Description
An issue was discovered in the COROS application through 3.8.12 for Android. Bluetooth pairing and bonding is neither initiated nor enforced by the application itself. Also, the watch does not enforce pairing and bonding. As a result, any data transmitted via BLE remains unencrypted, allowing attackers within Bluetooth range to eavesdrop on the communication. Furthermore, even if a user manually initiates pairing and bonding in the Android settings, the application continues to transmit data without requiring the watch to be bonded. This fallback behavior enables attackers to exploit the communication, for example, by conducting an active machine-in-the-middle attack.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2025-18755
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
The vulnerability described in EUVD-2025-18755 pertains to the COROS application for Android, specifically versions up to 3.8.12. The core issue is the lack of enforced Bluetooth pairing and bonding, which results in unencrypted data transmission via Bluetooth Low Energy (BLE). This flaw allows attackers within Bluetooth range to eavesdrop on communications and potentially conduct active machine-in-the-middle (MitM) attacks.
Severity Evaluation:
- CVSS Base Score: 9.8
- CVSS Vector: CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H
The high base score indicates a critical vulnerability due to the ease of exploitation (low complexity, no privileges required, no user interaction needed) and the severe impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Vectors:
- Eavesdropping: Attackers can intercept unencrypted data transmitted between the COROS watch and the Android application.
- Machine-in-the-Middle (MitM) Attacks: Attackers can intercept and modify data in transit, potentially injecting malicious commands or altering data integrity.
- Data Exfiltration: Sensitive information, such as user activity data, health metrics, and personal identifiers, can be captured and misused.
Exploitation Methods:
- Passive Monitoring: Using Bluetooth sniffing tools to capture data packets.
- Active Interception: Employing tools like BtleJuice or GATTacker to perform MitM attacks.
- Replay Attacks: Capturing and replaying legitimate commands to manipulate the device or application behavior.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Affected Systems:
- COROS smartwatches and fitness trackers.
- Android devices running the COROS application versions up to 3.8.12.
Software Versions:
- COROS application for Android versions up to 3.8.12.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Mitigations:
- Manual Pairing and Bonding: Users should manually initiate Bluetooth pairing and bonding through Android settings, although this does not fully mitigate the issue.
- Avoid Public Use: Limit the use of the COROS application in public or untrusted environments.
- Regular Updates: Ensure that both the COROS application and the smartwatch firmware are updated to the latest versions as soon as patches are available.
Long-Term Mitigations:
- Enforced Pairing and Bonding: The application should enforce Bluetooth pairing and bonding to ensure encrypted communication.
- Data Encryption: Implement end-to-end encryption for data transmitted via BLE.
- Security Audits: Conduct regular security audits and penetration testing to identify and address similar vulnerabilities.
5. Impact on European Cybersecurity Landscape
The vulnerability poses a significant risk to users within the European Union, particularly those relying on COROS devices for fitness and health tracking. The potential for data breaches and privacy violations could lead to regulatory scrutiny under GDPR, as well as reputational damage for COROS. The incident underscores the importance of robust security measures in IoT devices and the need for continuous monitoring and updates.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Technical Analysis:
- Bluetooth Pairing and Bonding: The lack of enforced pairing and bonding means that the communication channel is not secured, allowing unauthorized access to data.
- BLE Communication: Data transmitted via BLE is unencrypted, making it susceptible to interception and manipulation.
- Fallback Behavior: Even if users manually initiate pairing and bonding, the application does not enforce this requirement, allowing continued unsecured communication.
Detection and Response:
- Monitoring Tools: Use Bluetooth monitoring tools like BtleJuice, GATTacker, or BlueZ to detect unsecured BLE communications.
- Incident Response: Implement incident response plans to quickly identify and mitigate any detected exploitation attempts.
- User Education: Educate users on the importance of manual pairing and bonding, as well as the risks associated with using unsecured devices in public spaces.
Conclusion: The vulnerability in the COROS application highlights the critical need for secure communication protocols in IoT devices. Immediate mitigation strategies, such as manual pairing and bonding, can provide temporary relief, but long-term solutions require robust security measures and continuous updates. The European cybersecurity landscape must prioritize the security of IoT devices to protect user data and maintain trust in digital services.