Description
A vulnerability was found in Tenda AX12 Pro V2 16.03.49.24_cn. Affected by this issue is some unknown functionality of the component Telnet Service. Performing a manipulation results in hard-coded credentials. The attack is possible to be carried out remotely. A high degree of complexity is needed for the attack. The exploitation is known to be difficult. The exploit has been made public and could be used.
EPSS Score:
0%
Technical Analysis of EUVD-2026-4968 (CVE-2026-1610): Hard-Coded Credentials in Tenda AX12 Pro V2
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
EUVD ID: EUVD-2026-4968
CVE ID: CVE-2026-1610
CVSS v4.0 Base Score: 9.2 (Critical)
CVSS Vector: CVSS:4.0/AV:N/AC:H/AT:N/PR:N/UI:N/VC:H/VI:H/VA:H/SC:N/SI:N/SA:N/E:P
Severity Breakdown
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Network-based exploitation (remote attack possible).
- Attack Complexity (AC:H): High complexity due to required preconditions (e.g., knowledge of hard-coded credentials, network access).
- Attack Requirements (AT:N): No special conditions (e.g., user interaction) are needed.
- Privileges Required (PR:N): No authentication required.
- User Interaction (UI:N): No user interaction needed.
- Vulnerable Component (VC:H): High impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected system.
- Subsequent System Impact (SC:N): No impact on downstream systems.
- Exploit Maturity (E:P): Proof-of-concept (PoC) exploit is publicly available.
Key Takeaways:
- The vulnerability allows unauthenticated remote attackers to gain access to the Telnet service using hard-coded credentials.
- Despite the high attack complexity, the publicly available exploit significantly increases the risk of exploitation.
- The critical severity (9.2) stems from the complete compromise potential (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) of the affected device.
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Surface
The vulnerability resides in the Telnet service of the Tenda AX12 Pro V2 router, which is exposed to:
- Local network (LAN) attacks (if Telnet is enabled internally).
- Remote attacks (if Telnet is exposed to the WAN, which is highly discouraged but possible due to misconfigurations).
Exploitation Steps
-
Reconnaissance:
- Attacker scans for open Telnet ports (TCP/23) on the target device.
- Identifies the Tenda AX12 Pro V2 via banner grabbing or fingerprinting.
-
Credential Discovery:
- The attacker leverages hard-coded credentials (likely embedded in firmware or configuration files).
- Publicly disclosed exploits (e.g., GitHub PoC) may reveal these credentials.
-
Initial Access:
- Attacker logs in via Telnet using the hard-coded credentials.
- Gains unrestricted shell access with root/administrative privileges.
-
Post-Exploitation:
- Persistence: Installs backdoors, modifies firmware, or disables security features.
- Lateral Movement: Uses the compromised router as a pivot point to attack other internal systems.
- Data Exfiltration: Intercepts unencrypted traffic (e.g., HTTP, FTP) passing through the router.
- Denial of Service (DoS): Disrupts network operations by modifying routing tables or crashing the device.
Exploitation Difficulty
- Known to be difficult (AC:H) due to:
- Requirement for precise knowledge of the hard-coded credentials.
- Potential rate-limiting or brute-force protections (though unlikely in consumer-grade routers).
- Network segmentation may limit exposure (e.g., Telnet not exposed to WAN).
- However, public PoC availability lowers the barrier for script kiddies and automated attacks.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Product
- Vendor: Tenda
- Product: AX12 Pro V2 (Wi-Fi 6 Router)
- Affected Firmware Version: 16.03.49.24_cn (Chinese market variant)
- Component: Telnet Service (likely enabled by default or misconfigured)
Potential Impact Scope
- Consumer & SOHO Networks: Home users and small businesses using the affected router.
- Enterprise Edge Cases: If deployed in branch offices or remote locations without proper hardening.
- Geographic Focus: Primarily Chinese market (due to "_cn" firmware suffix), but similar vulnerabilities may exist in other regional variants.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (High Priority)
-
Disable Telnet Service:
- Access the router’s admin panel (
http://192.168.0.1or similar) and disable Telnet if enabled. - Use SSH (if available) with strong credentials instead.
- Access the router’s admin panel (
-
Apply Firmware Updates:
- Check Tenda’s official website (Tenda Support) for patched firmware.
- If no update is available, consider replacing the device if critical security is required.
-
Network-Level Protections:
- Block Telnet (TCP/23) at the firewall (both inbound and outbound).
- Segment the network to isolate the router from critical internal systems.
- Monitor for unusual Telnet connections (e.g., via SIEM or IDS).
-
Change Default Credentials:
- Even if Telnet is disabled, change all default admin credentials to prevent other attack vectors.
Long-Term Hardening
-
Disable Unnecessary Services:
- Disable UPnP, WPS, and remote administration if not required.
- Enable firewall rules to restrict access to the admin interface.
-
Implement Network Access Control (NAC):
- Use MAC filtering or 802.1X authentication to limit device access.
