Description
Tenda AC10 V1.0 V15.03.06.23, AC1206 V15.03.06.23, AC6 V2.0 V15.03.06.23, AC7 V1.0 V15.03.06.44, AC5 V1.0 V15.03.06.28, FH1203 V2.0.1.6, AC9 V3.0 V15.03.06.42_multi and FH1205 V2.0.0.7(775) were discovered to contain a stack overflow via the speed_dir parameter in the formSetSpeedWan function.
EPSS Score:
0%
EUVD-2023-42696 Technical Analysis Report
Executive Summary
EUVD-2023-42696 (CVE-2023-38936) represents a critical severity stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability affecting multiple Tenda router models. With a CVSS v3.1 score of 9.8/10, this vulnerability poses an immediate and severe threat to affected network infrastructure, particularly within European residential and small business environments.
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Severity Classification
- CVSS v3.1 Score: 9.8 (Critical)
- Attack Vector: Network (AV:N)
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
- User Interaction: None (UI:N)
- Scope: Unchanged (S:U)
- Impact: High across all CIA triad components (C:H/I:H/A:H)
Technical Assessment
The vulnerability is a stack-based buffer overflow in the formSetSpeedWan function, triggered through the speed_dir parameter. This class of vulnerability is particularly dangerous because:
- Memory Corruption: Allows arbitrary data to overwrite stack memory
- Control Flow Hijacking: Potential to overwrite return addresses and execute arbitrary code
- No Authentication Required: Exploitable without valid credentials
- Remote Exploitation: Accessible over the network interface
The critical severity rating is justified given:
- Zero authentication requirements
- Remote network accessibility
- Complete system compromise potential
- Wide deployment of affected devices
2. Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Primary Attack Vector
HTTP/HTTPS Web Management Interface - The vulnerability exists in the router's web administration functionality, specifically in WAN speed configuration.
Exploitation Methodology
Stage 1: Discovery
- Network scanning to identify Tenda routers
- Fingerprinting firmware versions via HTTP headers/responses
- Identification of vulnerable endpoints (formSetSpeedWan)
Stage 2: Exploitation
POST /goform/formSetSpeedWan HTTP/1.1
Host: [target_router_ip]
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
speed_dir=[MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD_EXCEEDING_BUFFER_SIZE]
Stage 3: Post-Exploitation
- Remote Code Execution (RCE): Execute arbitrary commands with router privileges
- Persistence: Install backdoors or modify firmware
- Lateral Movement: Pivot to internal network segments
- Traffic Interception: Man-in-the-middle attacks on all network traffic
- Botnet Recruitment: Incorporate device into DDoS or cryptomining operations
Attack Scenarios
- Unauthenticated Remote Takeover: Direct exploitation from the internet if management interface is exposed
- Internal Network Compromise: Exploitation from compromised internal hosts
- Drive-by Exploitation: Automated scanning and exploitation by worm-like malware
- Supply Chain Attacks: Pre-compromise of devices before deployment
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Confirmed Vulnerable Products
| Model | Version | Firmware Build |
|---|---|---|
| AC10 | V1.0 | V15.03.06.23 |
| AC1206 | - | V15.03.06.23 |
| AC6 | V2.0 | V15.03.06.23 |
| AC7 | V1.0 | V15.03.06.44 |
| AC5 | V1.0 | V15.03.06.28 |
| FH1203 | V2.0 | V2.0.1.6 |
| AC9 | V3.0 | V15.03.06.42_multi |
| FH1205 | V2.0 | V2.0.0.7(775) |
Deployment Context
- Primary Market: Consumer and SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) routers
- Geographic Distribution: Widespread across European markets, particularly Eastern Europe and Southern Europe
- Estimated Exposure: Potentially hundreds of thousands of devices across the EU
Additional Considerations
- Other firmware versions may be vulnerable but unconfirmed
- Similar code patterns may exist in other Tenda product lines
- OEM/white-label versions may exist under different branding
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Priority 1)
For Network Administrators:
-
Disable Remote Management
- Access router settings → Administration → Remote Management → Disable
- Ensure management interface only accessible from trusted internal networks
-
Network Segmentation
- Place affected routers behind additional firewall layers
- Implement strict ingress filtering on WAN interfaces
-
Access Control Lists (ACLs)
- Restrict management interface access to specific IP addresses
- Implement time-based access controls where possible
For Security Teams:
-
Asset Inventory
- Identify all Tenda devices in the network infrastructure
- Document firmware versions and exposure levels
-
Network Monitoring
- Deploy IDS/IPS signatures for exploitation attempts
- Monitor for unusual outbound connections from router devices
- Log all access attempts to router management interfaces
Short-term Mitigations (Priority 2)
-
Firmware Updates
- Check Tenda's official website for security patches
- Note: As of analysis date, no official patch confirmed
- Subscribe to Tenda security advisories
-
Compensating Controls
- Deploy Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to filter malicious payloads
- Implement input validation at network perimeter
- Use VPN for all remote management access
-
Device Replacement Planning
- Evaluate alternative router vendors with better security track records
- Budget for hardware replacement if patches unavailable
Long-term Strategy (Priority 3)
-
Vendor Security Assessment
- Establish security requirements for network equipment procurement
- Prioritize vendors with responsible disclosure programs
- Require security update commitments in procurement contracts
-
Zero Trust Architecture
- Implement network access control (NAC) solutions
- Deploy micro-segmentation to limit blast radius
- Assume compromise and implement defense-in-depth
-
Continuous Monitoring
- Implement SIEM correlation rules for IoT device anomalies
- Regular vulnerability scanning of network infrastructure
- Automated firmware version tracking
Detection Signatures
Snort/Suricata Rule Example:
alert tcp any any -> any 80 (msg:"EUVD-2023-42696 Tenda Stack Overflow Attempt";
flow:to_server,established; content:"POST"; http_method;
content:"/goform/formSetSpeedWan"; http_uri;
content:"speed_dir="; http_client_body;
pcre:"/speed_dir=[^\&]{200,}/";
classtype:attempted-admin; sid:2023042696; rev:1;)
5. Impact on European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory Implications
NIS2 Directive Considerations
- Essential Entities: Organizations using affected devices must assess compliance impact
- Incident Reporting: Exploitation may trigger mandatory reporting requirements
- Supply Chain Risk: Highlights vulnerabilities in consumer-grade equipment used in business contexts
GDPR Implications
- Compromised routers can facilitate data breaches
- Controllers must ensure appropriate technical measures
- Potential for regulatory action if inadequate security measures demonstrated
Sector-Specific Impacts
Critical Infrastructure
- Risk Level: Moderate to High
- Small utilities and municipal services often use consumer-grade equipment
- Potential for cascading failures if used in operational technology (OT) environments
Healthcare Sector
- Risk Level: High
- Medical practices and small clinics frequently use affected device classes
- Patient data confidentiality at risk
Financial Services
- Risk Level: Moderate
- Small branch offices and payment terminals may be affected
- Compliance implications under PSD2 and other regulations
SME Sector
- Risk Level: Very High
- Highest concentration of affected devices
- Limited security resources for detection and remediation
- Potential for widespread compromise