CVE-2023-37711
CVE-2023-37711
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
Tenda AC1206 V15.03.06.23 and AC10 V15.03.06.47 were discovered to contain a stack overflow in the deviceId parameter in the saveParentControlInfo function.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2023-37711
CVE ID: CVE-2023-37711 CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Affected Products: Tenda AC1206 (V15.03.06.23), Tenda AC10 (V15.03.06.47) Vulnerability Type: Stack-Based Buffer Overflow
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Technical Overview
CVE-2023-37711 is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Tenda’s saveParentControlInfo function, specifically in the deviceId parameter. The flaw arises due to improper bounds checking when processing user-supplied input, allowing an attacker to overwrite adjacent memory structures on the stack.
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown (Score: 9.8 - Critical)
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely over the network without authentication. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No specialized conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No prior authentication or privileges needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | Exploitation does not require user interaction. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged (U) | Impact is confined to the vulnerable component (router firmware). |
| Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Successful exploitation could lead to full system compromise. |
| Integrity (I) | High (H) | Arbitrary code execution could modify system behavior. |
| Availability (A) | High (H) | Denial-of-service (DoS) or persistent compromise possible. |
Severity Justification
- Critical (9.8) due to:
- Remote exploitability (no authentication required).
- High impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
- Low attack complexity, making it attractive for threat actors.
- Potential for wormable exploitation in IoT botnets (e.g., Mirai variants).
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
-
Input Crafting:
- The attacker sends a maliciously crafted HTTP request to the vulnerable endpoint (e.g.,
/goform/saveParentControlInfo). - The deviceId parameter is manipulated to exceed the allocated buffer size, triggering a stack overflow.
- The attacker sends a maliciously crafted HTTP request to the vulnerable endpoint (e.g.,
-
Stack Corruption:
- The overflow overwrites the return address on the stack, allowing arbitrary code execution (ACE).
- If ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) and NX (No-Execute) are disabled (common in embedded devices), the attacker can redirect execution to a ROP (Return-Oriented Programming) chain or shellcode.
-
Payload Delivery:
- Shellcode Injection: If the stack is executable, the attacker can inject shellcode to spawn a reverse shell.
- ROP Exploitation: If NX is enabled, the attacker can chain existing gadgets to bypass protections.
- DoS Attack: Even if ACE fails, the overflow can crash the device, leading to a denial of service.
Attack Scenarios
| Scenario | Description | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Remote Code Execution (RCE) | Attacker gains root access to the router, enabling lateral movement into the internal network. | Full network compromise, data exfiltration, malware deployment. |
| Botnet Recruitment | Exploited devices are enslaved into a DDoS botnet (e.g., Mirai, Mozi). | Large-scale DDoS attacks, further propagation. |
| Persistent Backdoor | Attacker installs a backdoor for long-term access. | Ongoing espionage, C2 (Command & Control) operations. |
| Firmware Tampering | Malicious firmware is flashed to maintain persistence. | Permanent compromise, even after reboots. |
| Denial of Service (DoS) | Crash the router, disrupting network connectivity. | Service outages, business disruption. |
Exploitation Requirements
- Network Access: The attacker must be on the same network (LAN) or, if the router’s admin interface is exposed to the WAN, remotely exploitable.
- No Authentication: The vulnerability does not require credentials.
- Minimal Tools: A simple HTTP request crafted with
curl,Burp Suite, or a custom exploit script.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Products
| Product | Vulnerable Firmware Version | Fixed Version (if available) |
|---|---|---|
| Tenda AC1206 | V15.03.06.23 | Not yet patched (as of analysis) |
| Tenda AC10 | V15.03.06.47 | Not yet patched (as of analysis) |
Detection Methods
- Firmware Analysis:
- Extract firmware using tools like
binwalkand analyze thesaveParentControlInfofunction for unsafestrcpy/sprintfusage.
- Extract firmware using tools like
- Network Scanning:
- Use
nmapto identify Tenda routers:nmap -p 80,443 --script http-title 192.168.1.0/24 | grep "Tenda"
- Use
- Vulnerability Scanning:
- Tools like Nessus, OpenVAS, or Burp Suite can detect the vulnerable endpoint.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Short-Term)
-
Network Segmentation:
- Isolate Tenda routers from critical internal networks using VLANs or firewalls.
- Disable WAN-side admin access to prevent remote exploitation.
-
Disable Parent Control Features:
- If not in use, disable the parental control functionality via the router’s admin panel.
-
Apply Workarounds:
- Input Sanitization: Deploy a WAF (Web Application Firewall) to block malformed
deviceIdparameters. - Rate Limiting: Restrict excessive requests to
/goform/saveParentControlInfo.
- Input Sanitization: Deploy a WAF (Web Application Firewall) to block malformed
-
Monitor for Exploitation Attempts:
- Deploy IDS/IPS (e.g., Snort, Suricata) with rules to detect buffer overflow attempts:
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"Tenda Router Stack Overflow Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"/goform/saveParentControlInfo"; nocase; content:"deviceId="; nocase; pcre:"/deviceId=[^\x00]{256,}/"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
- Deploy IDS/IPS (e.g., Snort, Suricata) with rules to detect buffer overflow attempts:
Long-Term Remediation
-
Firmware Update:
- Monitor Tenda’s official website for patches and apply them immediately upon release.
- If no patch is available, consider replacing the device with a supported model.
-
Hardening Embedded Devices:
- Enable ASLR and NX if supported by the firmware.
- Disable unnecessary services (e.g., UPnP, Telnet, SSH if unused).
-
Vendor Coordination:
- Report the vulnerability to Tenda’s security team (security@tenda.com) if no patch is available.
- Engage with CERT/CC or CISA for coordinated disclosure.
-
User Awareness:
- Educate users on secure router configuration (e.g., changing default credentials, disabling remote admin).
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications
-
IoT Security Crisis:
- This vulnerability is part of a growing trend of critical flaws in consumer-grade routers, which are often poorly secured and rarely updated.
- Similar vulnerabilities (e.g., CVE-2021-40847 in Netgear, CVE-2022-27255 in TP-Link) highlight systemic issues in IoT firmware development.
-
Botnet Expansion:
- Exploited Tenda routers are prime targets for botnets (e.g., Mirai, Mozi, Gafgyt), contributing to DDoS attacks, cryptojacking, and proxy networks.
- The low barrier to exploitation makes this an attractive vector for script kiddies and APT groups alike.
-
Supply Chain Risks:
- Many ISPs bundle Tenda routers with internet plans, increasing the attack surface for large-scale compromises.
- Third-party firmware (e.g., OpenWRT) may not be a viable alternative due to lack of support for newer models.
-
Regulatory and Compliance Impact:
- Organizations using affected routers may violate compliance standards (e.g., PCI DSS, NIST SP 800-53, GDPR) if proper mitigations are not applied.
- CISA’s Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) Catalog may list this CVE, mandating federal agencies to patch within a strict timeline.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
- Vulnerable Function:
saveParentControlInfoin/bin/httpd(Tenda’s custom HTTP server). - Flaw: The function uses unsafe C functions (
strcpy,sprintf) to copy thedeviceIdparameter into a fixed-size stack buffer without bounds checking. - Exploit Primitive:
char buffer[256]; strcpy(buffer, user_controlled_deviceId); // No length check → Stack Overflow
Exploitation Steps (Proof of Concept)
-
Identify the Vulnerable Endpoint:
POST /goform/saveParentControlInfo HTTP/1.1- Parameter:
deviceId=[MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD]
-
Craft the Exploit:
- Step 1: Determine the offset to overwrite the return address (e.g., 264 bytes).
- Step 2: Locate a ROP gadget or shellcode (if NX is disabled).
- Step 3: Overwrite the return address to redirect execution.
-
Example Exploit (Conceptual):
import requests target = "http://192.168.1.1/goform/saveParentControlInfo" payload = "A" * 264 + "\xef\xbe\xad\xde" # Overwrite return address data = {"deviceId": payload, "other_params": "..."} response = requests.post(target, data=data) print(response.text) -
Post-Exploitation:
- If successful, the attacker gains root access and can:
- Dump firmware for further analysis.
- Install backdoors (e.g.,
telnetd,dropbear). - Modify DNS settings for phishing or MITM attacks.
- If successful, the attacker gains root access and can:
Reverse Engineering Insights
- Firmware Extraction:
binwalk -e AC1206_V15.03.06.23.bin - Binary Analysis:
- Use Ghidra or IDA Pro to analyze
httpdfor unsafe functions. - Search for
strcpy,sprintf,getsin thesaveParentControlInfofunction.
- Use Ghidra or IDA Pro to analyze
Defensive Techniques for Embedded Systems
| Technique | Description | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|
| Stack Canaries | Detects stack corruption before return address overwrite. | High (if implemented) |
| ASLR | Randomizes memory layout to prevent ROP. | Medium (often disabled in IoT) |
| NX Bit | Marks stack as non-executable. | High (forces ROP exploitation) |
| Safe Functions | Replace strcpy with strncpy. | High (prevents overflow) |
| Firmware Signing | Ensures only trusted updates are applied. | High (mitigates persistence) |
Conclusion
CVE-2023-37711 represents a critical risk to organizations and consumers using Tenda AC1206 and AC10 routers. The stack-based buffer overflow enables remote code execution without authentication, making it a high-value target for threat actors. Given the lack of immediate patches, organizations must implement network segmentation, WAF rules, and monitoring to mitigate exposure.
Security teams should prioritize this vulnerability due to its high CVSS score, low exploitation complexity, and potential for large-scale botnet recruitment. Long-term, IoT vendors must adopt secure coding practices (e.g., bounds checking, ASLR, NX) to prevent such flaws in future firmware releases.
Recommended Next Steps
- Patch Management: Monitor Tenda for firmware updates and apply them immediately.
- Threat Hunting: Search for exploitation attempts in logs (e.g., malformed
deviceIdparameters). - Incident Response: Prepare for potential compromises with forensic readiness (e.g., router memory dumps).
- Vendor Engagement: Pressure Tenda to release a patch via coordinated disclosure.
For further research, refer to the exploit PoCs available in the IoT-Vulns GitHub repository.