CVE-2025-59340
CVE-2025-59340
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
jinjava is a Java-based template engine based on django template syntax, adapted to render jinja templates. Priori to 2.8.1, by using mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(), it is possible to instruct the underlying ObjectMapper to deserialize attacker-controlled input into arbitrary classes. This enables the creation of semi-arbitrary class instances without directly invoking restricted methods or class literals. As a result, an attacker can escape the sandbox and instantiate classes such as java.net.URL, opening up the ability to access local files and URLs(e.g., file:///etc/passwd). With further chaining, this primitive can potentially lead to remote code execution (RCE). This vulnerability is fixed in 2.8.1.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2025-59340
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
CVE ID: CVE-2025-59340 CVSS Score: 9.8
The vulnerability in jinjava, a Java-based template engine, allows an attacker to exploit the deserialization process to instantiate arbitrary classes. This can lead to sandbox escape and potentially remote code execution (RCE). The high CVSS score of 9.8 indicates a critical severity due to the potential for significant impact, including unauthorized access to sensitive files and execution of arbitrary code.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Vectors:
- Deserialization of Untrusted Data: An attacker can craft malicious input that, when deserialized, results in the instantiation of arbitrary classes.
- Sandbox Escape: By exploiting the deserialization process, an attacker can escape the sandbox environment and access local files or URLs.
- Remote Code Execution (RCE): Further chaining of exploits can lead to RCE, allowing the attacker to execute arbitrary commands on the affected system.
Exploitation Methods:
- Crafted Input: An attacker can provide specially crafted input to the
mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical()method, leading to the deserialization of attacker-controlled data. - Class Instantiation: The attacker can instantiate classes such as
java.net.URLto access local files or URLs, potentially leading to further exploitation.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Affected Software:
- jinjava versions prior to 2.8.1
Affected Systems:
- Any system running applications that use jinjava for template rendering, particularly those that process untrusted input.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
- Upgrade to the Latest Version: Upgrade jinjava to version 2.8.1 or later, which includes the fix for this vulnerability.
- Input Validation: Ensure that all input to the template engine is properly validated and sanitized.
- Disable Unnecessary Features: Disable any unnecessary features or classes that could be exploited through deserialization.
Long-Term Strategies:
- Regular Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits and code reviews to identify and mitigate similar vulnerabilities.
- Use Security Tools: Implement tools that can detect and prevent deserialization attacks, such as static analysis tools and runtime protection mechanisms.
- Education and Training: Educate developers and security personnel on the risks associated with deserialization and best practices for secure coding.
5. Impact on Cybersecurity Landscape
The discovery and exploitation of this vulnerability highlight the ongoing risks associated with deserialization in Java applications. It underscores the importance of secure coding practices and the need for continuous monitoring and updating of software dependencies. The potential for RCE through deserialization attacks remains a significant threat, requiring vigilant attention from cybersecurity professionals.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Vulnerability Details:
- Root Cause: The vulnerability arises from the use of
mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical()to deserialize attacker-controlled input, allowing the instantiation of arbitrary classes. - Exploitation Chain: The attacker can chain multiple exploits to achieve RCE, starting with deserialization to instantiate classes and then using those classes to access local files or URLs.
Detection and Prevention:
- Static Analysis: Use static analysis tools to detect unsafe deserialization practices in the codebase.
- Runtime Protection: Implement runtime protection mechanisms to monitor and block suspicious deserialization activities.
- Logging and Monitoring: Enhance logging and monitoring to detect and respond to any unusual deserialization activities.
Example Exploit Code:
// Example of crafted input to exploit the vulnerability
String maliciousInput = "{\"@type\":\"java.net.URL\",\"val\":\"file:///etc/passwd\"}";
ObjectMapper mapper = new ObjectMapper();
Object obj = mapper.getTypeFactory().constructFromCanonical(maliciousInput);
Patch Analysis:
- Fix Implementation: The fix in version 2.8.1 involves stricter controls on the deserialization process, preventing the instantiation of arbitrary classes from untrusted input.
References:
By addressing this vulnerability promptly and implementing robust security measures, organizations can mitigate the risks associated with deserialization attacks and enhance their overall cybersecurity posture.