CVE-2023-3128
CVE-2023-3128
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- Low
Description
Grafana is validating Azure AD accounts based on the email claim. On Azure AD, the profile email field is not unique and can be easily modified. This leads to account takeover and authentication bypass when Azure AD OAuth is configured with a multi-tenant app.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2023-3128 (Grafana Azure AD OAuth Authentication Bypass)
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
CVE ID: CVE-2023-3128 CVSS Score: 9.4 (Critical) – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Vector Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Network-based exploitation (remote attack surface).
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low – No specialized conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR:N): None – Unauthenticated attackers can exploit.
- User Interaction (UI:N): None – No user action needed.
- Scope (S:U): Unchanged – Impact confined to the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality (C:H): High – Unauthorized access to sensitive data.
- Integrity (I:H): High – Attacker can impersonate legitimate users.
- Availability (A:H): High – Potential for service disruption via account takeover.
Severity Justification
This vulnerability is critical due to:
- Authentication Bypass: Attackers can impersonate legitimate users without credentials.
- Multi-Tenant Exploitation: Affects organizations using Azure AD OAuth in multi-tenant configurations.
- Low Exploitation Barrier: No prior authentication or user interaction is required.
- High Impact: Full account takeover leading to data exfiltration, privilege escalation, and lateral movement.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Root Cause
Grafana’s Azure AD OAuth integration incorrectly validates user identity by relying on the email claim from Azure AD tokens. Since:
- Azure AD does not enforce email uniqueness (multiple users can share the same email in different tenants).
- Users can modify their profile email in Azure AD (if allowed by tenant policies).
An attacker can:
- Register a malicious Azure AD tenant with a user whose email matches a target user in the victim’s tenant.
- Authenticate via OAuth to Grafana, which trusts the email claim without proper validation.
- Gain unauthorized access to the victim’s Grafana account.
Exploitation Steps
-
Reconnaissance:
- Identify a target organization using Grafana with Azure AD OAuth in a multi-tenant configuration.
- Enumerate valid user emails (via OSINT, phishing, or leaked data).
-
Malicious Tenant Setup:
- Create an Azure AD tenant (e.g.,
attacker-tenant.onmicrosoft.com). - Register a user with the same email as the target victim (e.g.,
admin@victim-org.com).
- Create an Azure AD tenant (e.g.,
-
OAuth Token Manipulation:
- Initiate an OAuth flow with Grafana, presenting the attacker’s Azure AD token.
- Grafana incorrectly trusts the email claim, granting access to the victim’s account.
-
Post-Exploitation:
- Data Exfiltration: Access dashboards, metrics, and sensitive configurations.
- Privilege Escalation: If the victim has admin rights, compromise the entire Grafana instance.
- Lateral Movement: Use Grafana as a pivot to other internal systems (e.g., databases, cloud services).
Attack Variations
- Same-Email Collision: If multiple users in different tenants share the same email, any of them can impersonate the other.
- Email Spoofing: If Azure AD allows email modification, an attacker can change their email to match a target.
- Session Hijacking: If Grafana caches sessions based on email, an attacker can reuse stolen tokens.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Versions
- Grafana Enterprise: All versions prior to 9.5.3, 9.4.8, 9.3.14, 9.2.19, and 8.5.26.
- Grafana OSS: All versions prior to 9.5.3, 9.4.8, 9.3.14, 9.2.19, and 8.5.26.
Affected Configurations
- Azure AD OAuth Integration must be enabled.
- Multi-tenant app registration in Azure AD (where any Azure AD tenant can authenticate).
- Email-based user provisioning in Grafana (default behavior).
Unaffected Systems
- Grafana instances not using Azure AD OAuth.
- Single-tenant Azure AD configurations (where only the organization’s tenant is allowed).
- Grafana versions 9.5.3+, 9.4.8+, 9.3.14+, 9.2.19+, 8.5.26+ with the patch applied.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
-
Upgrade Grafana:
- Apply the latest patched versions:
- 9.5.3+ (recommended)
- 9.4.8+
- 9.3.14+
- 9.2.19+
- 8.5.26+ (for legacy deployments)
- Apply the latest patched versions:
-
Temporary Workarounds (if patching is delayed):
- Disable Azure AD OAuth and switch to an alternative authentication method (e.g., LDAP, SAML).
- Restrict Azure AD app registration to single-tenant mode (if multi-tenancy is not required).
- Enforce unique email validation in Grafana’s configuration (if possible).
-
Azure AD Hardening:
- Disable email modification for users in Azure AD (via Conditional Access or tenant policies).
- Enforce MFA for all Grafana users to mitigate post-exploitation risks.
- Monitor for suspicious OAuth token requests (e.g., logins from unexpected tenants).
