CVE-2025-40925
CVE-2025-40925
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- None
Description
Starch versions 0.14 and earlier generate session ids insecurely. The default session id generator returns a SHA-1 hash seeded with a counter, the epoch time, the built-in rand function, the PID, and internal Perl reference addresses. The PID will come from a small set of numbers, and the epoch time may be guessed, if it is not leaked from the HTTP Date header. The built-in rand function is unsuitable for cryptographic usage. Predicable session ids could allow an attacker to gain access to systems.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2025-40925
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Description:
CVE-2025-40925 affects Starch versions 0.14 and earlier, where the session IDs are generated insecurely. The session ID generator uses a SHA-1 hash seeded with a counter, the epoch time, the built-in rand function, the PID, and internal Perl reference addresses. This method is predictable and not suitable for cryptographic purposes.
Severity Evaluation: The CVSS score of 9.1 indicates a critical vulnerability. The predictability of session IDs can lead to unauthorized access, session hijacking, and potential data breaches. The high severity is due to the ease of exploitation and the significant impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Vectors:
- Session Hijacking: An attacker can predict session IDs and hijack active user sessions, gaining unauthorized access to user accounts.
- Brute Force Attacks: Given the predictability, attackers can use brute force techniques to guess valid session IDs.
- Information Leakage: If the epoch time is leaked via the HTTP Date header, it further simplifies the prediction of session IDs.
Exploitation Methods:
- Predictable Session IDs: By analyzing the components used to generate session IDs (counter, epoch time,
randfunction, PID, and Perl reference addresses), an attacker can predict future session IDs. - Automated Scripts: Attackers can write scripts to automate the prediction and testing of session IDs, increasing the likelihood of successful exploitation.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Affected Software:
- Starch versions 0.14 and earlier
Affected Systems:
- Any system running applications that rely on Starch for session management.
- Web applications and services that use Starch for session handling.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
- Upgrade Starch: Upgrade to a version of Starch that addresses this vulnerability.
- Session ID Regeneration: Implement a more secure session ID generation mechanism, such as using cryptographically secure random number generators.
- Session Management: Regularly invalidate and regenerate session IDs to reduce the risk of session hijacking.
Long-Term Strategies:
- Code Review: Conduct thorough code reviews to identify and fix similar vulnerabilities.
- Security Audits: Regularly perform security audits and penetration testing to identify and mitigate potential vulnerabilities.
- User Education: Educate users about the importance of secure session management and the risks associated with predictable session IDs.
5. Impact on Cybersecurity Landscape
Immediate Impact:
- Increased risk of session hijacking and unauthorized access.
- Potential data breaches and loss of sensitive information.
Long-Term Impact:
- Erosion of trust in applications using Starch for session management.
- Increased scrutiny of session management practices in web applications.
- Potential regulatory and compliance issues for organizations affected by the vulnerability.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Session ID Generation Mechanism:
- The default session ID generator in Starch uses a SHA-1 hash seeded with:
- A counter
- The epoch time
- The built-in
randfunction - The PID
- Internal Perl reference addresses
Vulnerability Details:
- The
randfunction is not suitable for cryptographic purposes due to its predictability. - The PID comes from a small set of numbers, making it easier to guess.
- The epoch time can be guessed or leaked, further simplifying the prediction of session IDs.
Mitigation Implementation:
- Replace the
randfunction with a cryptographically secure random number generator. - Include additional entropy sources in the session ID generation process.
- Regularly invalidate and regenerate session IDs to mitigate the risk of session hijacking.
References:
By addressing this vulnerability promptly and implementing robust mitigation strategies, organizations can significantly reduce the risk of unauthorized access and data breaches.