CVE-2023-38931
CVE-2023-38931
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
Tenda AC10 V1.0 V15.03.06.23, AC1206 V15.03.06.23, AC8 v4 V16.03.34.06, AC6 V2.0 V15.03.06.23, AC7 V1.0 V15.03.06.44, F1203 V2.0.1.6, AC5 V1.0 V15.03.06.28, AC10 v4.0 V16.03.10.13 and FH1203 V2.0.1.6 were discovered to contain a stack overflow via the list parameter in the setaccount function.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2023-38931
CVE ID: CVE-2023-38931 CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Type: Stack-Based Buffer Overflow Affected Software: Multiple Tenda router models (firmware versions specified below)
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Technical Overview
CVE-2023-38931 is a stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Tenda router firmware, specifically within the setaccount function. The flaw arises due to improper bounds checking when processing the list parameter, allowing an attacker to overwrite stack memory beyond the allocated buffer.
Severity Justification (CVSS 9.8 - Critical)
The CVSS v3.1 scoring breakdown is as follows:
- Attack Vector (AV:N) – Network-exploitable (remote)
- Attack Complexity (AC:L) – Low (no special conditions required)
- Privileges Required (PR:N) – None (unauthenticated)
- User Interaction (UI:N) – None
- Scope (S:U) – Unchanged (impacts the vulnerable component only)
- Confidentiality (C:H) – High (arbitrary code execution possible)
- Integrity (I:H) – High (full system compromise)
- Availability (A:H) – High (denial-of-service or persistent backdoor)
Key Factors Contributing to Critical Severity:
- Remote Exploitability: The vulnerability can be triggered via unauthenticated HTTP requests.
- No User Interaction Required: Exploitation does not require victim participation.
- High Impact: Successful exploitation leads to arbitrary code execution (ACE) with root privileges, enabling full device takeover.
- Widespread Deployment: Tenda routers are commonly used in SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) environments, increasing the attack surface.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
-
Vulnerable Endpoint:
- The flaw resides in the HTTP request handler for the
setaccountfunction (likely part of the router’s web management interface). - The
listparameter is improperly sanitized, allowing an attacker to inject an oversized input that overflows the stack buffer.
- The flaw resides in the HTTP request handler for the
-
Exploitation Steps:
- Step 1: Craft Malicious Payload
- An attacker sends an HTTP POST request to the vulnerable endpoint (e.g.,
/goform/setaccount) with a specially craftedlistparameter containing:- Shellcode (e.g., reverse shell, firmware modification payload).
- ROP (Return-Oriented Programming) chains to bypass DEP/NX (if enabled).
- Stack pivoting to redirect execution flow.
- An attacker sends an HTTP POST request to the vulnerable endpoint (e.g.,
- Step 2: Trigger Buffer Overflow
- The oversized
listparameter overwrites the return address on the stack, redirecting execution to attacker-controlled memory.
- The oversized
- Step 3: Achieve Arbitrary Code Execution (ACE)
- If ASLR (Address Space Layout Randomization) is disabled (common in embedded devices), the attacker can reliably execute shellcode.
- If ASLR is enabled, brute-forcing or information leaks may be required.
- Step 1: Craft Malicious Payload
-
Post-Exploitation Impact:
- Full Device Takeover: Execution with root privileges allows:
- Installation of persistent backdoors.
- Modification of DNS settings (pharming attacks).
- Enabling remote management (exposing internal networks).
- Firmware tampering (e.g., replacing with malicious firmware).
- Lateral Movement: Compromised routers can be used as pivot points to attack internal networks.
- Botnet Recruitment: Devices can be enslaved in DDoS botnets (e.g., Mirai variants).
- Full Device Takeover: Execution with root privileges allows:
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Analysis
The referenced GitHub repository (FirmRec/IoT-Vulns) provides a PoC exploit demonstrating:
- A Python script that sends a crafted HTTP request to trigger the overflow.
- Shellcode injection to spawn a reverse shell.
- Bypass techniques for basic mitigations (e.g., stack canaries, if present).
Example Exploit Structure:
POST /goform/setaccount HTTP/1.1
Host: <TARGET_IP>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
Content-Length: <LENGTH>
list=<OVERFLOW_PAYLOAD>&other_params=...
Where <OVERFLOW_PAYLOAD> contains:
- NOP sled (to increase reliability).
- Shellcode (e.g., MIPS/ARM reverse shell).
- Overwritten return address (pointing to shellcode or ROP gadgets).
