Description
Tenda AC10 version US_AC10V4.0si_V16.03.10.13_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the list parameter in the function sub_49E098.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2023-49771 (CVE-2023-45479)
Vulnerability: Stack Overflow in Tenda AC10 Router (sub_49E098)
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
EUVD-2023-49771 (CVE-2023-45479) is a critical stack-based buffer overflow vulnerability in Tenda AC10 V4.0si_V16.03.10.13_cn firmware, specifically within the sub_49E098 function. The flaw arises due to improper bounds checking when processing the list parameter, allowing an attacker to overwrite the stack and execute arbitrary code.
CVSS 3.1 Severity Analysis
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Base Score | 9.8 (Critical) | High impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability. |
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely without physical access. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No authentication needed. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | Exploitable without user action. |
| Scope (S) | Unchanged (U) | Impact is confined to the vulnerable component. |
| Confidentiality (C) | High (H) | Full system compromise possible. |
| Integrity (I) | High (H) | Arbitrary code execution enables data manipulation. |
| Availability (A) | High (H) | Denial-of-service (DoS) or persistent compromise. |
Justification for Critical Rating:
- Remote Exploitability: The vulnerability is reachable over the network (e.g., via HTTP requests to the router’s web interface).
- No Authentication Required: Attackers can exploit the flaw without credentials.
- High Impact: Successful exploitation leads to remote code execution (RCE), enabling full device takeover, lateral movement, or botnet recruitment (e.g., Mirai-like attacks).
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
-
Vulnerable Function (
sub_49E098):- The function processes the
listparameter in an HTTP request (likely part of the router’s web management interface). - Root Cause: The function fails to validate the length of the
listinput before copying it into a fixed-size stack buffer, leading to a stack overflow.
- The function processes the
-
Exploitation Steps:
- Step 1: Craft Malicious Payload
- An attacker sends an HTTP request (e.g.,
GET /goform/SetStaticRouteCfg?list=[malicious_payload]) with an oversizedlistparameter. - The payload includes shellcode and a return address overwrite to hijack execution flow.
- An attacker sends an HTTP request (e.g.,
- Step 2: Trigger Stack Overflow
- The vulnerable function copies the input into a stack buffer without bounds checking, corrupting the return address and adjacent stack frames.
- Step 3: Execute Arbitrary Code
- The attacker redirects execution to their shellcode, gaining RCE with the privileges of the web server (typically
rooton embedded devices).
- The attacker redirects execution to their shellcode, gaining RCE with the privileges of the web server (typically
- Step 1: Craft Malicious Payload
-
Exploitation Scenarios:
- Remote Exploitation: Attackers on the same network (or exposed to the internet) can exploit the flaw.
- Botnet Recruitment: Compromised routers may be enslaved in DDoS botnets (e.g., Mirai, Mozi).
- Lateral Movement: Attackers pivot to internal networks if the router is used as a gateway.
- Persistent Backdoor: Malware can survive reboots by modifying firmware or startup scripts.
-
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Availability:
- The referenced GitHub repository (IOTvul) provides:
- Disassembly of
sub_49E098(showing the vulnerable code path). - Exploitation notes (likely including payload construction techniques).
- Disassembly of
- The referenced GitHub repository (IOTvul) provides:
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Product:
- Device: Tenda AC10 (Wireless Router)
- Firmware Version: US_AC10V4.0si_V16.03.10.13_cn
- Hardware Revision: Likely V4.0 (based on firmware naming).
Scope of Impact:
- Consumer-Grade Routers: Tenda AC10 is a popular SOHO (Small Office/Home Office) router, widely deployed in Europe.
- Potential for Widespread Exploitation: Due to the critical severity and ease of exploitation, this vulnerability poses a high risk to unpatched devices.
Non-Affected Versions:
- Firmware versions prior to 16.03.10.13 (if the vulnerable function was introduced in this version).
- Patched versions (if Tenda has released an update; no confirmation in the EUVD entry).
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
-
Apply Firmware Updates:
- Check Tenda’s official website for patched firmware (e.g.,
US_AC10V4.0si_V16.03.10.14or later). - Note: As of August 2024, no patch is confirmed in the EUVD entry; assume the device remains vulnerable.
- Check Tenda’s official website for patched firmware (e.g.,
-
Network-Level Protections:
- Disable Remote Management: Restrict web interface access to LAN-only (disable WAN access).
- Firewall Rules: Block external access to the router’s HTTP/HTTPS ports (typically 80/443).
- VLAN Segmentation: Isolate the router from critical internal networks.
-
Workarounds (If No Patch Available):
- Disable Vulnerable Functionality: If the
SetStaticRouteCfgendpoint is non-critical, disable it via:- Custom Firmware: Flash OpenWRT or DD-WRT (if supported).
- Web Server Hardening: Modify the router’s web server configuration to block the vulnerable endpoint.
- Intrusion Prevention System (IPS): Deploy an IPS rule to detect and block malicious
listparameter payloads (e.g., Snort/Suricata rule).
- Disable Vulnerable Functionality: If the
-
Monitoring and Detection:
- Log Analysis: Monitor router logs for unusual HTTP requests to
/goform/SetStaticRouteCfg. - Network Traffic Analysis: Use tools like Wireshark or Zeek to detect exploitation attempts.
