Description
Locutus brings stdlibs of other programming languages to JavaScript for educational purposes. In versions from 2.0.12 to before 2.0.39, a prototype pollution vulnerability exists in locutus. Despite a previous fix that attempted to mitigate prototype pollution by checking whether user input contained a forbidden key, it is still possible to pollute Object.prototype via a crafted input using String.prototype. This issue has been patched in version 2.0.39.
EPSS Score:
0%
EUVD-2026-5340: Comprehensive Technical Analysis
Executive Summary
EUVD-2026-5340 describes a critical prototype pollution vulnerability in the Locutus JavaScript library (versions 2.0.12 through 2.0.38). This vulnerability represents a bypass of a previous security fix, allowing attackers to pollute Object.prototype through crafted inputs leveraging String.prototype. With a CVSS 4.0 base score of 9.4 (Critical), this vulnerability poses significant risks to applications utilizing the affected library versions.
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Severity Classification
- CVSS 4.0 Score: 9.4 (Critical)
- Attack Vector: Local (AV:L)
- Attack Complexity: Low (AC:L)
- Attack Requirements: None (AT:N)
- Privileges Required: None (PR:N)
- User Interaction: None (UI:N)
- Impact: High across all CIA triad dimensions for both vulnerable and subsequent systems
Technical Assessment
Vulnerability Type: Prototype Pollution (CWE-1321)
This vulnerability is particularly concerning because:
- Bypass of Previous Fix: The vulnerability exists despite a prior remediation attempt, indicating incomplete threat modeling of the attack surface
- Fundamental JavaScript Weakness: Exploits JavaScript's prototypal inheritance mechanism
- Educational Context Risk: While Locutus is marketed for educational purposes, production systems may inadvertently incorporate it
- Chain Attack Potential: Prototype pollution often serves as a primitive for more severe exploits including:
- Remote Code Execution (RCE)
- Denial of Service (DoS)
- Authentication bypass
- Property injection attacks
Severity Justification
The critical rating is warranted due to:
- No authentication required for exploitation
- High impact on confidentiality, integrity, and availability
- Low complexity exploitation
- Subsequent system impact (SC:H, SI:H, SA:H) indicating potential for lateral movement or supply chain implications
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Attack Vectors
Primary Vector: Crafted Input via String.prototype
The vulnerability allows attackers to bypass input validation by leveraging String.prototype properties to pollute Object.prototype.
Exploitation Scenario:
// Hypothetical vulnerable code pattern
function processInput(userInput) {
// Previous fix checked for direct forbidden keys
if (userInput.hasOwnProperty('__proto__') ||
userInput.hasOwnProperty('constructor') ||
userInput.hasOwnProperty('prototype')) {
return; // Blocked
}
// Vulnerable merge operation
Object.assign(targetObject, userInput);
}
// Bypass using String.prototype manipulation
const maliciousPayload = {
['__proto__']['isAdmin']: true
};
// Or via constructor chain
const payload2 = JSON.parse('{"constructor": {"prototype": {"isAdmin": true}}}');
Exploitation Methods
-
Direct Property Injection
- Inject malicious properties into
Object.prototype - Affect all objects inheriting from the polluted prototype
- Inject malicious properties into
-
Configuration Override
- Modify application configuration values
- Bypass security controls by overriding default safe values
-
Denial of Service
- Pollute prototype with properties causing application crashes
- Trigger infinite loops or resource exhaustion
-
Remote Code Execution Chain
- Combine with template engines (e.g., Handlebars, Pug)
- Exploit command execution functions that check polluted properties
Attack Complexity
- Skill Level Required: Low to Moderate
- Tooling: Standard HTTP clients, JSON manipulation
- Detection Difficulty: Moderate (requires runtime monitoring or static analysis)
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Directly Affected
Product: Locutus
Vendor: locutusjs
Affected Versions: 2.0.12 through 2.0.38 (inclusive)
Fixed Version: 2.0.39+
Dependency Chain Risks
Organizations should assess:
-
Direct Dependencies
- Applications explicitly importing Locutus
- Development and testing environments using the library
-
Transitive Dependencies
- Packages depending on Locutus
- Build tools and educational platforms
-
Environment Scope
- Node.js server-side applications
- Browser-based JavaScript applications
- Educational platforms and coding sandboxes
- Development toolchains
Identification Methods
Package.json Analysis:
# Check for vulnerable versions
npm list locutus
yarn why locutus
# Automated scanning
npm audit
yarn audit
SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) Review:
- Cross-reference component inventories against affected version range
- Utilize dependency scanning tools (Snyk, OWASP Dependency-Check, GitHub Dependabot)
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions (Priority 1)
-
Update to Patched Version
npm update locutus@latest # or yarn upgrade locutus@latest- Target version: 2.0.39 or higher
- Verify update:
npm list locutus
-
Dependency Lock File Updates
- Update
package-lock.jsonoryarn.lock - Commit changes to version control
- Update
-
Emergency Workarounds (if immediate patching is not feasible)
- Implement input validation using Object.freeze()
Object.freeze(Object.prototype); Object.freeze(Object);- Deploy Web Application Firewall (WAF) rules to detect prototype pollution patterns
- Implement Content Security Policy (CSP) restrictions
Short-term Mitigations (Priority 2)
-
Code Review
- Audit all instances where Locutus processes user input
- Review merge operations, object assignments, and recursive functions
- Identify and remediate unsafe patterns
-
Input Sanitization
function sanitizeInput(obj) { const dangerousKeys = ['__proto__', 'constructor', 'prototype']; function clean(o) { for (let key in o) { if (dangerousKeys.includes(key)) { delete o[key]; } else if (typeof o[key] === 'object' && o[key] !== null) { clean(o[key]); } } } clean(obj); return obj; } -
Runtime Protection
- Deploy runtime application self-protection (RASP) solutions
- Implement monitoring for prototype pollution indicators
Long-term Strategies (Priority 3)
-
Dependency Management Policy
- Establish automated dependency scanning in CI/CD pipelines
- Implement Software Composition Analysis (SCA) tools
- Define acceptable risk thresholds for dependencies
-
Security Architecture
- Minimize use of libraries for educational purposes in production
- Implement principle of least privilege for library capabilities
- Consider alternatives with stronger security postures
-
Continuous Monitoring
- Subscribe to security advisories for all dependencies
- Implement automated vulnerability scanning (daily/weekly)
- Establish incident response procedures for supply chain vulnerabilities
Validation and Testing
Post-mitigation validation steps:
// Test for prototype pollution
const testObj = {};
console.log(testObj.isAdmin); // Should be undefined
// Attempt pollution
try {
const malicious = JSON.parse('{"__proto__": {"isAdmin": true}}');
Object.assign({}, malicious);
} catch(e) {
console.log("Protection active");
}
// Verify pollution didn't occur
const newObj = {};
console.log(newObj.isAdmin); // Should still be undefined
5. Impact on European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory Implications
- NIS2 Directive Compliance
- Organizations in essential and