CVE-2023-30604
CVE-2023-30604
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
It is identified a vulnerability of insufficient authentication in the system configuration interface of Hitron Technologies CODA-5310. An unauthorized remote attacker can exploit this vulnerability to access system configuration interface, resulting in performing arbitrary system operation or disrupt service.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2023-30604
CVE ID: CVE-2023-30604 CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Type: Insufficient Authentication (CWE-287) Affected Product: Hitron Technologies CODA-5310 Cable Modem/Router
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
CVE-2023-30604 describes an authentication bypass vulnerability in the system configuration interface of the Hitron CODA-5310 cable modem/router. An unauthenticated remote attacker can exploit this flaw to gain unauthorized access to the device’s administrative interface, enabling arbitrary system operations, configuration changes, or service disruption.
Severity Justification (CVSS 9.8 - Critical)
The CVSS v3.1 scoring breakdown is as follows:
| Metric | Value | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable remotely over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None | No authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No user interaction required. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged | Impact confined to the vulnerable device. |
| Confidentiality (C) | High | Full access to sensitive configuration data. |
| Integrity (I) | High | Arbitrary system modifications possible. |
| Availability (A) | High | Service disruption via configuration changes or DoS. |
Key Takeaways:
- Critical severity due to remote, unauthenticated access with high impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
- Exploitation does not require advanced skills, increasing the likelihood of widespread attacks.
- The vulnerability is highly attractive to threat actors (e.g., botnets, APTs, script kiddies) due to its low barrier to entry.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Vectors
-
Remote Exploitation (Primary Vector)
- The vulnerability is remotely exploitable if the administrative interface is exposed to the internet (e.g., via WAN-side management or misconfigured port forwarding).
- Attackers can send crafted HTTP/HTTPS requests to the device’s web interface to bypass authentication.
-
Local Network Exploitation (Secondary Vector)
- If the device is only accessible via the local network (LAN), an attacker with network access (e.g., via compromised IoT devices, phishing, or insider threats) can exploit the flaw.
Exploitation Methods
Step-by-Step Exploitation (Hypothetical)
-
Reconnaissance
- Attacker identifies the CODA-5310 via:
- Shodan/Censys queries (e.g.,
http.title:"Hitron Technologies"). - Default credentials scanning (though this vulnerability does not require credentials).
- Port scanning (common ports:
80/HTTP,443/HTTPS,8080).
- Shodan/Censys queries (e.g.,
- Attacker identifies the CODA-5310 via:
-
Authentication Bypass
- The vulnerability likely stems from:
- Missing or flawed session validation (e.g., predictable session tokens, lack of CSRF protection).
- Hardcoded or default credentials (though the CVE suggests a true authentication bypass).
- Improper access control checks (e.g., missing
isAdmin()validation in API endpoints).
- Example Exploit Request:
GET /cgi-bin/admin.cgi?action=config&cmd=set&key=admin_password&value=hacked123 HTTP/1.1 Host: <TARGET_IP> User-Agent: Mozilla/5.0- If the device fails to validate the session, this request may modify the admin password without authentication.
- The vulnerability likely stems from:
-
Post-Exploitation Actions
- Privilege Escalation: Gain full administrative control.
- Persistence: Modify firmware, install backdoors, or disable security features.
- Lateral Movement: Use the compromised device as a pivot point for further attacks (e.g., ARP spoofing, DNS hijacking).
- Service Disruption: Reboot the device, change DNS settings to malicious servers, or disable internet access.
-
Weaponization
- Botnet Recruitment: Add the device to a Mirai-like botnet for DDoS attacks.
- Data Exfiltration: Steal sensitive configurations (e.g., Wi-Fi passwords, ISP credentials).
- Ransomware: Encrypt device settings and demand payment for restoration.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Confirmed Affected Product
- Hitron CODA-5310 (Cable Modem/Router)
- Firmware Version: All versions prior to the patched release (exact version not specified in CVE).
- Hardware Revision: Likely all revisions, as the vulnerability is in the web interface logic.
Potential Impact Scope
- ISP-Deployed Devices: Many ISPs (e.g., Rogers, Shaw, Videotron) distribute the CODA-5310 to customers, increasing the attack surface.
- Enterprise/SoHo Use: Businesses using the device for small office/home office (SoHo) setups are at risk.
- Geographic Concentration: Higher risk in regions where Hitron devices are widely deployed (e.g., North America, parts of Europe).
Verification Methods
- Fingerprinting:
- Check HTTP response headers for
Server: Hitron Technologies. - Look for default login pages (
/login.cgi,/admin.cgi).
- Check HTTP response headers for
- Exploitation Testing:
- Attempt to access restricted endpoints (e.g.,
/cgi-bin/admin.cgi) without authentication. - Use Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to intercept and modify requests.
- Attempt to access restricted endpoints (e.g.,
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (For End Users & ISPs)
| Mitigation | Details | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|
| Disable Remote Management | Restrict admin access to LAN-only via device settings. | High (prevents WAN-side attacks) |
| Change Default Credentials | Replace default admin passwords with strong, unique credentials. | Medium (does not fix the auth bypass) |
| Apply Firmware Updates | Install the latest firmware from Hitron’s official support page. | High (if patch is available) |
| Network Segmentation | Isolate the modem/router in a DMZ or separate VLAN to limit lateral movement. | Medium |
| Firewall Rules | Block inbound traffic to ports 80, 443, 8080 from the WAN. | High |
| Disable Unused Services | Turn off UPnP, Telnet, SSH, and SNMP if not required. | Medium |
Long-Term Remediation (For Vendors & ISPs)
-
Patch Development & Deployment
- Vendor (Hitron Technologies):
- Release a firmware update fixing the authentication bypass.
