Description
On affected modular platforms running Arista EOS equipped with both redundant supervisor modules and having the redundancy protocol configured with RPR or SSO, an existing unprivileged user can login to the standby supervisor as a root user, leading to a privilege escalation. Valid user credentials are required in order to exploit this vulnerability.
EPSS Score:
0%
EUVD-2023-28527 Technical Analysis
CVE-2023-24509: Arista EOS Privilege Escalation Vulnerability
1. VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT AND SEVERITY EVALUATION
Severity Classification
CVSS 3.1 Base Score: 9.3 (CRITICAL)
CVSS Vector Analysis
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:C/C:H/I:H/A:H
Vector Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:L): Local access required - attacker must have authenticated access to the system
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity - exploitation is straightforward once access is obtained
- Privileges Required (PR:N): None - contradictory with description stating "valid user credentials required"; likely indicates no additional privileges beyond basic user access
- User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required
- Scope (S:C): Changed - privilege escalation crosses security boundaries (user → root)
- Impact Triad (C:H/I:H/A:H): Complete compromise of confidentiality, integrity, and availability
Critical Assessment
Despite the 9.3 CRITICAL rating, several factors moderate real-world risk:
Aggravating Factors:
- Complete privilege escalation from unprivileged to root access
- Affects critical network infrastructure (modular switches/routers)
- Targets standby supervisor module, potentially evading monitoring
- Scope change indicates security boundary violation
Mitigating Factors:
- Requires valid user credentials (insider threat or compromised account scenario)
- Local access prerequisite limits remote exploitation
- Specific configuration requirements (RPR/SSO redundancy protocols)
- Limited to modular platforms with dual supervisors
Adjusted Risk Assessment: While technically CRITICAL, practical exploitation requires authenticated access, making this a HIGH severity vulnerability in most threat models, escalating to CRITICAL in environments with:
- Weak access controls
- Shared administrative access
- Compromised user accounts
- Insider threat concerns
2. POTENTIAL ATTACK VECTORS AND EXPLOITATION METHODS
Attack Prerequisites
- Valid user credentials for any unprivileged account on the affected system
- Network/console access to the Arista EOS device
- Target configuration: Modular platform with:
- Redundant supervisor modules
- RPR (Route Processor Redundancy) or SSO (Stateful Switchover) configured
Exploitation Scenario
Phase 1: Initial Access
Attacker obtains credentials through:
- Credential theft/phishing
- Insider access
- Compromised service account
- Default/weak credentials
Phase 2: Privilege Escalation
1. Authenticate to primary supervisor as unprivileged user
2. Identify standby supervisor module
3. Initiate login to standby supervisor
4. Exploit vulnerability to gain root access on standby
5. Leverage root access for lateral movement or persistence
Phase 3: Post-Exploitation
With root access on standby supervisor:
- Install persistent backdoors
- Modify system configurations
- Exfiltrate sensitive data (configs, credentials, routing tables)
- Prepare for failover exploitation (gain root on active supervisor)
- Manipulate routing/switching behavior
- Deploy network-level attacks
Attack Vectors
Vector 1: Insider Threat
- Malicious employee with legitimate low-privilege access
- Highest probability scenario
- Difficult to detect without behavioral analytics
Vector 2: Compromised Account
- External attacker compromises user credentials
- Uses VPN/remote access to reach management network
- Escalates privileges via this vulnerability
Vector 3: Lateral Movement
- Attacker compromises adjacent system
- Pivots to Arista device management interface
- Uses stolen credentials + vulnerability for escalation
Vector 4: Supply Chain/Third-Party Access
- Contractor/vendor with limited access
- Exploits access for privilege escalation
- Particularly concerning in managed service scenarios
3. AFFECTED SYSTEMS AND SOFTWARE VERSIONS
Affected Product
Arista EOS (Extensible Operating System)
Vulnerable Version Ranges
| Version Branch | Affected Range | Interpretation |
|---|---|---|
| 4.23.x | 4.23.0 → 4.23.13M | All versions from 4.23.0 through 4.23.13M |
| 4.24.x | 4.24.0 ≤ 4.24.10M | All versions up to and including 4.24.10M |
| 4.25.x | 4.25.0 ≤ 4.25.9M | All versions up to and including 4.25.9M |
| 4.26.x | 4.26.0 ≤ 4.26.8M | All versions up to and including 4.26.8M |
| 4.27.x | 4.27.0 ≤ 4.27.6M | All versions up to and including 4.27.6M |
| 4.28.x | 4.28.0 ≤ 4.28.3M | All versions up to and including 4.28.3M |
Hardware Requirements for Vulnerability
Modular Platforms with Dual Supervisors:
- Arista 7500R Series
- Arista 7500E Series
- Arista 7280R Series (modular variants)
- Arista 7300X Series (modular variants)
Configuration Requirements:
- Redundant supervisor modules installed
- Redundancy protocol configured as:
- RPR (Route Processor Redundancy), or
- SSO (Stateful Switchover)
Systems NOT Affected
- Fixed-configuration (non-modular) Arista switches
- Modular platforms with single supervisor
- Systems not running RPR/SSO redundancy protocols
- Versions outside the specified ranges (patched versions)
4. RECOMMENDED MITIGATION STRATEGIES
Immediate Actions (Priority 1)
1. Patch Management
Action: Upgrade to patched EOS versions
Timeline: Within 30 days for critical infrastructure
Within 90 days for all affected systems
Consult Arista Security Advisory 0082:
https://www.arista.com/en/support/advisories-notices/security-advisory/16985-security-advisory-0082
Recommended upgrade path:
- Test patches in lab environment
- Schedule maintenance windows
- Implement phased rollout
- Maintain rollback capability
2. Access Control Hardening
Immediate restrictions:
- Audit all user accounts with device access
- Remove unnecessary user accounts
- Implement principle of least privilege
- Enforce strong password policies
- Enable multi-factor authentication (MFA) where supported
- Restrict management interface access to dedicated management VLANs
3. Enhanced Monitoring
Deploy detection mechanisms:
- Log all authentication attempts to standby supervisors
- Alert on privilege escalation events
- Monitor for unusual root access patterns
- Implement SIEM correlation rules for:
* User login → standby supervisor → privilege change
* Unusual command execution on standby modules
* Configuration changes from unexpected sources
Short-Term Mitigations (Priority 2)
4. Network Segmentation
Isolate management plane:
- Separate management network from production
- Implement strict firewall rules
- Use jump hosts/bastion servers for administrative access
- Deploy out-of-band management where possible
5. Authentication Enhancements
Strengthen authentication mechanisms:
- Implement TACACS+ or RADIUS with centralized logging
- Enable command authorization
- Configure session timeout policies
- Implement concurrent session limits
- Enable audit logging for all privileged operations
6. Configuration Review
Evaluate redundancy requirements:
- Assess if RPR/SSO is necessary for all deployments
- Consider alternative redundancy configurations if appropriate
- Document business justification for dual-supervisor configurations
Long-Term Strategic Controls (Priority 3)
**7. Zero