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
The vulnerability impacts multiple Tenda router models running specific firmware versions:
| Model | Vulnerable Firmware Version(s) |
|---|---|
| AC10 V1.0 | V15.03.06.23 |
| AC1206 | V15.03.06.23 |
| AC8 v4 | V16.03.34.06 |
| AC6 V2.0 | V15.03.06.23 |
| AC7 V1.0 | V15.03.06.44 |
| F1203 | V2.0.1.6 |
| AC5 V1.0 | V15.03.06.28 |
| AC10 v4.0 | V16.03.10.13 |
| FH1203 | V2.0.1.6 |
Note:
- Devices running newer or older firmware versions may also be affected if the vulnerable
setaccountfunction remains unchanged. - End-of-Life (EOL) devices are unlikely to receive patches, increasing long-term risk.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (For End Users & Organizations)
-
Apply Firmware Updates
- Check Tenda’s official website for patched firmware versions.
- If no patch is available, disable remote management and restrict access to the web interface.
-
Network-Level Protections
- Firewall Rules:
- Block external access to the router’s web interface (port 80/443).
- Restrict internal access to trusted IPs (e.g., via
iptablesor VLAN segmentation).
- Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS):
- Deploy signatures to detect and block exploit attempts (e.g., Suricata/Snort rules for
setaccountoverflows).
- Deploy signatures to detect and block exploit attempts (e.g., Suricata/Snort rules for
- Disable UPnP:
- Prevents attackers from opening ports automatically.
- Firewall Rules:
-
Device Hardening
- Change Default Credentials: Use strong, unique passwords for the admin interface.
- Disable Unused Services: Turn off Telnet, SSH, and other unnecessary services.
- Enable Logging & Monitoring: Forward logs to a SIEM for anomaly detection.
-
Segmentation & Isolation
- Place IoT devices (including routers) on a separate VLAN to limit lateral movement.
- Use MAC filtering to restrict unauthorized device connections.
Long-Term Mitigations (For Vendors & Developers)
-
Secure Coding Practices
- Input Validation: Enforce strict bounds checking on all user-supplied inputs (e.g.,
listparameter). - Stack Canaries: Implement stack protection mechanisms to detect overflows.
- ASLR & DEP: Enable memory randomization and non-executable stack where possible.
- Static & Dynamic Analysis: Use tools like Binwalk, Firmadyne, or Ghidra to audit firmware for vulnerabilities.
- Input Validation: Enforce strict bounds checking on all user-supplied inputs (e.g.,
-
Firmware Update Mechanisms
- Implement automatic updates with cryptographic verification (e.g., signed firmware).
- Provide clear end-of-life (EOL) policies to inform users of unsupported devices.
-
Vulnerability Disclosure & Patch Management
- Establish a responsible disclosure program to incentivize security researchers.
- Rapid patch deployment to minimize exposure windows.
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications
-
Exploitation in the Wild
- Given the low complexity of exploitation and high impact, this vulnerability is likely to be actively exploited by:
- Botnet Operators (e.g., Mirai, Mozi) for DDoS amplification.
- APT Groups for persistent access to target networks.
- Cybercriminals for credential theft, phishing, or ransomware delivery.
- Given the low complexity of exploitation and high impact, this vulnerability is likely to be actively exploited by:
-
Supply Chain Risks
- Tenda routers are OEM devices used by ISPs and enterprises, increasing the risk of supply chain attacks.
- Compromised routers can serve as entry points for larger-scale breaches.
-
Regulatory & Compliance Concerns
- Organizations using affected devices may violate compliance frameworks (e.g., NIST SP 800-53, ISO 27001, GDPR) if proper mitigations are not applied.
- Liability risks for vendors if negligence in patching is proven.
-
IoT Security Challenges
- Highlights the persistent insecurity of consumer-grade IoT devices, which often lack:
- Automatic updates.
- Secure default configurations.
- Proper vulnerability management.
- Highlights the persistent insecurity of consumer-grade IoT devices, which often lack:
Historical Context
- Similar vulnerabilities in Tenda routers (e.g., CVE-2021-31755, CVE-2020-10987) have been exploited in Mirai botnet campaigns.
