architecture:
- Create dedicated printer VLAN
- Implement strict ACLs between printer and user VLANs
- Allow only necessary protocols (IPP, HTTPS, SNMP)
- Block NetBIOS/SMB from untrusted segments
3. Protocol Restrictions
Action: Disable NetBIOS if not operationally required
Configuration Steps:
1. Access printer web interface
2. Navigate to Network Settings
3. Disable NetBIOS over TCP/IP
4. Disable SMBv1 if possible
5. Enable only required protocols
Short-term Mitigations (Priority 2)
4. Access Control Lists (ACLs)
Firewall Rules:
- DENY UDP 137 (NetBIOS Name Service) from untrusted networks
- DENY UDP 138 (NetBIOS Datagram Service) from untrusted networks
- DENY TCP 139 (NetBIOS Session Service) from untrusted networks
- ALLOW only from trusted management subnets
5. Network Monitoring
Deploy detection mechanisms:
IDS/IPS Signatures:
- Monitor for malformed NetBIOS packets
- Alert on unusual QNAME lengths
- Detect buffer overflow attempts
- Track printer communication anomalies
SIEM Correlation:
- Printer reboot events
- Failed NetBIOS registrations
- Unusual network traffic patterns
- Authentication anomalies
6. Physical Security
- Restrict physical access to printer control panels
- Disable USB ports if not required
- Implement PIN-based administrative access