- Implement proper session validation (e.g., CSRF tokens, secure cookies).
- Add rate-limiting to prevent brute-force attacks.
- ISPs:
- Push automatic updates to customer devices.
- Notify users of the vulnerability and mitigation steps.
- Vendor (Hitron Technologies):
-
Secure Development Practices
- Code Audits: Conduct static (SAST) and dynamic (DAST) analysis to identify similar flaws.
- Penetration Testing: Engage third-party security firms to test for authentication bypasses, CSRF, and XSS.
- Hardening: Disable debug interfaces, enforce HTTPS-only access, and implement HSTS.
-
Monitoring & Detection
- IDS/IPS Rules: Deploy Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts.
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"CVE-2023-30604 - Hitron CODA-5310 Auth Bypass Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"/cgi-bin/admin.cgi"; nocase; content:"action=config"; nocase; reference:cve,CVE-2023-30604; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;) - Log Analysis: Monitor for unusual admin login attempts or configuration changes.
- IDS/IPS Rules: Deploy Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts.
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Threat Actor Motivations
| Threat Actor | Likely Exploitation Goals |
|---|---|
| Botnet Operators | Recruit devices for DDoS attacks (e.g., Mirai, Mozi). |
| APT Groups | Use compromised modems for espionage, lateral movement, or supply chain attacks. |
| Ransomware Gangs | Encrypt device settings and demand payment. |
| Script Kiddies | Deface admin panels or disrupt services for notoriety. |
| Cybercriminals | Steal ISP credentials, Wi-Fi passwords, or PII for resale. |
Broader Implications
-
Supply Chain Risks
- ISPs distributing vulnerable devices increase the attack surface for millions of users.
- Third-party firmware (e.g., custom ISP builds) may introduce additional vulnerabilities.
-
IoT & Critical Infrastructure Threats
- Compromised modems can be used to disrupt home/business internet access.
- Industrial control systems (ICS) relying on similar hardware may face cascading failures.
-
Regulatory & Compliance Risks
- GDPR, CCPA, NIS2: Organizations failing to patch may face fines for negligence.
- FCC/CRTC Regulations: ISPs may be required to notify customers of vulnerabilities.
-
Economic Impact
- Downtime costs for businesses relying on internet connectivity.
- Reputation damage for Hitron and ISPs if mass exploitation occurs.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis (Hypothetical)
Based on similar vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2021-20090 in Arcadyan routers), the flaw likely stems from:
-
Improper Session Validation
- The device may trust client-side session tokens without server-side validation.
- Example: A request with
sessionid=12345is accepted even if the session is invalid.
-
Hardcoded or Predictable Credentials
- Some devices use static credentials (e.g.,
admin:admin) that are not properly checked. - Alternatively, backdoor accounts may exist in the firmware.
- Some devices use static credentials (e.g.,
-
Missing CSRF Protection
- The admin interface may not validate CSRF tokens, allowing unauthenticated requests to execute actions.
-
Insecure Direct Object References (IDOR)
- The API may not verify user permissions before processing requests (e.g.,
/api/set_config?user=admin).
- The API may not verify user permissions before processing requests (e.g.,
Exploitation Proof of Concept (PoC)
(Note: This is a hypothetical example for educational purposes.)
import requests
target = "http://<TARGET_IP>/cgi-bin/admin.cgi"
payload = {
"action": "config",
"cmd": "set",
"key": "admin_password",
"value": "pwned123"
}
response = requests.get(target, params=payload)
if "success" in response.text:
print("[+] Exploit successful! Admin password changed.")
else:
print("[-] Exploit failed.")
Detection & Forensics
-
Log Analysis
- Check for unauthenticated access to
/cgi-bin/admin.cgior/login.cgi. - Look for unusual configuration changes (e.g., DNS settings, port forwarding rules).
- Check for unauthenticated access to
-
Memory Forensics
- Use Volatility or Ghidra to analyze firmware for hardcoded credentials or backdoor functions.
-
Network Traffic Analysis
- Capture PCAPs of exploitation attempts using Wireshark/TShark:
tshark -i eth0 -f "tcp port 80 and host <TARGET_IP>" -w exploit_attempt.pcap
- Capture PCAPs of exploitation attempts using Wireshark/TShark:
Reverse Engineering the Firmware
-
Extract Firmware
- Download the latest firmware from Hitron’s website.
- Use binwalk to extract filesystem:
binwalk -e CODA-5310_firmware.bin
-
Analyze Web Interface
- Locate
/www/cgi-bin/admin.cgiand decompile using Ghidra or IDA Pro. - Search for authentication checks (e.g.,
check_auth(),isAdmin()).
- Locate
-
Identify Vulnerable Endpoints
- Look for unprotected API calls (e.g.,
/api/config,/api/reboot).
- Look for unprotected API calls (e.g.,
Conclusion & Recommendations
Key Takeaways
- CVE-2023-30604 is a critical authentication bypass with high exploitability and severe impact.
- Remote exploitation is possible if the admin interface is exposed to the internet.
- Immediate mitigation (disabling remote access, applying patches) is essential to prevent compromise.
Action Plan for Security Teams
- Identify & Patch all Hitron CODA-5310 devices in the environment.
- Monitor for exploitation attempts using IDS/IPS and log analysis.
- Educate users on the risks of exposed admin interfaces.
- Engage Hitron/ISP for official patches and guidance.
Future Research Directions
- Firmware analysis to identify additional vulnerabilities.
- Exploit development for red teaming and penetration testing.
- Threat intelligence to track real-world exploitation (e.g., via GreyNoise, Shodan).
References: