Description
Tenda AC10 version US_AC10V4.0si_V16.03.10.13_cn was discovered to contain a stack overflow via the src parameter in the function sub_47D878.
EPSS Score:
0%
Technical Analysis of EUVD-2023-49772 (CVE-2023-45480) – Tenda AC10 Stack Overflow Vulnerability
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
EUVD ID: EUVD-2023-49772
CVE ID: CVE-2023-45480
CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity Breakdown
The vulnerability is classified as a stack-based buffer overflow in the sub_47D878 function of Tenda AC10 (US_AC10V4.0si_V16.03.10.13_cn), allowing unauthenticated remote attackers to execute arbitrary code with high privileges.
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Exploitable over the network without physical access.
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low complexity; no special conditions required.
- Privileges Required (PR:N): No authentication needed.
- User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction required.
- Scope (S:U): Impact confined to the vulnerable system.
- Confidentiality (C:H), Integrity (I:H), Availability (A:H): Full compromise of all security objectives.
The 9.8 (Critical) score reflects the high risk of remote code execution (RCE) with minimal prerequisites, making it a prime target for botnets, ransomware, and persistent threats.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
The vulnerability stems from improper bounds checking in the src parameter within the sub_47D878 function. An attacker can craft a malicious input (e.g., an oversized HTTP request) to overflow the stack, overwrite return addresses, and execute arbitrary code.
Step-by-Step Exploitation Flow:
-
Reconnaissance:
- Identify vulnerable Tenda AC10 devices via Shodan, Censys, or mass scanning (e.g.,
http.title:"Tenda"). - Fingerprint the firmware version (
US_AC10V4.0si_V16.03.10.13_cn).
- Identify vulnerable Tenda AC10 devices via Shodan, Censys, or mass scanning (e.g.,
-
Crafting the Exploit:
- Analyze the disassembled
sub_47D878function (available in referenced GitHub links). - Identify the stack layout and buffer size to determine the overflow offset.
- Construct a malicious HTTP request with a payload exceeding the buffer limit, including:
- NOP sled (for reliability).
- Shellcode (e.g., reverse shell, firmware modification).
- Return address overwrite (e.g.,
system()or ROP chain).
- Analyze the disassembled
-
Delivery & Execution:
- Send the exploit via HTTP GET/POST to the vulnerable endpoint (likely a web interface API).
- If successful, the attacker gains root-level access to the router.
-
Post-Exploitation:
- Persistence: Modify firmware or install backdoors.
- Lateral Movement: Pivot into internal networks.
- Botnet Recruitment: Enlist the device in DDoS attacks (e.g., Mirai variants).
- Data Exfiltration: Intercept or modify network traffic.
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Availability
- The referenced GitHub repository (
l3m0nade/IOTvul) contains:- Disassembled code (
sub_47d878_code.png). - Technical write-up (
sub_47D878.md) detailing the overflow mechanics.
- Disassembled code (
- Exploitability: Given the low complexity, a working PoC is likely already in circulation among threat actors.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Product:
- Tenda AC10 Wireless Router
- Firmware Version:
US_AC10V4.0si_V16.03.10.13_cn - Hardware Revision: Likely AC10 V4.0 (exact hardware variants may vary).
Scope of Impact:
- Consumer & SOHO Deployments: Common in home and small business networks.
- Geographical Distribution: Primarily Europe, Asia, and North America (Tenda is a popular budget router brand).
- Exposure Risk: Many Tenda routers are exposed to the internet due to misconfigurations (e.g., UPnP enabled, default credentials).
Non-Vulnerable Versions:
- Unknown at this time. Tenda has not publicly acknowledged or patched this vulnerability.
- Workarounds: See Mitigation Strategies below.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
-
Network-Level Protections:
- Block WAN Access: Disable remote administration (
http://router-ip:80or443). - Firewall Rules: Restrict access to the router’s web interface to trusted LAN IPs only.
- Disable UPnP: Prevents automatic port forwarding, reducing exposure.
- Block WAN Access: Disable remote administration (
-
Firmware & Configuration:
- Check for Updates: Monitor Tenda’s official website for patches (though none are confirmed yet).
- Manual Firmware Replacement: If possible, flash a third-party firmware (e.g., OpenWRT, DD-WRT) if supported.
- Factory Reset: If compromise is suspected, reset to defaults and reconfigure securely.
-
Intrusion Detection & Monitoring:
- Deploy IDS/IPS: Use Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts (e.g., oversized HTTP requests to
/goform/endpoints). - Log Analysis: Monitor for unusual outbound connections (e.g., reverse shells, C2 traffic).
- Deploy IDS/IPS: Use Snort/Suricata rules to detect exploitation attempts (e.g., oversized HTTP requests to
-
Long-Term Mitigations:
- Replace End-of-Life (EOL) Devices: If no patch is available, consider upgrading to a supported router model.