-
Regular Vulnerability Scanning:
- Use tools like OpenVAS, Nessus, or Nmap to detect exposed services.
- Monitor CVE databases for new vulnerabilities in Tenda devices.
-
Replace End-of-Life (EOL) Devices:
- If the router is no longer supported, migrate to a modern, actively maintained model.
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory & Compliance Implications
- NIS2 Directive (EU 2022/2555):
- Organizations in critical sectors (e.g., energy, healthcare, transport) must ensure secure network infrastructure.
- A compromised router could lead to supply chain attacks or lateral movement into critical systems.
- GDPR (EU 2016/679):
- If the router is used in a business handling personal data, a breach could result in regulatory fines (up to 4% of global revenue).
- ENISA Guidelines:
- The vulnerability aligns with ENISA’s "Threat Landscape for IoT" report, highlighting hard-coded credentials as a top risk in consumer-grade networking devices.
Threat to Critical Infrastructure
- SOHO & Remote Work Risks:
- With the rise of remote work, compromised home routers can serve as entry points into corporate networks.
- Botnet Recruitment:
- Attackers may enlist vulnerable routers into DDoS botnets (e.g., Mirai variants).
- Supply Chain Attacks:
- If Tenda routers are used in ISP or enterprise deployments, a mass exploitation could lead to large-scale outages.
Geopolitical & Economic Factors
- Chinese Market Focus:
- The "_cn" firmware suggests primary risk in China, but similar vulnerabilities may exist in European-market variants.
- Third-Party Exploit Availability:
- The public PoC increases the risk of automated attacks by cybercriminals and APT groups.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
-
Hard-Coded Credentials:
- The Telnet service in Tenda AX12 Pro V2 (16.03.49.24_cn) contains embedded credentials (likely in
/etc/passwd,/etc/shadow, or a proprietary configuration file). - These credentials are not user-modifiable and may be identical across all devices of the same model/firmware.
- The Telnet service in Tenda AX12 Pro V2 (16.03.49.24_cn) contains embedded credentials (likely in
-
Firmware Analysis (Hypothetical):
- A reverse engineering of the firmware (using Binwalk, Ghidra, or IDA Pro) would likely reveal:
- Static credentials in plaintext or weakly obfuscated form.
- Backdoor accounts with root privileges.
- Lack of secure boot or firmware signing, allowing tampering.
- A reverse engineering of the firmware (using Binwalk, Ghidra, or IDA Pro) would likely reveal:
Exploitation Proof-of-Concept (PoC)
- GitHub Reference: QIU-DIE/CVE/issues/49
- Expected Exploit Flow:
# Step 1: Identify target (Nmap scan) nmap -p 23 --script telnet-brute <TARGET_IP> # Step 2: Connect via Telnet with hard-coded credentials telnet <TARGET_IP> # (Credentials likely disclosed in PoC) # Step 3: Gain root shell id # Should return "uid=0(root)"
Detection & Forensics
-
Indicators of Compromise (IoCs):
- Unusual Telnet connections (e.g., from external IPs).
- Modified
/etc/passwdor/etc/shadowfiles. - Unexpected processes (e.g.,
nc,busybox, or custom malware). - Unauthorized firmware changes (e.g.,
md5summismatch).
-
Log Analysis:
- Check router logs for failed/successful Telnet login attempts.
- Monitor outbound connections from the router (e.g., to C2 servers).
Reverse Engineering & Firmware Extraction
- Download Firmware:
- Obtain the latest firmware from Tenda’s website.
- Extract Filesystem:
binwalk -e AX12_Pro_V2_16.03.49.24_cn.bin - Analyze Binaries:
- Use Ghidra or IDA Pro to inspect
telnetdor related binaries. - Search for hard-coded strings (e.g.,
admin:password,root:toor).
- Use Ghidra or IDA Pro to inspect
Conclusion & Recommendations
Summary of Risks
- Critical severity (9.2) due to unauthenticated remote access via hard-coded credentials.
- Public exploit availability increases the likelihood of automated attacks.
- High impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability of the affected device.
Action Plan for Organizations
| Priority | Action | Responsible Party |
|---|---|---|
| Critical | Disable Telnet immediately | Network Admins |
| Critical | Apply firmware updates (if available) | IT Security Team |
| High | Block Telnet at the firewall | SOC / Network Team |
| High | Monitor for IoCs (unusual Telnet logins) | Threat Hunters |
| Medium | Replace EOL/unpatched devices | Procurement / Management |
Final Recommendations
- For Consumers: Disable Telnet and update firmware immediately.
- For Enterprises: Replace vulnerable routers if used in critical infrastructure.
- For Security Researchers: Analyze firmware for additional backdoors and report findings to Tenda.
- For Regulators: Enforce stricter IoT security standards (e.g., EU Cyber Resilience Act) to prevent hard-coded credentials in consumer devices.
References: