CVE-2023-37704
CVE-2023-37704
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
Tenda FH1203 V2.0.1.6 was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the deviceId parameter in the formSetClientState function.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2023-37704
CVE ID: CVE-2023-37704 CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Affected Product: Tenda FH1203 (Firmware Version 2.0.1.6) Vulnerability Type: Stack-Based Buffer Overflow
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
CVE-2023-37704 is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in the Tenda FH1203 V2.0.1.6 router firmware, specifically within the formSetClientState function. The flaw arises due to improper bounds checking on the deviceId parameter, allowing an attacker to overwrite adjacent memory structures on the stack.
Severity Justification (CVSS 9.8 - Critical)
The CVSS v3.1 scoring breakdown is as follows:
- Attack Vector (AV:N) – Exploitable remotely over a network.
- Attack Complexity (AC:L) – Low complexity; no special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR:N) – No privileges needed.
- User Interaction (UI:N) – No user interaction required.
- Scope (S:U) – Impact confined to the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality (C:H) – High impact (arbitrary code execution possible).
- Integrity (I:H) – High impact (malicious code execution).
- Availability (A:H) – High impact (system crash or denial of service).
The critical severity stems from:
- Remote exploitability (no authentication required).
- Potential for arbitrary code execution (ACE) with root privileges.
- Low attack complexity, making it attractive for threat actors.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
-
Triggering the Vulnerability
- The
formSetClientStatefunction processes thedeviceIdparameter without proper length validation. - An attacker crafts a maliciously oversized
deviceIdinput (e.g., via HTTP POST request) to overflow the stack buffer.
- The
-
Stack Overflow Exploitation
- The overflow corrupts the return address on the stack, allowing redirection of execution flow.
- If ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) and stack canaries are absent (common in embedded devices), exploitation is trivial.
- Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) techniques may be used to bypass DEP/NX (Data Execution Prevention).
-
Payload Delivery
- A successful exploit could:
- Execute arbitrary shellcode (e.g., reverse shell, firmware modification).
- Crash the device (Denial of Service).
- Escalate privileges (if the vulnerable process runs as root).
- A successful exploit could:
Attack Vectors
| Vector | Description |
|---|---|
| Remote Exploitation | Attacker sends a crafted HTTP request to the router’s web interface. |
| LAN-Based Attack | Compromised device on the same network exploits the flaw. |
| WAN-Based Attack | If the router’s admin interface is exposed to the internet (misconfiguration). |
| Phishing/CSRF | Tricking a user into visiting a malicious page that sends the exploit payload. |
Exploitation Proof of Concept (PoC)
- The referenced GitHub repository (FirmRec/IoT-Vulns) likely contains a PoC exploit demonstrating the overflow.
- A typical exploit would involve:
WherePOST /goform/formSetClientState HTTP/1.1 Host: <ROUTER_IP> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: <LENGTH> deviceId=<MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD>&other_params=...<MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD>is a long string (e.g., 1000+ bytes) designed to overwrite the return address.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Product
- Tenda FH1203 (Wireless Router)
- Firmware Version: 2.0.1.6 (and potentially earlier versions if the same codebase is used).
Unaffected Versions
- Firmware versions after 2.0.1.6 (if patched by Tenda).
- Other Tenda models (unless they share the same vulnerable code).
Detection Methods
- Firmware Analysis: Extract and analyze the firmware binary for the
formSetClientStatefunction. - Network Scanning: Use tools like Nmap or Shodan to identify exposed Tenda FH1203 devices.
nmap -p 80,443 --script http-title <TARGET_IP> | grep "Tenda" - Vulnerability Scanners: Nessus, OpenVAS, or Burp Suite can detect the flaw via HTTP request fuzzing.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
| Mitigation | Description |
|---|---|
| Apply Vendor Patch | Check Tenda’s official website for firmware updates (if available). |
| Disable Remote Administration | Restrict web interface access to LAN-only (disable WAN access). |
| Network Segmentation | Isolate the router in a DMZ or separate VLAN to limit lateral movement. |
| Firewall Rules | Block external access to the router’s admin port (default: 80/443). |
| Disable Unused Services | Turn off UPnP, WPS, and Telnet/SSH if not in use. |
Long-Term Remediation
-
Input Validation & Sanitization
- Implement strict length checks on the
deviceIdparameter. - Use safe string handling functions (e.g.,
strncpyinstead ofstrcpy).
- Implement strict length checks on the
-
Stack Protections
- Enable stack canaries (
-fstack-protectorin GCC). - Implement ASLR and DEP/NX if supported by the hardware.
- Enable stack canaries (
-
Firmware Hardening
- Disable debug interfaces (e.g., UART, JTAG).
- Sign firmware updates to prevent tampering.
-
Monitoring & Detection
- Deploy IDS/IPS (e.g., Snort, Suricata) to detect exploit attempts.
- Log and alert on unusual HTTP requests targeting the router.
-
Vendor Coordination
- Report the vulnerability to Tenda if no patch exists.
- Monitor CERT/CC and CISA advisories for updates.
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications
-
IoT Security Risks
- Embedded devices (routers, cameras, NAS) are frequent targets due to:
- Lack of automatic updates.
- Weak default credentials.
- Outdated firmware with known vulnerabilities.
- CVE-2023-37704 exemplifies how a single flaw can lead to full device compromise.
- Embedded devices (routers, cameras, NAS) are frequent targets due to:
-
Botnet Recruitment
- Exploited routers are often enlisted in botnets (e.g., Mirai, Mozi) for:
- DDoS attacks.
- Cryptojacking.
- Proxy networks for malicious traffic.
- Exploited routers are often enlisted in botnets (e.g., Mirai, Mozi) for:
-
Supply Chain Risks
- Many SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) routers share similar codebases, increasing the risk of cross-vendor vulnerabilities.
-
Regulatory & Compliance Impact
- Organizations using vulnerable routers may fail compliance (e.g., PCI DSS, NIST SP 800-53, GDPR).
- CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog may list this CVE, requiring federal agencies to patch.
Threat Actor Motivations
| Threat Actor | Potential Exploitation Goals |
|---|---|
| Cybercriminals | Botnet recruitment, ransomware delivery, data exfiltration. |
| APT Groups | Persistent access for espionage or lateral movement. |
| Script Kiddies | Defacement, DoS, or bragging rights. |
| State-Sponsored | Surveillance, infrastructure disruption. |
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
- Vulnerable Function:
formSetClientState(likely in/bin/httpdor similar web server binary). - Flaw: The
deviceIdparameter is copied into a fixed-size stack buffer without length validation. - Assembly Snippet (Hypothetical):
; Vulnerable code (pseudo-assembly) mov eax, [deviceId_param] ; Load user-controlled input push eax ; Push onto stack (no bounds check) call strcpy ; Unsafe copy -> overflow
Exploitation Requirements
| Requirement | Details |
|---|---|
| Memory Layout | Stack must be executable (no NX) or ROP gadgets must be available. |
| ASLR/DEP Status | If disabled, exploitation is trivial; if enabled, requires bypass. |
| Authentication | None required (pre-auth vulnerability). |
| Network Access | LAN or WAN (if admin interface is exposed). |
Post-Exploitation Scenarios
-
Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)
- Reverse Shell: Spawn a shell back to the attacker.
- Firmware Modification: Persist malware across reboots.
- DNS Hijacking: Redirect traffic to malicious servers.
-
Denial of Service (DoS)
- Crash the
httpdprocess, rendering the web interface inaccessible.
- Crash the
-
Lateral Movement
- Use the compromised router as a pivot point to attack internal networks.
Forensic Indicators
- Logs:
- Unusually long
deviceIdparameters in HTTP requests. - Crashes in
/var/log/messagesordmesg(if logging is enabled).
- Unusually long
- Network Traffic:
- Unexpected outbound connections (e.g., to C2 servers).
- Unusual DNS queries or port scans.
Reverse Engineering Steps
- Firmware Extraction
- Use Binwalk or Firmware Mod Kit to extract the filesystem.
binwalk -e FH1203_V2.0.1.6.bin - Binary Analysis
- Load
httpdin Ghidra or IDA Pro to locateformSetClientState. - Identify the buffer size and unsafe function calls (e.g.,
strcpy,sprintf).
- Load
- Dynamic Analysis
- Use QEMU to emulate the firmware and fuzz the
deviceIdparameter. - Attach GDB to monitor stack corruption.
- Use QEMU to emulate the firmware and fuzz the
Conclusion & Recommendations
CVE-2023-37704 represents a critical, remotely exploitable vulnerability in a widely deployed SOHO router. Given its CVSS 9.8 score, organizations and individuals using the Tenda FH1203 (V2.0.1.6) must immediately apply mitigations to prevent compromise.
Key Takeaways for Security Teams
✅ Patch Management: Prioritize firmware updates for all Tenda devices. ✅ Network Hardening: Restrict router admin access to trusted networks. ✅ Threat Monitoring: Deploy IDS/IPS to detect exploit attempts. ✅ Incident Response: Prepare for potential post-exploitation scenarios (e.g., botnet recruitment).
Further Research
- Exploit Development: Analyze the PoC in FirmRec/IoT-Vulns for deeper insights.
- Firmware Analysis: Reverse engineer the patched version (if available) to confirm fixes.
- Threat Intelligence: Monitor dark web forums for discussions on Tenda router exploits.
By addressing this vulnerability proactively, organizations can reduce their attack surface and mitigate the risk of large-scale IoT-based attacks.
References: