Description
The ObjectSerializationDecoder in Apache MINA uses Java’s native deserialization protocol to process incoming serialized data but lacks the necessary security checks and defenses. This vulnerability allows attackers to exploit the deserialization process by sending specially crafted malicious serialized data, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE) attacks. This issue affects MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X and 2.2.X, and will be fixed by the releases 2.0.27, 2.1.10 and 2.2.4. It's also important to note that an application using MINA core library will only be affected if the IoBuffer#getObject() method is called, and this specific method is potentially called when adding a ProtocolCodecFilter instance using the ObjectSerializationCodecFactory class in the filter chain. If your application is specifically using those classes, you have to upgrade to the latest version of MINA core library. Upgrading will not be enough: you also need to explicitly allow the classes the decoder will accept in the ObjectSerializationDecoder instance, using one of the three new methods: /** * Accept class names where the supplied ClassNameMatcher matches for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param classNameMatcher the matcher to use */ public void accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher) /** * Accept class names that match the supplied pattern for * deserialization, unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param pattern standard Java regexp */ public void accept(Pattern pattern) /** * Accept the wildcard specified classes for deserialization, * unless they are otherwise rejected. * * @param patterns Wildcard file name patterns as defined by * {@link org.apache.commons.io.FilenameUtils#wildcardMatch(String, String) FilenameUtils.wildcardMatch} */ public void accept(String... patterns) By default, the decoder will reject *all* classes that will be present in the incoming data. Note: The FtpServer, SSHd and Vysper sub-project are not affected by this issue.
EPSS Score:
7%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2024-3562
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Description: The vulnerability in the Apache MINA library's ObjectSerializationDecoder component arises from the use of Java’s native deserialization protocol without adequate security checks. This flaw allows attackers to send specially crafted serialized data, potentially leading to remote code execution (RCE).
Severity Evaluation:
The vulnerability has a base score of 10.0 according to CVSS 4.0, indicating a critical severity level. The scoring vector CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:L/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:H/SI:H/SA:H highlights the following:
- Attack Vector (AV): Network (N)
- Attack Complexity (AC): Low (L)
- Authentication (AT): None (N)
- Privileges Required (PR): None (N)
- User Interaction (UI): None (N)
- Confidentiality (VC), Integrity (VI), Availability (VA): High (H)
- Scope (SC), Scope Integrity (SI), Scope Availability (SA): High (H)
This high severity is due to the potential for complete system compromise through RCE, which can lead to significant data breaches, system downtime, and unauthorized access.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Vectors:
- Network-Based Attacks: Attackers can exploit this vulnerability over the network by sending malicious serialized data to applications using the vulnerable MINA core library.
- Man-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: If an attacker can intercept and modify network traffic, they can inject malicious serialized data.
Exploitation Methods:
- Crafted Serialized Data: Attackers can create specially crafted serialized objects that, when deserialized, execute arbitrary code on the target system.
- Deserialization Gadgets: Utilizing known deserialization gadgets in Java libraries to chain together a series of method calls that result in code execution.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Affected Versions:
- Apache MINA core versions 2.0.X, 2.1.X, and 2.2.X.
Specific Conditions:
- Applications using the
IoBuffer#getObject()method. - Applications adding a
ProtocolCodecFilterinstance using theObjectSerializationCodecFactoryclass in the filter chain.
Fixed Versions:
- MINA core 2.0.27, 2.1.10, and 2.2.4.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions:
- Upgrade: Immediately upgrade to the patched versions of Apache MINA core (2.0.27, 2.1.10, or 2.2.4).
- Configuration: Explicitly allow only trusted classes for deserialization using the new methods provided:
accept(ClassNameMatcher classNameMatcher)accept(Pattern pattern)accept(String... patterns)
Long-Term Strategies:
- Code Review: Conduct a thorough code review to identify and mitigate similar deserialization vulnerabilities.
- Security Training: Educate developers on the risks associated with deserialization and best practices for secure coding.
- Monitoring: Implement monitoring and logging to detect and respond to suspicious deserialization activities.
5. Impact on European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory Compliance:
- Organizations must comply with regulations such as GDPR, which mandates robust security measures to protect personal data.
- Failure to address this vulnerability could result in significant fines and legal repercussions.
Critical Infrastructure:
- Many critical infrastructure systems, including financial services, healthcare, and government agencies, rely on Java-based applications. This vulnerability poses a significant risk to these sectors.
Supply Chain Security:
- The vulnerability highlights the importance of supply chain security, as third-party libraries can introduce critical vulnerabilities.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Deserialization Risks:
- Deserialization of untrusted data is a common attack vector for RCE. Java’s deserialization mechanism can be exploited using gadget chains that lead to code execution.
Mitigation Methods:
- Whitelisting: Use the new methods to whitelist only trusted classes for deserialization.
- Serialization Alternatives: Consider using safer serialization formats like JSON or Protocol Buffers, which do not have the same deserialization risks.
- Network Security: Implement network security measures such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems (IDS), and intrusion prevention systems (IPS) to detect and block malicious traffic.
Example Code for Mitigation:
ObjectSerializationDecoder decoder = new ObjectSerializationDecoder();
decoder.accept(new ClassNameMatcher() {
@Override
public boolean matches(String className) {
return className.startsWith("com.trusted.package");
}
});
Conclusion: The vulnerability in Apache MINA's ObjectSerializationDecoder is critical and requires immediate attention. Organizations should prioritize upgrading to the patched versions and implementing the recommended mitigation strategies to protect against potential RCE attacks. This incident underscores the importance of robust security practices in software development and the need for continuous monitoring and updating of third-party libraries.