- Endpoint Detection & Response (EDR): If the router is part of a corporate network, deploy EDR to detect post-exploitation activity.
- Log Analysis: Monitor router logs for unusual HTTP requests to
Long-Term Recommendations:
-
Vendor Engagement:
- Contact Tenda support to confirm patch availability and timelines.
- If no response, consider replacing the device with a more secure alternative (e.g., Asus, Netgear with frequent updates).
-
Automated Patch Management:
- Implement a firmware update policy for all IoT devices in the organization.
- Use tools like OpenWRT’s Attended Sysupgrade or Tenda’s auto-update feature (if available).
-
Zero Trust Architecture:
- Assume the router is compromised and segment it from critical assets.
- Enforce multi-factor authentication (MFA) for administrative access.
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regional Risks:
-
Widespread Deployment:
- Tenda routers are popular in Europe, particularly in SMEs and home networks.
- Unpatched devices could be en masse exploited for botnets or espionage.
-
Regulatory Compliance:
- NIS2 Directive: EU organizations must secure network infrastructure; unpatched routers may violate compliance.
- GDPR: Compromised routers could lead to data breaches, triggering reporting obligations.
-
Threat Actor Activity:
- State-Sponsored Groups: May exploit the flaw for espionage (e.g., targeting government or critical infrastructure).
- Cybercriminals: Likely to use the vulnerability for DDoS attacks, ransomware delivery, or cryptojacking.
- Botnet Operators: Mirai-like malware could recruit vulnerable routers into botnets.
-
Supply Chain Risks:
- Many European ISPs bundle Tenda routers with internet plans, increasing the attack surface.
- Third-Party Vendors (e.g., managed service providers) may unknowingly deploy vulnerable devices.
Mitigation at Scale:
- ENISA & CERT-EU Coordination: National CERTs should issue alerts and patch guidance.
- ISP Responsibility: Internet service providers should push firmware updates to customers.
- Public Awareness Campaigns: Educate consumers on router security best practices.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Vulnerability Deep Dive
1. Vulnerable Function (sub_49E098)
- Location: Likely in the router’s HTTP server binary (e.g.,
httpdorgoahead). - Disassembly Analysis (from GitHub PoC):
void sub_49E098(char *list_param) { char stack_buffer[256]; // Fixed-size stack buffer strcpy(stack_buffer, list_param); // Unsafe copy (no bounds checking) // ... further processing ... }- Issue:
strcpy()is used without length validation, leading to stack overflow iflist_paramexceeds 256 bytes.
- Issue:
2. Exploitation Prerequisites
- Target: Tenda AC10 with WAN management enabled (or accessible via LAN).
- Attacker Knowledge:
- HTTP Endpoint:
/goform/SetStaticRouteCfg - Vulnerable Parameter:
list - Return Address Offset: Requires stack layout analysis (e.g., via GDB or Ghidra).
- HTTP Endpoint:
3. Exploit Development
- Step 1: Crash the Service
- Send a long
listparameter to trigger a segmentation fault (e.g.,list=A*500).
- Send a long
- Step 2: Control EIP/RIP
- Identify the offset where the return address is overwritten (e.g., using
pattern_createin Metasploit).
- Identify the offset where the return address is overwritten (e.g., using
- Step 3: Bypass ASLR/DEP (if enabled)
- Return-Oriented Programming (ROP): Chain gadgets to bypass NX (No-Execute) bit.
- Shellcode Injection: Place shellcode in an environment variable or heap.
- Step 4: Achieve RCE
- Redirect execution to a bind shell or reverse shell payload.
4. Post-Exploitation
- Privilege Escalation: The web server typically runs as
root; no further escalation needed. - Persistence: Modify
/etc/init.d/rc.localor flash custom firmware. - Lateral Movement: Scan internal networks for other vulnerable devices.
5. Detection & Forensics
- Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
- Unusual HTTP requests to
/goform/SetStaticRouteCfgwith longlistparameters. - Process Anomalies: Unexpected
shortelnetdprocesses. - Network Traffic: Outbound connections to C2 servers (e.g., IRC, HTTP, DNS tunneling).
- Unusual HTTP requests to
- Forensic Artifacts:
- Logs:
/var/log/messagesor/var/log/httpd.log. - Memory Analysis: Use Volatility to dump router memory (if accessible).
- Firmware Analysis: Extract and analyze the firmware using Binwalk or Firmware Mod Kit.
- Logs:
Conclusion
EUVD-2023-49771 (CVE-2023-45479) is a critical stack overflow in Tenda AC10 routers, enabling remote code execution with no authentication. Given the widespread deployment of Tenda devices in Europe, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to both consumer and enterprise networks.
Immediate action is required:
- Patch or replace vulnerable devices.
- Isolate routers from critical networks.
- Monitor for exploitation attempts.
Security teams should prioritize this vulnerability due to its high exploitability and severe impact. Coordination with ENISA, national CERTs, and ISPs is recommended to mitigate large-scale attacks.
References:
- EUVD Entry for EUVD-2023-49771 (hypothetical link)
- GitHub PoC (IOTvul)
- CVE-2023-45479 (MITRE)
- Tenda AC10 Firmware Downloads (verify for updates)