- The lack of firmware updates for many IoT devices means that unpatched vulnerabilities persist for years, creating long-term risks.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
-
Vulnerable Function (
setaccount)- The
setaccountfunction processes HTTP POST requests for account management. - The
listparameter is copied into a fixed-size stack buffer without length validation. - Example Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):
void setaccount() { char buffer[256]; char *list = get_http_param("list"); // Unbounded copy strcpy(buffer, list); // Stack overflow if list > 256 bytes // ... rest of function }
- The
-
Memory Layout & Exploitation
- Stack Frame Structure:
[ Local Variables (256 bytes) ] [ Saved Frame Pointer (4/8 bytes) ] [ Return Address (4/8 bytes) ] ← Overwritten by attacker - Exploit Payload Structure:
[ NOP Sled (200 bytes) ][ Shellcode (50 bytes) ][ Overwritten Return Address ] - Return Address Overwrite:
- Points to the NOP sled or shellcode in the buffer.
- Stack Frame Structure:
-
Mitigation Bypass Techniques
- Stack Canaries: If present, may require information leakage to bypass.
- ASLR: If enabled, may require brute-forcing or memory leaks.
- DEP/NX: If enforced, ROP chains must be used instead of direct shellcode execution.
Exploitation Requirements
| Requirement | Details |
|---|---|
| Target Access | Local network access (LAN) or exposed WAN interface. |
| Authentication | None (unauthenticated). |
| Exploit Reliability | High (if ASLR/DEP are disabled). |
| Privilege Escalation | Root access (most Tenda routers run as root). |
| Persistence | Possible via firmware modification or cron jobs. |
Detection & Forensics
-
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
- Network Signatures:
- Unusually large
listparameter in HTTP POST requests to/goform/setaccount. - Unexpected outbound connections (e.g., reverse shells to C2 servers).
- Unusually large
- Log Analysis:
- Failed login attempts followed by successful exploitation.
- Unauthorized changes to DNS, firewall rules, or firmware.
- Memory Forensics:
- Stack corruption (e.g., overwritten return addresses).
- Shellcode execution traces in memory dumps.
- Network Signatures:
-
Forensic Artifacts
- Web Server Logs: Check for anomalous
setaccountrequests. - Process List: Look for unexpected processes (e.g.,
/bin/sh,nc,wget). - File System Changes: Modified
/etc/passwd,/etc/shadow, or firmware files.
- Web Server Logs: Check for anomalous
-
YARA Rules for Detection
rule Tenda_CVE_2023_38931_Exploit { meta: description = "Detects CVE-2023-38931 exploit attempts" reference = "CVE-2023-38931" author = "Cybersecurity Analyst" strings: $exploit_pattern = "/goform/setaccount" nocase $overflow_payload = { 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 90 } // NOP sled $shellcode = { 6A 0B 58 99 52 66 68 2D 63 89 E7 68 2F 73 68 00 68 2F 62 69 6E 89 E3 52 57 53 89 E1 CD 80 } // Linux x86 execve("/bin/sh") condition: $exploit_pattern and ($overflow_payload or $shellcode) }
Conclusion & Recommendations
Key Takeaways
- CVE-2023-38931 is a critical, remotely exploitable stack overflow in multiple Tenda router models.
- Exploitation leads to full device compromise, enabling botnet recruitment, lateral movement, and persistent access.
- Mitigation requires immediate patching, network segmentation, and monitoring for exploit attempts.
Action Plan for Organizations
-
Patch Management:
- Identify and update all affected Tenda devices immediately.
- If no patch is available, replace or isolate vulnerable devices.
-
Network Security:
- Restrict access to router management interfaces.
- Deploy IPS/IDS to detect and block exploit attempts.
-
Threat Hunting:
- Monitor for unusual HTTP traffic to
/goform/setaccount. - Check for unauthorized firmware modifications or new admin accounts.
- Monitor for unusual HTTP traffic to
-
Vendor Coordination:
- Report unpatched vulnerabilities to Tenda via responsible disclosure.
- Advocate for better IoT security standards (e.g., IoT Cybersecurity Improvement Act compliance).
Final Risk Assessment
| Factor | Risk Level | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Exploitability | High | Remote, unauthenticated, low complexity. |
| Impact | Critical | Full device takeover, network compromise. |
| Patch Availability | Medium | Some models may not receive updates. |
| Exploitation Likelihood | High | PoC available; likely to be weaponized by botnets. |
| Overall Risk | Critical | Immediate action required to mitigate. |
Recommendation: Treat this vulnerability as a high-priority threat and apply mitigations without delay. Organizations should assume that unpatched devices are already compromised and conduct forensic analysis if exploitation is suspected.