- Segmentation: Isolate IoT/embedded devices in a separate VLAN.
- Zero Trust: Enforce MFA and strict access controls for router management.
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory & Compliance Implications:
- NIS2 Directive (EU 2022/2555): Critical infrastructure operators must ensure secure supply chains and timely patching. Unpatched routers in ISP or enterprise networks could lead to non-compliance.
- GDPR (Art. 32): Failure to secure network devices may result in data breaches, triggering regulatory fines (up to 4% of global revenue).
- ENISA Guidelines: The vulnerability aligns with ENISA’s IoT security baseline, which mandates secure firmware updates and vulnerability disclosure.
Threat Actor Exploitation:
- Botnet Recruitment: Vulnerable Tenda routers are prime targets for Mirai, Mozi, or Gafgyt botnets.
- Ransomware & APTs: Compromised routers can serve as initial access vectors for ransomware (e.g., LockBit, Black Basta) or state-sponsored APTs.
- Supply Chain Risks: If used in critical infrastructure (e.g., healthcare, energy), exploitation could lead to cascading failures.
European-Specific Risks:
- SMEs & Home Users: Many European SMEs and households use Tenda routers, increasing the attack surface.
- Telecom Providers: ISPs distributing vulnerable routers may face reputation damage and regulatory scrutiny.
- Cross-Border Threats: Exploited routers can be used in DDoS attacks targeting EU institutions, banks, or critical services.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
- Vulnerable Function:
sub_47D878(likely part of the HTTP request handler). - Overflow Mechanism:
- The
srcparameter is copied into a fixed-size stack buffer without proper length validation. - An attacker can overflow the buffer, corrupt the return address, and redirect execution to malicious shellcode.
- The
- Exploit Primitives:
- Stack-based ROP (Return-Oriented Programming): If ASLR/DEP is enabled, attackers may chain gadgets to bypass protections.
- Shellcode Execution: If NX is disabled, direct shellcode execution is possible.
Reverse Engineering Insights (From GitHub References)
-
Disassembly Analysis (
sub_47d878_code.png):- The function likely uses
strcpyorsprintf-like unsafe functions for copying thesrcparameter. - Buffer Size: ~256-512 bytes (common in embedded systems).
- Overflow Offset: Requires fuzzing or static analysis to determine the exact offset for EIP control.
- The function likely uses
-
Exploit Development Steps:
- Step 1: Identify the buffer size and overflow offset (e.g., using GDB or Ghidra).
- Step 2: Craft a payload with:
- Junk data (to fill the buffer).
- Return address overwrite (e.g.,
0xdeadbeeffor testing). - Shellcode (e.g., MIPS reverse shell for Tenda’s architecture).
- Step 3: Deliver via HTTP request (e.g.,
GET /goform/setSysTools?src=[MALICIOUS_PAYLOAD]).
-
Bypassing Mitigations:
- ASLR: If enabled, brute-force or information leaks may be required.
- NX/DEP: Use ROP chains to execute
system()orexecve(). - Stack Canaries: If present, leak the canary before overflowing.
Detection & Forensics
- Network Signatures:
- Snort Rule Example:
alert tcp any any -> $HOME_NET 80 (msg:"Tenda AC10 Stack Overflow Attempt"; flow:to_server,established; content:"src="; pcre:"/src=.{500,}/"; classtype:attempted-admin; sid:1000001; rev:1;)
- Snort Rule Example:
- Log Indicators:
- Unusually large HTTP requests to
/goform/endpoints. - Crash logs in
/var/log/(if accessible).
- Unusually large HTTP requests to
- Memory Forensics:
- Volatility/Ghidra analysis of core dumps (if available).
- Heap/Stack artifacts from successful exploitation.
Conclusion & Recommendations
Key Takeaways:
- Critical RCE vulnerability in Tenda AC10 routers, exploitable remotely without authentication.
- High risk of botnet recruitment, ransomware, and APT exploitation.
- No official patch available; mitigation relies on network segmentation and access controls.
Action Plan for Security Teams:
- Immediately restrict WAN access to vulnerable routers.
- Deploy IDS/IPS rules to detect exploitation attempts.
- Monitor for post-exploitation activity (e.g., unusual outbound traffic).
- Plan for device replacement if no patch is released.
- Report to CERT-EU/ENISA if exploited in critical infrastructure.
Further Research:
- Develop a PoC for internal testing (if authorized).
- Analyze firmware updates from Tenda for silent patches.
- Collaborate with ISPs to identify and notify affected customers.
This vulnerability underscores the critical need for IoT security hardening and proactive vulnerability management in both consumer and enterprise environments.