Long-Term Security Recommendations
-
Identity Provider (IdP) Best Practices:
- Use immutable identifiers (e.g.,
objectId,subclaim) instead of email for authentication. - Enforce tenant restrictions in Azure AD app registrations.
- Implement token binding to prevent replay attacks.
- Use immutable identifiers (e.g.,
-
Grafana Configuration:
- Enable strict OAuth validation (e.g., require
issclaim matching the expected tenant). - Log and alert on anomalous authentication attempts (e.g., logins from new tenants).
- Regularly audit user permissions to detect unauthorized access.
- Enable strict OAuth validation (e.g., require
-
Network-Level Protections:
- Restrict Grafana access via VPN or zero-trust network access (ZTNA).
- Deploy Web Application Firewalls (WAFs) to detect OAuth abuse patterns.
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications
-
Supply Chain Risks:
- Grafana is widely used in DevOps, cloud monitoring, and observability stacks.
- Compromise of Grafana can lead to data breaches in connected systems (e.g., Prometheus, Elasticsearch, cloud providers).
-
Identity Provider (IdP) Trust Issues:
- Highlights flaws in OAuth/OIDC implementations where email claims are trusted without validation.
- Similar vulnerabilities may exist in other SaaS applications using Azure AD OAuth.
-
Increased Attack Surface for Cloud Environments:
- Multi-tenant Azure AD apps are common in enterprise SaaS integrations.
- Attackers can leverage weak OAuth configurations for initial access.
-
Regulatory and Compliance Risks:
- GDPR, HIPAA, SOC2: Unauthorized access to monitoring data may violate compliance requirements.
- Incident Response Challenges: Difficult to detect email-based impersonation without proper logging.
Threat Actor Motivations
- Cybercriminals: Data theft for extortion (e.g., ransomware) or resale.
- APT Groups: Persistent access for espionage (e.g., monitoring internal systems).
- Insider Threats: Malicious employees exploiting weak authentication.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Vulnerability Mechanics
-
OAuth Flow in Grafana:
- User authenticates via Azure AD → Azure AD issues an ID token (JWT).
- Grafana validates the token signature and extracts the
emailclaim. - Grafana maps the email to a user account (creating one if it doesn’t exist).
-
Flaw in Validation:
- Grafana does not verify the
iss(issuer) claim, allowing tokens from any Azure AD tenant. - The
emailclaim is not guaranteed to be unique across tenants.
- Grafana does not verify the
-
Exploitation Proof of Concept (PoC):
# Example: Malicious Azure AD token with spoofed email { "iss": "https://login.microsoftonline.com/attacker-tenant-id/v2.0", "sub": "attacker-user-id", "email": "admin@victim-org.com", # Spoofed email "name": "Attacker User", "tid": "attacker-tenant-id" }- Grafana trusts the
emailclaim and grants access toadmin@victim-org.com.
- Grafana trusts the
Detection and Forensics
-
Log Analysis:
- Grafana logs: Check for unexpected
issclaims in OAuth tokens. - Azure AD logs: Monitor for authentication attempts from unknown tenants.
- SIEM alerts: Correlate Grafana logins with anomalous tenant IDs.
- Grafana logs: Check for unexpected
-
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
- Unexpected user logins from new Azure AD tenants.
- Session tokens with mismatched
issandemailclaims. - Unauthorized dashboard access or configuration changes.
-
Mitigation Verification:
- Test with a non-existent email in a test tenant – if Grafana creates a user, the patch is not applied.
- Verify
issclaim validation by attempting login from an unauthorized tenant.
Secure OAuth Implementation Guidelines
-
Always validate:
iss(issuer) claim matches the expected Azure AD tenant.aud(audience) claim matches the Grafana client ID.nonce(if used) to prevent replay attacks.
-
Use immutable identifiers:
- Prefer
sub(subject) oroid(object ID) overemailfor user mapping.
- Prefer
-
Enforce tenant restrictions:
- Configure Azure AD app registration to allow only specific tenants.
-
Implement token binding:
- Use Proof-of-Possession (PoP) tokens to prevent token theft.
Conclusion
CVE-2023-3128 represents a critical authentication bypass vulnerability in Grafana’s Azure AD OAuth integration, enabling account takeover and unauthorized access with minimal effort. The flaw stems from over-reliance on the non-unique email claim without proper tenant validation.
Immediate patching is essential, along with Azure AD hardening and monitoring for exploitation attempts. Organizations should review all OAuth integrations for similar misconfigurations and adopt zero-trust principles in identity management.
For security teams, this vulnerability underscores the importance of secure OAuth implementation, multi-factor authentication, and continuous monitoring of authentication logs. Failure to address this issue could lead to data breaches, lateral movement, and persistent access for threat actors.